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5Foreword
It is widely agreed that human rights should apply as much online as offline, and that freedom 
of expression and privacy should be no exception. But there are particular complexities in 
the online environment.
This publication explores these issues in the context of UNESCO’s new approach to Internet 
issues. The approach was adopted by our 195 Member States in November 2015, and is 
based on the Outcome Document of an earlier conference called CONNECTing the Dots.
Concretely, this means that UNESCO stands for the concept of “Internet Universality” and 
the related “ROAM principles” which refer to a Human-rights-based, Open and Accessible 
Internet that is governed by Multi-stakeholder participation. 
It is in this context that the current study was commissioned to address very specific rights 
and associated values. 
First is freedom of expression – which entails (a) the right to impart information (seen 
especially in the right to press freedom); (b) the right to seek and receive information (seen 
especially in the right of access to information, or “right to information”).
Second, and linked in part to the right to information, is the value of transparency – which 
means the openness of relevant documents and processes to the public.
Third is the right to privacy – which refers to a protected sphere for development of the 
personality and control of personal information.
Questions immediately arise at the points of intersection of these three issues.
For example, does transparency exist in inevitable tension with the right to privacy?
And: Is privacy an intrinsic obstacle for people’s right to seek and impart information, for 
instance through investigative journalism?
Traditionally, potential tensions between rights have been weighed on a case by case basis in 
terms of international human rights standards. These standards thus allow for the limitation 
of one right in the interests of other rights, as long as this is necessary, proportional, for 
legitimate purpose and set out in law. All this is in order to preserve the basic essence of 
the limited right, and to ensure that limits are exceptional and that freedom for the right is 
the norm. 
In the digital age, the challenge is to see how tensions between rights operate in relation to 
the Internet, and therefore in relation to the ROAM principles.
To illustrate, we are faced with a challenge about issues online like privacy invasion, mass 
surveillance, filtering and blocking. When are these legitimate limits of rights, and when do 
they become violations of the same?
What about considerations of Openness, Accessibility, and Multi-stakeholderism?
6The purpose of the current research was precisely to unpack some of these issues. In 
particular, it probes the complex interplay on the Internet between the right to freedom of 
expression (and information), transparency, and the right to privacy. The research explores 
the boundaries of these rights, and the various modalities of reconciling and aligning them.
The study analyses the legal framework, current mechanisms for balancing rights, and 
specific issues, cases and trends. As revealed by the research, traditional laws and regulations 
for the protection of privacy and freedom of expression often do not deal with digital issues. 
Also covered are the interplay and interactions between multiple players—e.g. the State 
agents, Internet users, ICT companies, civil society organizations, the judiciary and the 
security services. Various policy recommendations are made that address both key issues 
and various stakeholders groups. 
The study serves as a response to specific points in the CONNECTing-the-dots Outcome 
Document. One is option 6.3, which proposes that UNESCO “support Member States as 
requested in the harmonization of relevant domestic laws, policies and practices with 
international human rights law”. The second is 6.4, which envisages: “Support transparency 
and public participation in the development and implementation of policies and practices 
amongst all actors in the information society”.
We hope, therefore, that this research will contribute to the ongoing policy debates in 
our Member States and their societies about Internet freedom, and help to promote free 
expression, privacy and transparency in the global Internet eco-system. 
UNESCO expresses its thanks to the authors of this publication: Prof. Joseph A. Cannataci, 
Dr Bo Zhao, Ms Gemma Torres Vives, Dr Shara Monteleone, Prof. Jeanne Mifsud Bonnici and 
Dr Evgeni Moyakine for having conducted this comprehensive and in-depth assessment. 
UNESCO also thanks those international experts: Mr Danilo Doneda, Mr Lyad Kallas, Mr Pedro 
Less Andrade, Mr Danny O’Brien and Ms Carolina Rossini who have kindly participated in the 
consultation workshop and contributed to the first draft at the 10th Internet Governance 
Forum held in Brazil in 2015. 
Frank La Rue
Assistant Director 
General of UNESCO
7Executive summary
The proliferation of the Internet increasingly facilitates the connection and communication 
between individuals and the rest of the world. It has also been re-organizing aspects of 
human life in an unprecedented manner. The unique characteristics of the technology—
e.g. connectivity, openness, resilience and speed—have propelled the Internet to a dual 
status technology that differs significantly from other interactive communications media 
(like the telephone) and passive recipient communication media (like radio and TV), making 
it both a principal communicating medium and a distinctive and extended life sphere that 
embraces a wide range of human activities and interactions, old or new. Within this context, 
it is often argued that the online virtual world is in some respects no less important than the 
traditional physical and analogical world.
How these in-depth changes have had or continue to have a critical impact on important 
human rights, such as the right to privacy and the right to freedom of expression, is still 
an open question. How these relate to transparency is yet another topic in need of further 
inquiry. One of the potential causes of the lack of definitive or clear answers is the constant 
advance and evolution in digital technology. While the Internet and related Information 
and Communication Technologies (ICTs) have created more opportunities for the extension 
and enhancement of these two fundamental rights, there is little doubt that the Internet 
is also generating more challenges, risks and threats to the same two rights, and to their 
interrelations with the notion of transparency.
In this Report we seek to explore these issues further to provide at least partial answers to 
these open questions. One of our findings in the emerging Internet Eco-system, is the right to 
privacy in an online context which primarily refers to the right of individuals to information/
data privacy, which is subject to increasing threats that come from multiple sources and 
in various forms. For instance, increases in the use of Privacy-Invading Technologies (PITs) 
have contributed to a gradual collapse in the traditional communal boundaries established 
by such constructs as law, morals, communal rules, physical obstacles, technical limits, and 
geographical barriers, contributing to privacy invasions as reported across the globe. Given 
that the new virtual world and the emerging information economy are based on digitized 
data and cannot function without data collection and data processing, we must understand 
that the control of personal information and personal data is a critical element in the digital 
age, if we aspire to values such as the individual’s dignity, autonomy and liberty.
The Internet and the underpinning ICTs have also enabled a wider range of individuals to 
access and share more information globally, and to make greater use of their right to freedom 
of expression. It has also, by enabling a more efficient communication between individuals, 
enlarged the scope of the right to freedom of expression and opinion, often promoting 
transparency as a notion that lies at the core of other public interests. However, the misuse 
of this fundamental right can also contribute to the violation of other rights. Examples 
of such violations can be witnessed all across the globe, in cases of online defamation, 
online harassment and stalking, explicit hate speech, incitement to ethnic, religious or racial 
hatred, and online terrorist activities that threaten public order and security. Thus it is widely 
accepted that there is a global need to respond to the abuse observed in online speech 
so as to achieve a balance with other conflicting fundamental values and public interests.
8One of the main threats to the right to privacy and the right to freedom of expression 
is the mass surveillance conducted by some nations over both foreign citizens and their 
own nationals. Recent spectacular revelations point towards the magnitude to which State 
actors could exploit contemporarily available technologies for multiple purposes, which 
erode the two rights, as well as other principles of the rule of law and democracy. It has also 
become clear that private actors, particularly large companies providing online services 
relating to search engine functionality, social networking and e-commerce, have adopted a 
business model that often depends heavily on the exploitation of personal data in ways that 
are not transparent, or in ways not immediately apparent to the users. Similarly worrying 
is the fast adoption and deployment of new ICTs by a number of States to monitor, censor 
and control political dissent.
An additional aspect to consider is the interplay between the right to privacy and the 
right to freedom of expression (including other corollary rights) in the digital age, when 
the boundaries between the two rights need to be re-defined to accommodate in stances 
of collision. For example: how do we redefine the balance between a public figure’s right 
to privacy and the rights to freedom of expression as exercised by media and journalists? 
Given the rapid evolutions enabled by the Internet, what constitutes a public figure or a 
journalist? How does the notion of transparency link to the interplays between the rights of 
freedom of expression and privacy? 
This Report, approaching the issues described above from an individual citizen’s perspective 
and based upon research findings emerging from multiple sources, also strongly 
recommends that further actions be taken in the following aspects in order to tackle the 
challenges and threats linked to the two critical human rights under discussion. A number 
of concrete recommendations are presented in more detail in Chapter 9. 
This Report follows UNESCO’s new approach to Internet issues, as endorsed in November 
2015 on the occasion of its 38th General Conference. At that meeting, the Organisation’s 
195 Member States adopted the Outcome Document of the UNESCO-convened multi-
stakeholder conference called CONNECTing the Dots. In this document, 38 options for future 
action from UNESCO are set out; as well as the Internet Universality principles (R.O.A.M.), 
which advocate for a Human-rights-based, Open and Accessible Internet, governed by 
Multi-stakeholder participation. 
9CHAPTER 1 Introduction
The Internet has re-shaped human life and human society by providing both a significantly 
novel and influential communication medium, and an extended but distinctive virtual 
sphere that embraces a wide range of human activities. Yet, there is still the pending issue 
of how the Internet and the underpinning Information and Communication Technologies 
(ICTs) are influencing the realization of the human rights of privacy and freedom of 
expression, and the social value of transparency.
In this Report we seek to provide some partial answers to these open questions, by describing 
the ongoing challenges and threats faced by these two critical rights and the social value of 
transparency, and their interplay in the context of the advances in digital technology. The 
research was conducted on the basis of the following two main assumptions: a) since the 
advent of the Internet we have witnessed the development of new Internet eco-systems 
with special characteristics that may require a different legal treatment; and b) one of the 
fundamental issues that results from the novel digital ICTs developed in the past decades is 
the gradual collapse or blending of boundaries in human communities.
The authors of this Report believe that the Internet could now be evolving from a network 
of identical/similar networks, as originally intended by its creators, into something more; i.e. 
a large eco-system composed of smaller eco-systems. From a technical perspective, while 
the communication protocols enabling the Internet—i.e. the Transmission Control Protocol 
(TCP) and the Internet Protocol (IP), normally referred to collectively as ‘TCP/IP’—were 
designed to enable the routing of data packets within and across historically very similar 
and quasi-identical computer networks, we now witness the emergence of new patterns, 
with some of the computer networks that form the Internet differing significantly from other 
such networks, while also leaving room for the continued growth of these divergences. 
Indeed, IPv6 differs significantly from its precedent, IPv4, enabling IPv6-enabled systems to 
form an eco-system that will be significantly distinct from the IPv4-dominated Internet that 
we know today, at least at the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) layer.
From a less technical perspective, it is possible that we are also witnessing the creation of 
different spaces inside the Internet segregated either by existing national boundaries or 
virtual spaces dictated by technical and/or contractual means. In the first case, a country may 
use existing technology to define an Internet space that corresponds with its geographical 
borders using a variety of methods to control inward, outward and intra-border traffic flows. 
Given that such controls may differ from those exerted by other countries, they may, apart 
from creating partially distinct Internet spaces that nonetheless permit inward and outward 
communications from and to other such spaces, enable the existence of different Internet-
based experiences.
On the other hand, local, regional and international organisations may use innovative 
technologies to create separate Internet spaces and rules that would, possibly, be subject 
to separate or specified jurisdictions that may differ from the jurisdiction of the country in 
which the Internet user resides. By using technical means such as, for example, an overlay 
of software,1 such organisations may conceivably create a part of cyberspace using different 
protocols superimposed over the current TCP/IP protocols which could be open to anybody 
1 See, for example, Christian Grothoff, Martin Schanzenbach and Matthias Wachs, “A Censorship-Resistant, 
Privacy-Enhancing and Fully Decentralized Name System”, in Dimitris Gritzalis, Aggelos Kiayias and Ioannis 
Askoxylakis (Eds.), (2014) Cryptology and Network Security, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 8813, Cham: 
Springer International Publishing, available at <http://grothoff.org/christian/gns2014wachs.pdf>.
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in most countries, allowing access to such virtual spaces. Legal means may also be used to 
compel users to observe different defined spaces on the Internet. The rules of behaviour, 
sanctions and governance inside such virtual spaces could differ from those that exist 
outside the spaces, in much the same way that the rules of behaviour in some countries 
could differ from those of others.
No value judgement is being implied here. Countries may choose to adopt a national 
approach. They may choose to adopt or create a virtual space that constitutes a common 
jurisdiction. The key issue is whether on balance, the consequence is on one hand Internet 
Universality with its associated benefits which include various diversities, or on the 
other hand, fragmentations into divided and isolated zones which inhibit the exclusion 
of knowledge societies around the world and the achievement of global sustainable 
development objectives. 
How international human rights standards would apply to a fragmented scenario remains a 
matter for debate, relating to multiple layers of connected networks with numerous sources 
of rules and norms of different cultural and political origins. However, one widespread 
characteristic in this evolving Internet eco-system is the collapsing of boundaries historically 
ingrained in human life due to the rapid advances in digital technology. The nature of 
previous privacy boundaries is influenced by new Privacy Invading Technologies (PITs), 
such as body scanners; speech identification mechanisms; radio frequency identification 
(RFID) chips, which may also be human implantable; Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV); 
smart meters; canvass finger printing; and browser cookies, which are capable of enabling 
the collection of personal data from multiple locations. As pointed out by scholars, even 
the most secured home nowadays cannot protect from privacy invasion, in a variety of 
manners.2 
Within technical and commercial environments that involve functionalities that rely upon 
the collection, storage and/or processing of data, which often present constant threats to 
privacy, it is not difficult to abuse and misuse personal data for purposes not desired and/
or consented to by the relevant data subjects. The principal form of privacy that is breached 
in such contexts is often referred to as ‘information privacy’. This is, in part, because despite 
the dependence of such a world on the collection, storage and processing of all sorts of 
personal data, pre-digital privacy-protection mechanisms do not, in many aspects, transfer 
to the digitized virtual world.
Freedom of expression—including freedom to impart information and freedom to seek and 
receive information—is transitioning to a new era in which everyone who is connected 
to the Internet can, amongst other things: a) express themselves to others at a relatively 
low cost, and b) access information from all connected networks. In the Web 2.0 era, 
the Internet has become a new public sphere and forum that enables the imparting of, 
as well as easy access to, an unprecedented range of information, despite geographical 
boundaries. However, the ability to disseminate information on the Internet, coupled with 
free access to such information, including information on others, can harm other people’s 
privacy, reputation and other rights in unprecedented ways. One telling example can be 
found in the numerous online privacy invasion and defamation actions across the world 
brought to courts by public figures, consequent to the enlarged volume and audience 
of online publication. Therefore, it is also the case that the laws and morals defining the 
2 See, for instance Bert-Jaap Koops, “On Legal Boundaries, Technologies, and Collapsing Dimensions of 
Privacy”, (2014) Politica e Società, No. 2.
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fine boundaries between the scope of the right to freedom of expression regarding others 
and the protection of one’s private life, are undergoing a process of delineation and shift 
in different human communities, while being widely recognised as both an unavoidable 
social reality and an open question. 
What this Report therefore covers are the complexities of both free expression and privacy 
rights and of their inter-relation which may be mutually supportive in some instances and 
characterised by tension in others. Within this context, this Report carries out a discussion 
from the point of view of a global citizen in abstract, seeing beyond political, cultural and 
economic diversities in different human communities. It also attempts to focus on the 
common human online activities and human needs and sensibilities in the digital age, 
at a point in which a large part of human life has already been shifting into the online 
virtual world. In doing so, the Report follows a thematic problem-solution approach, first 
describing the existing problems relating to individual citizens, and subsequently pursuing 
potential solutions under available legal-technical frameworks.
The research findings of this Report are drawn from multiple sources, including United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) previous research on 
online freedom of expression and privacy; reports from international NGOs and human 
rights organizations; commercial reports; a series of EU-funded research projects; scholarly 
works; UN special reports on the two rights; and outputs from multiple international and 
regional conferences regarding Internet governance. However, the Report is not a mere 
description of the status quo in the online world. Rather, it offers overarching reflections on 
the notions of online privacy, online freedom of expression, online transparency, and their 
interplay, with a focus on those aspects that did not exist in the pre-digital era.
We define the Internet as a computer network of connected computer networks, 
including artefacts and constructs at all levels, such as at the hardware level; software-
level protocols and applications such as email, FTP and the Web; and content.3 Privacy is 
a complex term that refers to a variety of notions within and across different cultures and 
communities, ranging from the right to be left alone, to physical solitude, to bodily privacy, 
to information(al) privacy and information self-determination, to shaming, to dignity and 
personality, to appropriation of likeness and name, to secrecy, etc. However, in the online 
world, and therefore also for this Report, the focus is generally on what is widely referred 
to as ‘information privacy’, which is closely related to other dimensions and meanings of 
the generic notion of privacy. Note that while in this Report we use the terms ‘data privacy’ 
and ‘information privacy’ interchangeably, these may sometimes differ from each other in 
concrete contexts.
Regarding freedom of expression (and opinion), we follow the traditional definition 
provided by the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Thus, we 
include freedom of expression and opinion, freedom of information and other corollary 
concepts—such as the notions of access to information and freedom of peaceful assembly—
all of which fit into the online environment. Transparency is defined in this Report as an 
overarching concept and value that is a desired result that emerges from the exercising 
of the right to freedom of expression and information and enables enhanced free flows of 
information and thereby contributes to social goods like better governance, accountability 
and efficiency. These concepts are defined in detail in Chapters 3, 4 and 5.
3 See Footnote one in Jovan Kurbalija, (2014) An Introduction to Internet Governance, Sixth Edition, Msida 
and Geneva: DiploFoundation, available at <http://www.diplomacy.edu/resources/books/introduction-
Internet-governance>.
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The remaining part of this Report is organised as follows. Chapter 2 describes opportunities, 
threats and challenges of/from the Internet to the rights of information privacy and 
freedom of expression, as well as transparency at the individual, national and international 
levels. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 illustrate the related conceptions in law and outline the legal 
and alternative protection mechanisms linked to the three at the international, regional 
and national levels, explaining general legitimate limitations and restrictions. Chapter  6 
explains aspects of the interplays between privacy, freedom of expression and transparency 
in different contexts, illustrating their mutual-independence and potential conflicts in daily 
life realities. It also describes how the two rights and the value of transparency have been 
balanced in some legal systems and the important and well-recognized international 
human rights standards to reach a reconciled relationship.
Chapter 7 then goes on to discuss what may be missing in the present rights protection 
mechanisms. It illustrates the increasing risks and threats to these rights due to the fast 
advances of new digital technologies and the increasing use of multiple portable devices 
in daily life. In particular, it debates the balancing of the rights to freedom of expression and 
privacy in three concrete circumstances: the Google Spain case, the privacy protection of 
public figures, and anti-terrorism legislation. Chapter 8 offers a brief review of the policies 
across the world in bridging the aforementioned gaps in these major aspects. Finally, the 
Report is concluded by Chapter 9, in which concrete policy recommendations are provided 
to improve the protection of individual information privacy and freedom of expression, as 
well as transparency in the digital age.
The present research was commissioned as part of the elaboration of UNESCO’s Internet 
Universality framework, and particularly how to balance Rights against each other and in 
the light of Openness, Accessibility and Multi-stakeholder Participation, as per the RO.A.M, 
model. Specifically, it further responds to the options recommended by the CONNECTing 
the Dots Outcome Document that UNESCO “support Member States as requested in the 
harmonization of relevant domestic laws, policies and practices with international human 
rights law” and also “Support transparency and public participation in the development 
and implementation of policies and practices amongst all actors in the information society”.
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CHAPTER 2  The opportunities and threats from the Internet 
Technology advances have responded to existing opportunities and created new 
opportunities, vastly expanding human capacities through increases in the volume of data, 
information, communication and knowledge, as well as through increases in the speed of 
the transfer of data, leading to human progress and enormous benefits. We should not lose 
sight of these opportunities and benefits, by overemphasizing the challenges and threats 
brought about by the same changes. Thus, the rational approach to the risk posed by the 
new technologies would involve careful consideration of both aspects of the coin. Such 
approach would aim to avoid, eliminate, mitigate or transfer the risks and enhance and 
expand the range of benefits, thus solving existing issues, devising conscious trade-offs 
and shaping the whole in the interest of humanity at large. Within this context, this Chapter 
assesses the issues as they impact on privacy, freedom of expression and transparency.
2.1  The death of privacy in the digital age? 
The “death of privacy” in the 21st century was first predicted 15 years ago, inspired by 
accelerations in the development of technology.4 Though the claim seems a bit exaggerated, 
the reasons underlying the conclusion drawn at that moment in time are still valid today 
in their capturing of the wide-ranging and frightening threats to individual privacy.5 Most 
threats foreseen by the technical community have not failed the prediction. Rather, their 
presence has intensified by more advanced and unpredicted technologies. Similarly, the 
predominating threats to individual privacy in the past decade have gradually shifted from 
the offline, physical world to an online, virtual world, and the centre of privacy protection 
has accordingly moved from physical to informational privacy,6 in the context of digitization 
and connectivity. Such threats to privacy, like the corresponding benefits, can be witnessed 
at different levels, including the individual, societal, national, and international levels.
At individual level
Information about normal daily events and human activities, whether we are travelling, 
buying, walking, sitting, sleeping, reading or talking, is increasingly captured and stored in 
digital form for later access and analysis. Indeed, we are witnessing drastic increases in the 
number and use of all sorts of sensing devices that contribute to the systematic monitoring 
of human living spaces, both public and private, including CCTV and video cameras, 
microphones, thermal sensors, surveillance satellites, drones, smart electricity meters, 
smart TVs, wearable devices and built-in RFID chips. Similarly, we witness the proliferation 
of biometric technologies including those involving the collection, storage and processing 
of genetic sequence data, and of the data involved in fingerprint-, facial-, iris-, speech- and 
gait-recognition used for the identification of human beings for different purposes.
4 See among others Simson Garfinkel, (2001) Database Nation: The Death of Privacy in the 21st Century, 
Sebastopol: O’Reilly Media.
5 Ibid., pp. 10-12.
6 Physical privacy refers to the restricted access of others to our bodies, relationships and living spaces. 
See Keith Bauer, “Healthcare Ethics in the Information Age”, in Rocci Luppicini and Rebecca Adell, (2008) 
Handbook of Research on Technoethics, Hershey: Information Science Reference an imprint of IGI Global, 
p. 179. Information privacy refers to “the handling of ‘personal information’, that is, information about a 
particular person or information that can be used to identify a particular person”. See Australian Privacy 
Commissioner, “What Is Information Privacy and Why Do We Need to Protect It?”, August 1997, available at 
<http://www2.austlii.edu.au/itlaw/national_scheme/national-PART.html>. Information privacy and other 
related conceptions will be discussed further in Chapter 3. 
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On the one hand, the data-ization of life can protect aspects of private lives, such as religious, 
political and sexual orientation, which formerly could only be expressed in a relatively public 
manner and which individuals often had to suppress. On the other hand, it may enable 
new intrusions and exposures. For example, it would appear from the widespread on-going 
debates that the human community, as a whole, still lacks the wisdom or ability to handle 
data fairly and justly, especially in terms of what should or should not be generated, stored 
and used. As a result, such data is often subject to intentional or accidental information 
security breaches and can subsequently be accessed and interpreted by anyone capable 
of doing so, while at times also rendered available to others, including the general 
public. The effects of such breaches may also be exacerbated by rapid advances in data 
processing technologies, including in those enabling automatic and big data processing. 
As an additional example, information privacy breaches may contribute to physical privacy 
breaches—which refers to the unwanted access to human bodies and living spaces—
such as when burglars are equipped with hacked personal data revealing the absence of 
occupants of a premise and/or the layout of the space and its infrastructure.
In the digital age, individuals become increasingly vulnerable to privacy invasions as they 
depend more on the use of the Internet to carry out their daily activities and thus they 
disclose more of their personal data to others. The risk comes from both the fact that personal 
data becomes progressively digitized and as a result of it being stored in several devices and 
locations. For instance, the personal data stored in a smartphone contains, in the eyes of 
the U.S.A. Supreme Court ‘…a broad array of private information never found in a home in any 
form—unless the phone is [there]…’ The Supreme Court goes on to state that smartphones 
are ‘…in fact minicomputers that also happen to have the capacity to be used as a telephone…’ 
and that such computer systems ‘…can be called cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, 
tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers…’.7 
Mounting online threats include hacking, identity theft, fraud, phishing, pharming, spoofing, 
profiling, spyware, tracking cookies, online witch hunting, bullying and stalking, which may 
involve a wide range of actions, including the unwanted disclosure of a user’s personal 
information (sometimes known as “doxing”). This can be achieved either through the 
subject’s intentional or unintentional online activities and/or through others’ uploading of 
the subject’s digital information acquired offline—such as video images or sound tracks—in 
the absence of the subject’s consent and/or outside the data subject’s immediate control. 
Such privacy-invading actions can cause data subjects a wide variety of damages, including 
the prompting of suicidal thoughts or actions due to the victim’s loss of critical elements 
of human life, such as safety, personal identity, autonomy and dignity. These examples are 
evidence of how traditional boundaries between the public and the private, between the 
physical and the virtual, and between the past and the present are collapsing.
The challenges for ordinary individuals lie, mainly, in the technical complexity of online 
privacy breaches, which might only be well understood by a small group of well-educated 
elites, insofar as PITs are far beyond daily common knowledge. The popular ‘I have nothing 
to hide’ attitude often adopted by the users is another important factor contributing to 
weakened privacy8. Such an attitude reflects the increasing danger to personal data and the 
increasing value of privacy to personal development as an un-alienated human right, thus 
7 United States Supreme Court, Riley v. California 573 U.S. (2014), paras. 21 and 17, available at <https://
supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/573/13-132/>, accessed 17 May 2015
8 See in general Daniel J. Solove, (2011) Nothing to Hide: The False Tradeoff between Privacy and Security, New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press.
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extending until the moment that an individual confronts tangible immediate monetary 
harms such as e-theft or data destruction. Another common factor contributing to the 
erosion of privacy, is the privacy-for-service exchange practice widely adopted amongst 
Internet users, who tend to trade privacy for service partially because they feel incapable 
of controlling their personal information online.9 Ironically, while many Internet users are 
increasingly aware of the significance of their right to information privacy in online contexts, 
they are not willing to take action even after experiencing information security breaches.10
Individuals can also be privacy invaders when they master new ICTs to collect information 
from the Internet or to gain illegal access to private information. This can occur by using 
malware, spyware, as well as needlecams, smartphone apps, and other hacking devices and 
techniques. 
As individuals replace traditional photo cameras with multipurpose electronic devices such 
as smartphones and tablets to record aspects of both their life and others’, it has become 
increasingly possible to rapidly upload the images taken through such devices to online 
locations, such as Social Networking Services (SNS), and to share them with other known 
or unknown parties. This often happens without first requesting or obtaining the implicit or 
explicit consent of the parties involved as data subjects.
The rapid decline in the costs of new technologies enables individuals equipped with fairly 
cheap digital devices to pose a growing threat to other people’s privacy. For example, the 
increasing affordability of CCTV systems has enabled the installation of such systems in an 
increasing number of private homes, serving safety and security purposes, but also enabling 
the invasion of multiple parties’ legitimate privacy interests.11 Similarly, the increasing 
affordability and popularity of the private use of unmanned aircraft systems, or drones, 
may enable the breach of several parties’ physical and information privacy, such as by the 
collection of audio-visual data during fly-passes over others’ properties.12 Another form of 
privacy invasion is the unauthorized appropriation of likeness of individuals, or expression 
of consumer preference to friends for commercial benefits through public exposure of such 
content.
As Zittrain noted in 2008, the Internet “enables individuals in many cases to compromise 
privacy more thoroughly than government and commercial institutions traditionally 
targeted for scrutiny and regulation”.13 
The consequences of privacy invasions in the digital age can be serious and have no 
sufficient remedy. Some of these may include mental distress and emotional loss (e.g. due 
to online stalking and bullying), financial loss (e.g. resulting from instances of identity theft 
and fraud14), as well as twisted interpersonal relationships, and trust and intimacy issues. 
9 This is reflected in the most recent Ponemon research report on privacy and security among European, 
U.S. and Japanese consumers. Ponemon Institute LLC, Privacy and Security in a Connected Life: A Study of US, 
European and Japanese Consumers, Research Report, March 2015, available at <http://www.trendmicro.
com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/reports/rt_privacy_and_security_in_a_connected_life.
pdf>.
10 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
11 ECJ, Case C-212/13 František Ryneš v Úřad pro ochranu osobních údajů, Judgment, 11 December 2014.
12 For the capacity of drones for privacy threats, see Jonathan Olivito, “Beyond the Fourth Amendment: 
Limiting Drone Surveillance through the Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy”, (2013) Ohio State 
Law Journal, Vol. 74, No. 4, pp. 673-678.
13 Jonathan L. Zittrain, (2008) The Future of the Internet--And How to Stop It,, New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, p. 200.
14 Though one must also be careful to nuance privacy from security in many such instances
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Additionally, since the extraction of partial information from the whole picture about an 
individual may dominate an audience’s overall image about the individual, whether such 
information would be disclosed online or offline, privacy invasions that lead to partial 
disclosures may cause inappropriate judgements regarding the individual. This could 
potentially lead to the transformation of individuals from ‘subjects’ to ‘objects with shame’.15
On many occasions privacy invasions are conducted sporadically by private individuals, 
for individual purposes such as personal revenge or economic benefit. In contrast, large-
scale invasions of privacy, widely acknowledged at a global level, are conducted by private 
corporations and States. The latter type of privacy breaches—which is considered further in 
the remaining part of this section—also differs from the former insofar as it relates more to 
the collective than to the individual, adopts an institutional nature, and as a result is likely to 
trigger more negative consequences.
At corporate level 
Private business corporations may nowadays risk becoming a major source of privacy 
invasion, in many ways and for various reasons. Firstly, private ICT companies can misuse 
personal data that they collect in their daily business for economic benefits, exploiting the 
increasing value of data as a currency of the information economy.16 Secondly, the collection 
and processing of personal data are now key to some companies’ business models, to the 
point that some models involve the collection of private information either as a core part of 
the business or as a means to enhance efficiency, convenience and quality of service.17 It has 
been alleged by some that, in the age of Big Data, privacy erosion is in a sense the business 
model.18 Thirdly, traditional business enterprises and other entities often do not implement 
adequate controls to protect their consumers’ personal data from external threats—e.g. 
as emerging from external hackers—and internal vulnerabilities—e.g. as emerging from 
internal employees—especially when lacking necessary technical and financial means to 
safeguard customers’ personal data. As a result, information security breaches are reported 
on a regular basis in relation to customer and citizen data held by corporations and States. For 
example, Shopacheck, a loan firm in the UK, lost sensitive financial information pertaining to 
1.4 million customers after two back-up tapes went missing in 2012.19 Fourthly, commercial 
entities holding personal data may invade the data subjects’ privacy by the unauthorised 
sale of the data to other companies or actors. In relation to this, even if the data subjects 
would have authorised such sales, few proper legal safeguards—e.g. a legal requirement 
for the anonymization of data—may be provided as well as enforced, and this increases the 
danger of potential data privacy invasion.
15 Jeffrey Rosen, (2001) The Unwanted Gaze: The Destruction of Privacy in America, New York: Vintage Books 
USA, p. 115.
16 “Personal data is the currency of today’s digital market”. See Viviane Reding, “The EU Data Protection Reform 
2012: Making Europe the Standard Setter for Modern Data Protection Rules in the Digital Age”, Speech, 22 
January 2012, available at <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-26_nl.htm>.
17 Toby Mendel et al., (2012) Global Survey on Internet Privacy and Freedom of Expression, UNESCO Series on 
Internet Freedom, Paris: UNESCO, p. 98, available at <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-
and-information/resources/publications-and-communication-materials/publications/full-list/global-
survey-on-Internet-privacy-and-freedom-of-expression/>.
18 Molly Wood, “In the World of Big Data, Privacy Invasion Is the Business Model,” CNET, 29 February 2012, 
available at <http://www.cnet.com/news/in-the-world-of-big-data-privacy-invasion-is-the-business-
model/>, accessed 7 April 2015.
19 Clinton Manning, “Shopacheck Loses Data on 1.4 Million Customers”, Mirror, available at <http://www.
mirror.co.uk/money/city-news/shopacheck-loses-data-on-14-million-157430>, accessed 17 May 2015.
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In these contexts, many privacy invasions occur when personal data are processed 
automatically without sufficient human intervention, potentially enabling data-profiling-
based discriminatory treatment of the data subjects, in many cases without the subject’s 
knowledge. Another example of information privacy invasion, with similarly serious 
consequences, is the misuse of medical records and data, leading to unfair treatment of 
patients and additional data breaches, especially when Binding Corporate Rules (BCRs) are 
used and data anonymity and pseudonymity do not provide sufficient anonymization due 
to increasing capabilities to de-anonymise data based on available information.20 
Another example of potential invasion of privacy is the arbitrary cooperation of private 
companies with intelligence services across the globe, providing to the latter systematic 
access to large databases that contain personal data. In 2013 the UN Special Rapporteur 
for Freedom of Expression and Opinion criticized the compliance by companies with 
State requirements in the design of digital networks and communications infrastructures. 
Specifically, he criticized those that enable, support or do not counter illegitimate intrusions 
by State, developing and deploying new technologies and communications tools in 
specific ways and being complicit in developing technologies that enable mass or invasive 
surveillance in contravention of existing human rights standards.21 
At State level
Notable privacy invasions are conducted either by Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) or 
by intelligence services in the name of national security and public order. In the digital 
age, State authorities across the globe have been equipped with the most recent IT 
technologies, enabling them to monitor and conduct surveillance over individual citizens in 
an unprecedented manner.22 Such activities involve the use of a combination of techniques, 
such as data profiling, CCTV systems, malware, and all types of installed sensors, biometrics, 
data automatics, and big data analytics. Privacy can be legitimately limited for national 
security reasons but only when the criteria of legality, necessity and proportionality are 
fulfilled, as prescribed by the standards of the ICCPR. Unfortunately, in many cases these 
conditions are not met.
Furthermore, in the context of the expanding adoption of e-governance, State authorities 
may be one of the biggest data hosts and controllers, handling large amounts of personal 
data. However, such data are not always sufficiently secured against invasion. Additionally, 
the fact that States may have unfiltered authority to access all sorts of personal data places 
individual citizens in a very vulnerable position if, for instance, appropriate legal mechanisms 
are not implemented to protect citizens in the case of data profiling. Threats to citizens’ 
privacy and dignity also come from the shift of governance from human interference 
to another model based more on data automation and computing aimed at improving 
20 See in general “Data Protection in the EU: The Certainty of Uncertainty”, The Guardian, 5 June 2013, available 
at <http://www.theguardian.com/technology/blog/2013/jun/05/data-protection-eu-anonymous>, 
accessed 30 March 2015. Also see Paul Ohm, “Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising 
Failure of Anonymization», (2010) UCLA Law Review, Vol. 57, p. 1701.
21 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank 
La Rue, 17 April 2013, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/40, pp. 19-20, available at <http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/
dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/23/40>.
22 See, for example, the report of such activities carried by GCHQ in the UK. Privacy International, “Privacy 
International Challenges GCHQ’s Unlawful Hacking of Computers, Mobile Phones”, 13 May 2014, available 
at <https://www.privacyinternational.org/?q=node/471>, accessed 30 May 2015.
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governance efficiency. One of the problems is the predictive privacy harm. The threat is that 
without consent or even without knowing what is happening back stage, individuals are 
treated differently by State authority based on data profiling and behavioural assessment. 23
In some cases, there is also a problem rooted in the collapse of the previously established 
boundaries between intelligence services and law enforcement activities, as there 
are insufficient legal baselines for how different functions relate to limits or privacy 
intrusions. As a result, particularly after the 9/11 attacks in the USA, urgent anti-terrorism 
needs are successfully employed as arguments to justify massive interceptions of private 
communications and online activities. Yet, mass surveillance is not only a big threat to 
the privacy and dignity of ordinary individuals,24 but it can also become, in the long run, 
a potential source of weakness for State authorities themselves by diminishing trust and 
credibility.
Another issue to be considered is the inequality between local and foreign data subjects 
in a particular state. For instance, foreign data subjects are less protected by the USA’s 
law than by the European data protection law which provides equal information privacy 
protection for local and foreign citizens. In the digital age, in which personal data can be 
collected, stored and processed anywhere, mostly across borders, protecting information 
privacy in cross-border data processing is a major challenge. This is of particular importance 
in view of the escalating conflicts of jurisdiction and laws, and in view of the few legal 
remedies available for data privacy invasion on foreign territory. Although right now this 
concerns mostly citizens of developed countries, it will become a major legal problem for 
the international society to tackle. 
At the international level
Due to the openness and connectivity of the Internet, some threats to individual privacy 
emerge from cross-nation online privacy breaches and invasions orchestrated by cyber 
criminals, such as cross-border online frauds, phishing, stalking and harassment, as regularly 
reported for causing a wide range of losses, including individual monetary losses and the 
loss of human lives.25
The picture becomes even more complicated when national interests are involved, whether 
these are of a military, political or economic nature. In addition to conflicts of laws and 
jurisdictions relating to the increasing cross-border data transfers, significant challenges 
emerge from the widespread practices of State espionage and large scale data breaches 
that are supposedly conducted by national States enjoying technology advantages. For 
example, the breach of Sony Pictures Entertainment entailed the online publication of 
documents containing personal information about Sony’s employees.26 Another example 
is the unauthorised access of around 80 million records stored at Anthem Inc., the second 
23 See in general Kate Crawford and Jason Schultz, “Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress 
Predictive Privacy Harms”, (2014) Boston College Law Review, Vol. 55, No. 1, p. 93.
24 In the sense that it violates the moral-legal principle of presumption of innocence. See Jonida Milaj and 
Jeanne P. Mifsud Bonnici, “Unwitting Subjects of Surveillance and the Presumption of Innocence”, (2014) 
Computer Law & Security Review, Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 419-428.
25 See “Man Charged in Netherlands in Amanda Todd Suicide Case”, BBC News, accessed 8 May 2015, available 
at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27076991>.
26 Kim Zetter, “Sony Got Hacked Hard: What We Know and Don’t Know So Far”, WIRED, 3 December 2014, 
available at <http://www.wired.com/2014/12/sony-hack-what-we-know/>.
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largest US health insurer.27 In this context, privacy protection is related to data security 
which falls within the public security responsibilities of the State, but there are complexities 
when the breached infrastructure is private rather than public.
2.2  Freedom of expression online: enlarged but endangered
Freedom of expression has been widely recognized both as a fundamental human right 
and as a pre-condition for open and democratic societies.28 It is also well-accepted that the 
exercising of this right has changed and improved in many ways over the past decades, 
especially by the connection of so many individuals to an online space, characterized 
by unprecedented openness, decentralization, connectivity and equality. Nowadays, 
individual citizens with basic access to the Internet and minimum knowledge of their IT 
devices and the software/apps running on such devices, can transform themselves from 
passive readers to online content generators, thus gaining more speech power than ever 
before.29 These online activities enable people not only to seamlessly express themselves 
and communicate with others, but also to instantly reach huge audiences.
Freedom of expression is enlarged in the digital age not only by extending its access 
dimension, but also by enabling innovative ways to communicate and diffuse information. 
The online dissemination of information and opinions bears fewer limitations relating to 
space or geographical boundaries, no limitations relating to time or formats, and generates 
participant roles characterized by interactivity30.
Multiple online communication instruments and channels have also facilitated online 
assembly and association activities. Nowadays, anyone having access to the Internet can 
associate or assemble with others in cyberspace, oftentimes more easily than is possible 
physically. This functionality enables the achievement of common goals and the attraction 
of public attention, including via online video chats, online meetings, and SNS-based social 
groups. Indeed, as showcased during the political transformations and unrest in parts of 
the Arab world , the right to ‘free assembly and association’—as the cross-pollinating sister 
of the right to freedom of expression, including in online contexts—plays an important 
contributing role in the democratisation process.31 The same right is also considered ‘…
essential for people’s participation in the public debate and their exercise of democratic 
citizenship…’.32
SNSs can play a particularly important role in virtual assembly and association, enabling 
individuals to both accentuate their voice and mobilize others. This right has been 
emphasized as one of the Internet Governance principles at NETmundial, the Global 
Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance at Sao Paulo, Brazil in 2014: 
‘…Everyone has the right to peaceful assembly and association online, including through social 
27 Karen Freifeld, “U.S. States Probe Massive Data Breach at Health Insurer Anthem”, Reuters, 6 February 
2015, available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/06/us-anthem-cybersecurity-probe-
idUSKBN0L92NP20150206>.
28 UNESCO, Internet, Privacy and Freedom of Expression, p. 10. 
29 See Hans-Juergen Bucher, “The Power Of The Audience: Interculturality, Interactivity and Trust in Internet 
Communication: Research Design and Empirical Results”, (2005) The Electronic Journal of Communication, 
Vol. 15, Nos. 1-2, available at <http://www.cios.org/EJCPUBLIC/015/1/01511.HTML>..
30 For the previous four lack of limitations, see Ibid., pp. 6-8.
31 Wolfgang Benedek and Matthias C. Kettemann, (2014) Freedom of Expression and the Internet, Council of 
Europe, p. 38.
32 David J. Harris et al., (2009) Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, Second Edition, 2009, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, Notes 17 and 1. 
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networks and platforms…’ 33 Nonetheless, the notion of freedom of expression, though 
enlarged and complemented by the Internet, has also encountered new risks. The blurring 
of the traditional socio-legal boundaries, as in regard to privacy, leads to challenges to both 
other human rights and freedom of expression itself in the evolving Internet eco-system.34 
For instance, the misuse of the right to freedom of expression in online contexts can cause 
considerable damage to other individuals’ rights, such as those to privacy, reputation and 
dignity and other public interests, such as public security and public order. As an example, 
terrorist and religious extremist groups have been using such SNSs as Facebook and Twitter 
to advocate ideologies, recruit new believers and mobilize activities that have caused 
substantial harm.35 Similarly, hate speech, gender and racial discrimination speech, and 
Holocaust denial expressions may offend widely-held public values and potentially incite 
violence, discrimination and hostility. Likewise, freedom of speech online can be abused if 
sensitive personal information is disclosed without the subject’s consent or in the absence 
of a public interest-based justification. This can lead to invasions of individual privacy, and 
the compromise of the subject’s dignity, autonomy, reputation and social relationships.
Some well-known, albeit extreme instances of such abuses of the right to freedom of 
speech in online contexts, involve criminal activities like online stalking and witch-hunting, 
which have at times been serious enough to contribute to, or even cause, the loss of human 
lives. Other instances of such abuses of the right to freedom of expression online could 
encourage the circulation of rumours and false information, leading to the polarization of 
individuals and groups,36 which in recent years may have contributed to the compromise of 
trust amongst Internet users, and of the Internet itself.37 While such problems are not alien 
to the pre-digital age, they have indeed multiplied and amplified in the digital world.38
Access to information is also a complex issue. As the Internet becomes a world forum 
involving all its users, and a world archive that stores each piece of information uploaded, 
powered by increasing decentralization and technology developments in data storage, it 
poses new and special risks and challenges.39 For instance, a challenge to human society 
relates to the notions of ‘data persistence’ and ‘data retention’ – the idea that the Internet 
never forgets.40 While a human being has a moral right to grow and develop by learning 
from past mistakes, and therefore deserves a second chance to start over from the past, 
the Internet provides a social environment that may inhibit or deny such a chance. Indeed, 
33 NETmundial, “NETmundial Multistakeholder Statement”, 24 April 2014, p. 3, available at <http://netmundial.
br/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NETmundial-Multistakeholder-Document.pdf>.
34 See introduction and discussion of the new eco-system in Chapter 1. 
35 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), The Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes, Report, 
September 2012, Vienna: United Nations, available at <https://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/
Use_of_Internet_for_Terrorist_Purposes.pdf>..
36 See in general Cass R. Sunstein, (2009) On Rumors: How Falsehoods Spread, Why We Believe Them, What Can 
Be Done, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
37 See a discussion by Bucher in Hans-Juergen Bucher, “The Power of The Audience: Interculturality, 
Interactivity and Trust in Internet Communication: Research Design and Empirical Results”, (2005) 
The Electronic Journal of Communication, Vol. 15, Nos. 1-2, available at <http://www.cios.org/
EJCPUBLIC/015/1/01511.HTML>.
38 UNESCO, Keystones to Foster Inclusive Knowledge Societies: Access to Information and Knowledge, 
Freedom of Expression, Privacy, and Ethics on a Global Internet, Report, 2015, Paris: UNESCO, p. 36, available 
at <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002325/232563E.pdf>. 
39 In view of the copy-and-paste works done by individual Internet users and the bulk of data collected 
automatically online by web crawlers by different digital institutions including for example Google and the 
Internet Archive. 
40 See in general Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, (2011) Delete: The Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital Age, New York: 
Princeton University Press.
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digital footprints—i.e. the traces or «footprints» that people leave online over time—may 
lead or encourage spectators to blend a person’s past with the present, missing out on 
substantial changes and discontinuities41, pass ill judgement about the subject, and/or stifle 
individual development. This is the stated reason why the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
has decided in the Google Spain case to limit access to the litigant’s past information on the 
Internet.42 Nonetheless, the scope of “the right to be forgotten” is debatable.43
A no less important issue regarding freedom of expression in online contexts, with a specific 
focus on political expression, is what is widely referred to as the ‘digital divide’. Generally 
speaking, people of higher social-economic status can represent themselves with the 
power of digital means, and as a result often gain more support from others who would 
share similar opinions. Weak opportunities for accessing digital means will hinder a certain 
part of human community from accessing information, and from expressing their voices 
and ideas to others. On similar lines, digital illiteracy—which refers to a person’s inability to 
perform tasks effectively in a digital environment—renders it impossible for many global 
citizens, especially those coming from developing countries, to take up the opportunities 
presented by the Internet to more effectively participate in politics and public issues.
In some communities the problem with the digital divide has been taken to another level, 
which is characterized by differentiated Internet use.44 For instance, empirical research 
has shown that in the Netherlands, some people use the Internet to gain access to more 
information than others who seem to engage more in social interaction and gaming, which 
are both very time-consuming activities.45 It is also well known that digital divides have 
significant impacts on political inclusion, political knowledge, political participation and 
democratic institutions,46 and digital inequality may matter even more than its analogue 
counterpart.47
Furthermore, nowadays the Internet has gradually become a major stage of freedom of 
expression in modern life, if not the one with the largest reach. At the same time, digital 
technologies have enabled political States to exert systematic control over online freedom 
of expression via various technical means, the most common being Internet access 
restrictions, systematic online censorship, surveillance and filtering. To achieve this, different 
technologies are employed such as Deep Packet Inspection (DPIs), and the blocking of 
services in various forms including at the network protocol level and alternatives to filtering. 
The tools used range from denial of service (DoS) attacks, the restriction of access to 
Internet domains, the selection and removal of search results, through to the taking down 
41 Anita Allen, (2011) Unpopular Privacy: What Must We Hide?, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 164.
42 ECJ, Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja 
González, Judgment, 13 May 2014.
43 For instance, the implementation of the verdict to domain “.com” by Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on the Implementation of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union Judgment on «Google Spain and Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos(AEPD)and Mario Costeja González” C-131/12, 26 November 2014, available at <http://ec.europa.eu/
justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2014/wp225_en.pdf>.
44 Lu Wei and Douglas Blanks Hindman, “Does the Digital Divide Matter More? Comparing the Effects of 
New Media and Old Media Use on the Education-Based Knowledge Gap”, (2011) Mass Communication and 
Society, Vol. 14, No. 2, p. 219.
45 Alexander J.A.M. van Deursen and Jan A.G.M. van Dijk, “The Digital Divide Shifts to Differences in Usage”, 
(2014) New Media & Society, Vol. 16, No. 3, p. 219.
46 Ibid., p. 230.
47 Lu Wei and Douglas Blanks Hindman, “Does the Digital Divide Matter More? Comparing the Effects of 
New Media and Old Media Use on the Education-Based Knowledge Gap”, (2011) Mass Communication and 
Society, Vol. 14, No. 2, p. 229.
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of websites.48 Additionally, with new technical means such as those enabling ‘user targeting’ 
and ‘data profiling’, it is increasingly easy for States to exert control over the exercising of the 
right to freedom of expression; e.g. subsequent to the analysis of collected personal data, 
authorities may be able to locate human rights activists and limit their activities.49
It is not easy to describe or decide how certain kinds of online activities may or should 
influence the nature or exercising of the rights to freedom of expression and association 
online. For instance, in many democracies journalists and news reporters traditionally enjoy 
special legal protection relating to freedom of expression, as the fourth estate. Nowadays, 
given the continuous diminishing of the differences between traditional professional 
reporters/journalists and ordinary online informants—e.g. Internet users (or ‘Netizens’) who 
generate content by reporting live news and events, or social media producers—whether 
such special protection should be shared with ordinary informants on a content base is 
unclear and deserves further consideration of law. 50 Likewise, given that online expressions 
often reach far beyond national borders, it is not clear to what extent certain sorts of 
expressions that are totally legal and tolerable in one community—e.g. blasphemous 
speech, religious or anti-religious speech,51 and posthumous defamatory speech52—are 
legally, religiously and politically acceptable in other communities and States. Also, it is 
sometimes debated whether Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are a new form of 
freedom of expression;53 e.g. if such DDOSs are conducted by ‘hacktivists’, or performed or 
supported by national States for political or military purposes.
In summary, the fact that the Internet has turned into a critical, principal communications 
medium and is a means to re-construct modern human life is clearly something that 
has enhanced freedom of expression. However, this has also extended or increased the 
old problems of abusing the right to freedom of expression, as well as created new risks 
and dangers to it. There is also the overarching challenge to balance online freedom of 
expression with other human rights and public interests in a much diversified world.54
2.3  Transparency and access to information: more challenges 
Transparency and accountability lie at the core of good governance in relation to both 
modern States and private corporations. They are also central to the development of 
48 William H. Dutton et al., Freedom of Connection, Freedom of Expression: The Changing Legal and Regulatory 
Ecology Shaping the Internet, UNESCO Series on Internet Freedom, Report, 2011, Paris: UNESCO, pp. 34-40, 
available at <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-and-information/resources/publications-
and-communication-materials/publications/full-list/freedom-of-connection-freedom-of-expression-the-
changing-legal-and-regulatory-ecology-shaping-the-Internet/>.
49 For instance, in the recent case ECtHR, Shimovolos v. Russia, Judgment, 21 June 2011, Application No. 
30194/09.
50 For instance, some argue to extend the definition of journalists to social media producers. See UNESCO, 
Keystones to Foster Inclusive Knowledge Societies: Access to Information and Knowledge, Freedom of 
Expression, Privacy, and Ethics on a Global Internet, Report, 2015, Paris: UNESCO, p. 40, available at <http://
unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002325/232563E.pdf>.
51 Such as anti-Islamism speech.
52 Bo Zhao, “Legal Cases on Posthumous Reputation and Posthumous Privacy: History Censorship, Law, 
Politics and Culture”, (2014) Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 42, No. 1. 
53 Jay Leiderman, “Justice for the PayPal WikiLeaks Protesters: Why DDoS Is Free Speech”, The Guardian, 22 
January 2013, sec. Comment is free, available at <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/
jan/22/paypal-wikileaks-protesters-ddos-free-speech>.
54 The problem of balancing different rights and public interests in particular between online privacy and 
freedom of expression will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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modern democracies.55 Chapter 5 elaborates on the meaning of transparency—considered 
as a social value—and its links to the right to information. It suffices at this point to say that 
transparency influences the free flow of information and in brief refers, primarily, to both the 
availability and accessibility of information from a passive attribute and the efforts to make 
information easily usable from a positive perspective,56 whether such information is held by 
public bodies or the private sector.
The challenges to such transparency in the digital age can be grouped in two categories. 
First, there is the general need for access to, and data transparency of, public information 
held by government authorities and private companies, if private individuals are concerned 
or public interests are involved. Second, there is the special need for transparency of, and 
access to, information regarding freedom of expression, privacy and data protection in the 
private sector, public sector and government bodies.
The Internet has created new options for transparency at the global level regarding the 
information held by government bodies, the public sector and the private sector.57 
Certainly, more transparency helps to improve the accountability of political States on the 
international stage with respect to the protection of human rights and public interests. 
Greater transparency can also contribute to peace and international security by reducing 
uncertainty, decrease conflicts by increasing mutual understanding between individuals 
and groups of individuals, decentralize global power by breaking government monopoly 
over information, and empower NGOs, civil society and individuals to be active in improving 
democracy, social justice, freedom and good governance.58 
However, greater transparency can also generate more risks and challenges. For example, 
more information and transparency may lead to conflicts of values around activities 
regarded as immoral in some communities and encourage the victimization of out-
groups. Similarly, greater transparency does not necessarily lead to good governance and 
democracy,59 particularly if it does not empower those at the bottom of the power pyramid. 
Also, unrestricted online disclosures of critical information can cause dangers to particular 
communities and minorities. Thus, it is clear that the use of new ICT technologies to enable 
greater transparency, especially at global level, gives rise to delicate and complex issues 
and challenges – in particular, in striking the right balance between the interests of the 
whole and of particular communities, between individuals and collectives and between 
short- and long-term interests. In view of this, it is also clear that whilst the positive aspects 
of transparency must be recognised and advocated, there needs to be debate about the 
extent to which government-held data—in particular classified data—can be disclosed 
online, and with what exceptions. Such debate should take cognisance not only of national 
laws and mores of a particular society or power elite, but also their interpretations under 
international law, in particular international human rights laws and principles.
At the national level, there have been increasing calls for data transparency in relation 
to governmental operations, due to an increasing demand for the accountability of 
governments, participation in political events, anti-corruption and the establishment of 
55 Definition of transparency, its historical development and values will be further discussed in Chapter 5. 
56 Frederick Schauer, “Transparency in Three Dimensions”, (2011) University of Illinois Law Review, No. 4, pp. 
1343-1344, available at <http://www.illinoislawreview.org/article/transparency-in-three-dimensions/>.
57 As can be seen by how Snowden and other whistleblowers managed to connect with journalists and 
human rights activists to get information publicized, which is more difficult in the pre-digital age. 
58 Kristin M. Lord, (2012) The Perils and Promise of Global Transparency: Why the Information Revolution May 
Not Lead to Security, Democracy, or Peace, Albany: State University of New York Press, pp. 2-3.
59 Ibid., p. 3.
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public trust; or simply because of the right to know the information held by government.60 The 
global tendency towards e-governance and e-democracy has also increased transparency 
by contributing to the digital disclosure of government information, which, compared to its 
non-digital counterpart, is less costly and, in countries with ubiquitous connectivity, easier for 
ordinary citizens to access, thereby supporting increased participation in public affairs and 
the policy making process. However, the same shift towards the digitization of government 
information may also be combined with potential risks, such as the loss of privacy of the data 
subjects, threats to data protection, growing conflicts amongst participants and possibly, 
social fragmentation.61 A particular problem in relation to such a shift has been the lack of 
transparency around national security communications surveillance. 62 The call for more 
transparency regarding both the work of the intelligence services and law enforcement has 
been for this work to meet international human rights protection standards. 
The demand for transparency is increasing also in the private sector. Within this context, a 
significant challenge lies in the fact that, while nowadays transnational tech giants control a 
considerable part of the digital market under the jurisdiction of multiple State laws, it is still 
unclear whether such corporates can provide sufficient transparency and accountability 
to ensure public trust about data and privacy protection. Nonetheless, the application of 
transparency principles in relation to corporate conduct and governance structures, and 
the transparency of BCRs, as well as other measures, can improve public trust, promoting 
corporate reputation and improving efficiency.
A danger to transparency is the arbitrary cooperation of ICT companies with government 
actors, enabling such bodies to carry out massive surveillance, user data requests, restriction 
of access, content restriction or blocking, websites or networks blocking. In the absence 
of transparency, it is unknown whether such cooperation violates human rights under 
international standards. On many occasions, disclosure is limited due to considerations 
of company survival and employee safety. However, companies can use transparency to 
indicate their bona fides and respect for human rights in difficult contexts. The Global 
Network Initiative recommends that its corporate members deal with harsh political and 
legal environments with means such as making transparency reports and using legal 
appeal.63
Another transparency-related issue revolves around the conflicts that exist between the 
economic interests of ICT companies and the public interests relating to the protection of 
privacy and freedom of expression. Indeed, public demands for more transparency in private 
sector operations—to get to know the rights protection reality—may be rejected because 
of the economic value of information and data on the digital market.64 For instance, data 
60 Council of Europe, Electronic Democracy (“e-Democracy”), Recommendation CM/Rec(2009)1 and 
Explanatory Memorandum, September 2009, Strasbourg Cedex: Council of Europe Publishing, p. 77, 
available at <http://www.coe.int/t/dgap/democracy/Activities/GGIS/CAHDE/2009/RecCM2009_1_and_
Accomp_Docs/6647-0-ID8289-Recommendation%20on%20electronic%20democracy.pdf>.
61 Ibid., p. 57.
62 Chris Tuppen, Opening the Lines, A Call for Transparency from Governments and Telecommunications 
Companies, Report, 2013, Global Network Initiative, p. 2, available at <https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/
sites/default/files/GNI_OpeningtheLines.pdf>..
63 GNI, 16-18; Chris Tuppen, Opening the Lines, A Call for Transparency from Governments and 
Telecommunications Companies, Report, 2013, Global Network Initiative, pp. 16-17, available at <https://
globalnetworkinitiative.org/sites/default/files/GNI_OpeningtheLines.pdf>.
64 See Loek Essers, “Google Ordered by German Authority to Change Privacy Practices”, PCWorld, 8 April 2015, 
available at <http://www.pcworld.com/article/2907612/google-ordered-by-german-authority-to-change-
privacy-practices.html>.
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processing techniques, such as search engine algorithms and data analytics methods—will 
often be proprietary.
Similarly, under certain circumstances—for instance in the context of Cloud computing, 
where it is notably difficult to have a high degree of transparency65—the implementation 
of transparency principles would imply the disclosure of: data breaches; the repurposing of 
stored data; law compliance situations in different jurisdictions; the location, ownership and 
processing of the data of concern; and the related data processors’ legal liabilities as such.66 
While such disclosures may often be difficult to achieve, even when there are degrees of 
transparency, ordinary Internet users will often not understand the information supplied 
to them, or be unable to identify any relevant gaps and weaknesses in the services offered 
to them. There is also often a lack of information of redress processes and decision-making 
systems.
It is nevertheless important for the private sector to strike a sustainable balance between 
providing the best Internet services for the users, meeting their many competing demands 
and securing the users’ rights to privacy and freedom of expression on the one hand, while 
also seeking the best financial gains on the other.
In summary, the main challenge to transparency in the digital age is for the private sector, the 
public sector and governmental bodies to disclose more information and data about when 
individuals’ rights to such data and information are involved. There is also a need for access 
to necessary information that enhances participation in democracy (or e-democracy) and 
e-governance. Ultimately, transparency is a collective product of all social sectors, including 
government bodies, the judiciary, civil society organizations, NGOs, and private companies, 
who can act together to enable individuals to conduct better-informed lives and to use the 
information available to make the best decisions.
2.4  The endangered balancing in the digital age
Before the digital world, many societies had traditional mechanisms in place that protected, 
regulated and balanced the interests of multiple parties relating to the collection, transfer, 
analysis, aggregation and processing of information. Such mechanisms have enabled stable 
legal and societal boundaries relating to multiple human rights, including those to privacy, 
reputation, freedom of expression, freedom of information, access to information and 
transparency. Humanity has developed the fundamental principles underpinning the rights 
to privacy or family life, to freedom of expression and freedom of information, which are 
recognized by international human rights law and regional legal instruments.67 The balance 
among these values, as well as the boundaries defined between them, are set in the various 
legacy procedures and doctrines, legal and moral, that exist in the different legal systems 
and cultural communities.
The need for updating these values stems from the fact that, as shown elsewhere in this 
Report, ICTs challenge traditional legal and moral orders, a trend which will continue as the 
world moves closer to the Internet of Things, the Internet of Everything, big data analytics, 
Cloud computing and smart technologies. 
65 Neil Robinson et al., “The Cloud: Understanding the Security, Privacy and Trust Challenges”, Product Page, 
2011, p. xi, available at <http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR933.html>.
66 Siani Pearson and George Yee (Eds.), (2013) Privacy and Security for Cloud Computing, Computer 
Communications and Networks, London: Springer London, pp. 15-28.
67 This will be further illustrated in detail by Chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
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The finding and establishment of the boundaries online is not quite the same as in the 
analogue world. A recent example that illustrates this is the Facebook-based conflict 
between a mother who has been constantly sharing information about her baby, assuming 
that she could express herself as much as she wanted in this new public space 68 and an 
individual who is assumed to be or had been connected as Facebook friend, who chose 
to define boundaries by sending an open anonymous letter to this mother to stop the 
updating,69 indicating that s/he felt intruded with so many updates and wanted to be left 
alone.
There are at least two points to make regarding this situation. Firstly, in the analogue world 
the mother would probably have sent messages only to those whom she thinks really 
care about the new-born, instead of broadcasting the message to everyone connected 
to her as a Facebook friend. This would support the view that people react differently to 
online and offline environments. Secondly, the methods used to define boundaries may 
differ too. For instance, whilst the offended individual could—instead of sending such a 
letter— “de-friend” the mother, and indeed this is what often happens in such situations, 
such de-friending could, in one view, equate to one leaving a favourite public bar because 
one person at the bar has begun to dominate interactions, interrupting others who expect 
some silence or are accustomed to more diversified or less personal interactions. 
The conflicts between privacy and freedom of expression are intensified by the combination 
of the virtual and physical spheres. For example, based on the information available on the 
online stalking and bullying cases, many individuals are the victims of the online disclosure 
of their personal information collected from either the online or offline environment. 
Nevertheless, the damage inflicted to the victim’s personal life – e.g. reputational damages 
or lost personal relationships – has occurred both in the virtual and physical world. On some 
occasions, online disclosures are used specifically to punish individuals in manners that 
transcend both the online and the offline worlds, simply because such people hold different 
morals, despite individuals’ behaviours that may conform to the applicable domestic laws 
and regulations. As an example of this, some have used online and offline disclosures of 
personal information to punish doctors who help pregnant women with abortion.
It may also be argued that the proliferation of portable devices that are capable of collecting, 
storing and transferring data such as laptops, smartphones and smartwatches, can hinder 
freedom of expression and opinion insofar as they threaten to facilitate the publication of 
private interactions. On the other hand, since such devices offer potential for increased 
identification and transparency they may also provide disincentives for the misuse of the 
right to freedom of expression; e.g. speech intended to incite hatred or violence. Therefore, 
technology can be seen as both potentially hindering privacy and also stifling freedom of 
speech and transparency. 
Another challenge that emerges from the conflicts between freedom of expression and 
personal privacy relates to whether or not non-professional reporters and journalists—e.g. 
freelance reporters, citizen journalists, grassroots media and other content generators in 
the Web 2.0 age—should deserve the same special protections as those enjoyed by their 
68 See in general Post’s explanation of rules of civility in privacy protection. Robert C. Post, “The Social 
Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort”, (1989) California Law Review, Vol. 77, 
No. 5,p. 957.
69 “Mum Sent Poison Pen Letter for Posting Too Many Baby Pics on Facebook”, Mail Online, available at 
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3038419/She-crawls-mat-DONT-CARE-Mother-reveals-message-
sent-friends-Facebook-said-sick-oversharing-information-daughter.html>, accessed 16 April 2015.
27
professional counterparts, for example the qualified shielding of the confidentiality of 
sources.70 This issue arises in the light of the conflicts between freedom of expression and 
personal privacy, particularly nowadays, with respect to the reporting of issues of public 
interest71, due to the free speech protection especially relied upon by journalists, and at 
the same time the restricted privacy protections imposed in many jurisdictions on public 
figures, including figures involved in the matters being reported.
A closely related challenge is that of the changing legal status of Internet intermediaries such 
as Internet Service Providers (ISPs), search engines and portals, social networking platforms 
or participative networked platforms, and data processing and web hosting providers.72 
While these intermediaries are critical to the functioning of the Internet, they are often 
caught in the increasingly complex dilemma of balancing (or escalating conflicts between) 
online freedom of expression, privacy and transparency. In addition, as many traditional 
media shift their services from the offline to the online environment, they become hybrid 
intermediaries striking ever more intricate balances, or escalating such conflicts, insofar as 
in shifting from the offline to the online domain they find themselves both generating 
content and providing a public space that enables users to generate and share content. 73
Thus the key challenge relates to how States define these service providers and the 
corresponding legal duties, since such definitions will have a significant influence on the 
protection of privacy, freedom of expression, and freedom of information. For instance, 
if intermediaries are treated as media, then they usually bear stricter legal obligation to 
control contents. 74 In this regard, States could increasingly use intermediaries as the points 
of censorship.75 Where a distinction is maintained, intermediaries are likely to be awarded 
limited liability for content, which means that they would be required to intervene only if 
notified and persuaded that the content is illegal. Courts may also hold them liable for any 
non-intervention relating to illegal content that persists on their platforms. Such approach 
would contrast the approach taken by those jurisdictions protecting even business free 
speech rights, like regarding search engine’s algorithms as a particular category of freedom 
of speech protected by constitution.76 In general, the delegation of the power for content 
control introduces worries linked to the privatization of law enforcement, which runs afoul 
70 For instance, the constitutional and statutory protections of journalists in the U.S. law. Also see UNESCO, 
Keystones to Foster Inclusive Knowledge Societies: Access to Information and Knowledge, Freedom of Expression, 
Privacy, and Ethics on a Global Internet, Report, 2015, Paris: UNESCO, available at <http://unesdoc.unesco.
org/images/0023/002325/232563E.pdf>.
71 The balancing of the privacy interests of public figures and freedom of expression of others as a public 
good will be discussed further in Chapter 8. 
72 In this Report, publishers and other media creating and disseminating original contents are not 
intermediaries. For a discussion of different categories of Internet intermediaries and their importance in 
network operation by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), see OECD, 
The Economic and Social Role of Internet Intermediaries, Report, April 2010, pp. 6-14, available at <http://
www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/44949023.pdf>.
73 Rebecca MacKinnon et al., Fostering Freedom Online: The Role of Internet Intermediaries, UNESCO Series 
on Internet Freedom, Report, 2014, Paris: UNESCO, pp. 19-20, available at <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/
images/0023/002311/231162e.pdf>.
74 See Ross LaJeunesse’s discussion of this situation at 2014’s IGF (Internet Global Forum), available at 
Rebecca MacKinnon et al., Fostering Freedom Online: The Role of Internet Intermediaries, UNESCO Series 
on Internet Freedom, Report, 2014, Paris: UNESCO, p. 20, available at <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/
images/0023/002311/231162e.pdf>.
75 Rebecca Ong, “Internet Intermediaries: The Liability for Defamatory Postings in China and Hong Kong”, 
(2013) Computer Law & Security Review, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 274–281.
76 Stavroula Karapapa and Maurizio Borghi, “Search Engine Liability for Autocomplete Suggestions: 
Personality, Privacy and the Power of the Algorithm”, (2015) International Journal of Law and Information 
Technology, Vol. 23, No. 3, p. 8.
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of principles of rule of law and democracy, especially when there are commercial interests 
and an absence of transparency concerning content take-downs. 
A popular practice among intermediaries is to provide terms of service and require the users’ 
agreement before the use of their services, even if some contracted restrictions exceed the 
national legal limits.77 In this context, how corporate practices and BCRs of privately-owned 
public spaces interplay with government is a decisive factor for balancing the rights to 
freedom of information and privacy, as well as the issue of transparency. For example, how 
intermediaries handle the digital legacies of dead persons—e.g. a deceased’s information 
and data stored in the Facebook account of the deceased —now becomes a policy problem 
in many countries. In many cases, relatives of the deceased, even with passwords or last 
wills, are not allowed to access such SNS accounts when the intermediaries block access 
according to their terms of service.78 This reflects that it might be the case that even the 
deceased have an interest in privacy, in that they might not want their private information 
disclosed after death, even to close family members. Thus, unlike in the pre-digital age, in 
several contexts it is nowadays technical giants rather than the State that have a last say 
over data residing on their properties. When there is no legislation to strike a good balance, 
“code is law” in the digital era.
Another apparently problematic issue is the conflict between the right to access to 
information and freedom of information, and the right to privacy. The Google Spain Case, 
discussed in more detail later in the study, saw the ECJ order that the link to the “irrelevant” 
and “outdated” information of the plaintiff, in this case an auction notice of his repossessed 
house, should be removed by Google Spain,79 although the information is open to public 
access after being published to comply with a local law mandate and this information 
remains on the original website. On the one side is the privacy and reputation interest 
of the plaintiff and therefore an interest in delisting on Google, and on the other side is 
the right to freedom of expression and access to information of others. For many, it is still 
debatable in the long run if this decision to remove what the court deemed as irrelevant 
and outdated information strikes the right balance between the two fundamental interests.
Individual’s rights of access to information and freedom of information must be re-
considered in the digital age. The concept of freedom of information has been mostly 
understood as ‘access to information held by governmental institutions’, either by filing 
applications or by voluntary disclosure. But when private institutions are gradually taking 
more public responsibilities and thus hold increasingly more personal information that 
is critical to individuals, the scope of this right is overly limited if it does not cover the 
information or data in possession of the private sector, public sector, and government 
bodies. This is also the case when a huge amount of data collected by governments and 
State-owned enterprises is processed by private institutions that reside locally and/or 
abroad, such as in the context of Cloud computing.80 
77 Rebecca MacKinnon et al., Fostering Freedom Online: The Role of Internet Intermediaries, UNESCO Series 
on Internet Freedom, Report, 2014, Paris: UNESCO, p. 20, available at <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/
images/0023/002311/231162e.pdf>.
78 Jessica Hopper, “Digital Afterlife: What Happens to Your Online Accounts When You Die? - Rock 
Center with Brian Williams”, NBC News, 1 June 2012, available at <http://rockcenter.nbcnews.com/_
news/2012/06/01/11995859-digital-afterlife-what-happens-to-your-online-accounts-when-you-die?lite>, 
accessed 24 May 2015.
79 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL Google Inc. v Agencia Española de 
Protección de Datos (AEPD), delivered on 25 June 2013. 
80 As in reality, some universities have outsourced their electronic communications services to companies like 
Google for economic reasons. 
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This change of the legal scenario has been considered by some national laws on freedom 
of information in different forms. However, the majority of State laws still need to adjust to 
the change of circumstances. The right to access to one’s personal information has been 
protected under the EU law under the title of the right to data, which covers access to 
information regarding an individual in the private sector. More importantly, individual users 
have the right to know the terms of services or BCRs, particularly regarding the protection of 
their private data and privacy, including any information regarding the collection, storage, 
analysis, processing, change of purpose of use, and transfer of their data to third parties. 
However, in reality, many private companies are still not fully aware of their consumers’ right 
to access to information.81 
Individuals’ lack of sufficient access to information, even their own personal information in 
possession of the private sector, can be further compromised by technical complexities. 
Even provided with required information, individuals may not be able, or do not have the 
time or awareness, to fully understand what happens to their data. While many ISPs require 
the user’s consent to their terms of service, in particular those regarding privacy, data use, 
choice of law and choice of jurisdiction, many Internet users do not even read such texts 
before ticking and clicking for consent.82 
2.5  Further indirect, but long range impacts 
As outlined above, the challenges to individual privacy, freedom of expression, access to 
information, and transparency in the digital age are changing the traditional legal and 
moral boundaries developed in previous balancing mechanisms of these conflicting rights 
in the pre-Internet era. The intensified conflicts between the right to privacy and the right 
to freedom of expression reflect the fact that the pre-digital laws and morals cannot be fully 
and directly applied to the online world, even though it is agreed broadly, at the UN level, 
that human rights offline apply equally online. Indeed, it is the case that many previous 
legal rules and social norms need to be updated to adapt to the digital age, especially as the 
direct implementation of offline rules and norms to online circumstances may hinder the 
protection of both privacy and freedom of expression. For instance, there may be a need 
for tailored rules—respecting international human rights law—for governing the legal 
rights and duties of Internet intermediaries in view of their critical status in the operation 
of the Internet. Another example is the definition and legal regulation of personal data 
or personally identifiable data that was conceptualized in analogue times.83 The impact of 
these challenges reaches far beyond national geographical borders, and will need stronger 
international cooperation in the long run. 
In this context, certain empirical research suggests that increasing privacy invasions in the 
digital age are having deeper and wider impacts on individual lives and human society 
than most people would have expected. According to the most recent empirical research 
findings in Europe, the privacy invasion practices in present surveillance activities have 
81 For instance, see “Belgian DPA Report Says Facebook Tracking Violates EU Law”, Daily Dashboard, 31 March 
2015, available at <https://iapp.org/news/a/belgian-dpa-report-says-facebook-tracking-violates-eu-law/>, 
accessed 9 September 2015.
82 Rikke F. Joergensen, “The Unbearable Lightness of User Consent | Internet Policy Review”, (2014) Internet 
Policy Review: Journal on Internet Regulation, Vol. 3, No. 4, available at <http://policyreview.info/articles/
analysis/unbearable-lightness-user-consent>, accessed 29 May 2015.
83 Paul M. Schwartz and Daniel J. Solove, “The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally 
Identifiable Information”, (2011) New York University Law Review, Vol. 86, available at <http://papers.ssrn.
com/abstract=1909366>.
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brought forth 62 specific Adverse Events (AE). These include negative impacts on: a) 
individual identity (12 AE); b) autonomy (12 AE), and c) reputation (7AE). They also cover 
impacts that impede: a) public trust (10 AE); b) quality of democracy (AE); and c) social 
justice (9 AE). 84 These adverse developments are not fully known by ordinary citizens, and 
they have not been comprehensively addressed by administrative and legal reforms. 
Among the challenges to online freedom of expression is the gradually-forming position 
of the Internet as the public space and archive for information dissemination and data 
preservation. Simultaneously, it is much easier for any actor to understand both national 
citizens and the citizens of other countries, by collecting individual data via open source 
data and special surveillance channels. This can lead to freedom of expression being more 
easily monitored and controlled by government authorities without appropriate checks 
and balances.85 The (over)exposure of an individual in the online world without adequate 
privacy concern can increase the possibility that the individual becomes a target and the 
person be subjected to data profiling. 
A related concern is that private persons may have their personal data–e.g. family documents, 
photos, blog posts—and especially those stored somewhere in the Cloud, lost or unable 
to trace. While this bizarre situation is almost impossible in theory, sporadic incidents of 
Internet failure across the world have shown how extensive the damage could become.
Many of the challenges described certainly have an international dimension when free 
expression and informational privacy are conceptualized in diversified ways and protected 
to different extents across the world. Under international human rights law, each human 
being has the rights to privacy and freedom of expression, which are un-alienable and 
universal rights superior to national laws. However, the privacy of non-citizens is protected 
very differently. Additionally, in a world of data flows across borders, it does not always 
matter where an Internet user is. The protection of personal data and data privacy can 
neither be secured by domestic law, nor by international one. 
Clashes over the two fundamental rights happen not only between individuals and 
companies, as well as individuals and national States. They may also occur between State 
authorities and transnational companies. Big companies may withdraw service from a State 
where State authority requires the provision of personal information or the blocking of 
certain contents and connections. At this point, certain proposed practices in the private 
sector, like more transparency regarding disclosure demands, responses and procedural 
safeguards, will help limit the threats from arbitrary State interference.86
84 Review of RESPECT project WP13 report by Claudia Colonnello, to be published on RESPECT’s website as a 
deliverable of the RESPECT project. See <http://respectproject.eu/>.
85 See Evgeny Morozov, (2012) The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom, Reprint Edition, New York: 
PublicAffairs, pp. 143-177.
86 Global Network Initiative, “New Report Calls for Transparency from Governments and Telecommunications 
Companies”, pp. 16-19, available at <https://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/news/new-report-calls-
transparency-governments-and-telecommunications-companies>, accessed 13 April 2015. 
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2.6  The challenges of Internet Governance: increasing complexity 
To protect the rights to privacy and freedom of expression, as well as to achieve transparency, 
including in balancing the two rights, is not an easy task in the context of the present 
Internet Governance structures and practices. Internet Governance issues nowadays cover 
a mixture of international and national problems, commercial interests and human rights 
protection, national State power and transnational digital giants, and an assortment of civil 
society organizations and whistleblowers. The multi-stakeholder governance approach is 
exactly a reflection of the present complex situation, in which State authority has not been 
the predominant player, despite the fact that its powers continue to increase in the name 
of protecting national security, public order and other public interests.
There are concerns about the privatization of the governance of the Internet when digital 
giants with considerable market shares have full discretionary power to decide who has 
access to what kinds of information online. Driven by commercial interests, it is hard to 
say how such actors, who are accountable only to shareholders, would favour the two 
fundamental rights of expression and privacy, especially in relation to the end users. This is 
reflected in the opaque privacy policies with respect to Cloud storage and content control 
with limited redress for citizens. On the other hand, opacity may in some cases work to 
protect individuals’ privacy and freedom of expression.
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CHAPTER 3  Online privacy and data protection mechanisms 
3.1  Defining privacy in contexts 
The right to privacy is a human right and the need for privacy is universal and deep-
seated in each human being. For a long time, privacy has been an important subject of 
anthropological, sociological and philosophical discourses, about how it is defined and 
respected in various cultures.87 As a concept per se, privacy has various roots, including 
in numerous religious texts—e.g. the Christian, Muslim and Jewish traditions—and in 
ancient China and Greece.88 For the purposes of this Report, ‘Privacy’ may be defined as 
the presumption that individuals should have an area of autonomous development, 
interaction and liberty, a “private sphere” without interactions from others, free from State 
intervention and from excessive unsolicited intervention by other uninvited individuals.89 
Privacy is essential to human dignity and autonomy in all societies, enabling individuals to 
create barriers to protect themselves from interferences in their lives, such as access to their 
bodies, places and things, as well as their information and communications.90 
Despite the ubiquity of the notion of, and the need for privacy, there is no universal 
definition for it.91 The multiple ideas and conceptions conveyed can be approached from 
three interdependent clusters.92 The first cluster concerns physical space, which refers to 
the extent to which an individual’s physical space is protected from undesired invasion. 
The second cluster concerns making a choice, referring to an individual’s ability to make 
certain significant decisions without external interference; i.e. to personal autonomy. The 
third cluster concerns ‘information privacy’, or the flow of personal information, and refers 
to an individual’s control over the processing of personal information, including acquisition, 
disclosure, and use in different forms and for different purposes. In this third sense, the right 
to privacy refers to the ability of individuals to determine who has information about them 
and how that information is used.93
The concept of privacy bears various dimensions and distinct meanings in different cultural 
and societal contexts. As one of the fundamental and indispensable elements of human 
life, privacy is also closely associated with other deep-seated values, such as autonomy, 
dignity, spirituality, liberty, trust, reputation and personal development.94 Furthermore, the 
87 Judith DeCew, “Privacy”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (Ed.), Spring 2015, 
available at <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/privacy/>.
88 Toby Mendel et al., (2012) Global Survey on Internet Privacy and Freedom of Expression, UNESCO Series on 
Internet Freedom, Paris: UNESCO, p. 50, available at <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-
and-information/resources/publications-and-communication-materials/publications/full-list/global-
survey-on-Internet-privacy-and-freedom-of-expression/>.
89 Lord Lester of Herne Hill, Lord David Pannick and Javan Herberg (Eds.), (2009) Human Rights Law and 
Practice, Third Revised Edition, London: LexisNexis, para. 482. 
90 See the general illustration by Privacy International at <https://www.privacyinternational.org/>.
91 Toby Mendel et al., (2012) Global Survey on Internet Privacy and Freedom of Expression, UNESCO Series on 
Internet Freedom, Paris: UNESCO, p. 9, available at <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-and-
information/resources/publications-and-communication-materials/publications/full-list/global-survey-on-
Internet-privacy-and-freedom-of-expression/>.
92 To borrow Prof. Kang’s categorization, see Jerry Kang, “Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions”, 
(1998) Stanford Law Review, Vol. 50, pp. 1202–1205.
93 OHCHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, 17 April 2013, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/40, para. 22, available at <http://
ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/23/40>.
94 Marc Rotenberg, “Preserving Privacy in the Information Society”, UNESCO.org, available at <http://www.
unesco.org/webworld/infoethics_2/eng/papers/paper_10.htm>, accessed 30 May 2015..
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right to privacy complements other rights and freedoms, including freedom of expression, 
association and belief.95 The ability to communicate anonymously without governments 
knowing our identity has played a crucial role in safeguarding free expression and 
strengthening political accountability.96 For this reason, the value of privacy lies in promoting 
and securing democracy by providing citizens with the necessary space to develop and 
exercise their capacities of personal reflection, judgement and action. 
Privacy is unequivocally recognized as an important human right, at both the international 
and regional levels. However, despite the global recognition of the obligation to protect 
privacy, the content of this right has not been fully developed by international mechanisms 
for the protection of human rights.97 The lack of explicit articulation of this right has led to 
difficulties in its application and enforcement.98 Its interpretation in practice has encountered 
“challenges with respect to what constitutes the private sphere and in establishing notions 
of what constitutes public interest”.99 
The interplays between, and the methods used to balance privacy and other public interests, 
will be discussed and explained further in Chapter 6. 
3.2  Information privacy and data privacy in the digital age
With advances in innovative and sophisticated technologies, public bodies and entities 
from the private sector can now use “automated” means to collect, process and store all 
kinds of personal information. For instance, when individuals use or buy all sorts of services 
and products—e.g. when registering for an email service, visiting a doctor, or entering into 
a contract—they hand in their personal information. It is in this context that data protection 
laws have been developed to protect personal data from being misused for illegitimate 
purposes.
Data protection laws are designed to protect personal information that is either intended 
to be part of a filing system or collected, processed and stored by “automated” means.100 
Personal information includes data attributed to an individual, such as home address, 
telephone number, and social security number that might be used to identify the 
individual,101 as well as personal data that is generated on a sporadic basis—such as 
95 Toby Mendel et al., (2012) Global Survey on Internet Privacy and Freedom of Expression, UNESCO Series on 
Internet Freedom, Paris: UNESCO, p. 7, available at <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-and-
information/resources/publications-and-communication-materials/publications/full-list/global-survey-on-
Internet-privacy-and-freedom-of-expression/>.
96 Ibid.
97 OHCHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, 17 April 2013, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/40, para. 21, available at <http://
ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/23/40>. 
98 Toby Mendel et al., (2012) Global Survey on Internet Privacy and Freedom of Expression, UNESCO Series on 
Internet Freedom, Paris: UNESCO, p. 51, available at <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-
and-information/resources/publications-and-communication-materials/publications/full-list/global-
survey-on-Internet-privacy-and-freedom-of-expression/>.
99 OHCHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion 
and Expression, Frank La Rue, 17 April 2013, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/40, para. 21, available at <http://ap.ohchr.
org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/23/40>.
100 See Privacy International, “What Is Data Protection?”, available at <https://www.privacyinternational.
org/?q=node/44>, accessed 30 May 2015.
101 Thomas B. Kearns, “Technology and the Right to Privacy: The Convergence of Surveillance and Information 
Privacy Concerns”, (1999) William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 976-977, available at <http://
scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol7/iss3/10/>.
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medical data, credit card purchases, phone calls—which may be used to track the subject’s 
activities.102 Personally Identifiable Information (PII) refers to any information, be it stored 
online or offline, that identifies a person, or information that is not publicly accessible and 
purely statistical, or information that is certain types of data defined by law as PII.103 A much-
used concept is Information privacy (or data privacy), which refers to ‘a person’s control over 
the dissemination of information about himself to others’,104 or ‘the right to control one’s 
personal data’.105 In similar vein, information privacy ‘…concerns the handling of `personal 
information’ that is, information about a particular person or information that can be used 
to identify a particular person…’.106 
A closely-related, important concept is ‘sensitive personal data’ which refers to personal 
data revealing racial categorization or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or other 
philosophical beliefs, criminal convictions, trade union membership, and personal data 
concerning health or sexual life.107
Data protection laws empower individuals to control and protect their information from 
abuses and, thus, restrain and shape the activities of governments and companies.108 Even 
though there is a significant overlap between data protection and privacy protection, 
insofar as the disclosure of data can lead to privacy breaches, data protection rules differ 
from privacy protection rules, both in their scope and in substantive content.109 Some 
even hold that data protection law applies to all personally identifying data while privacy 
protection law applies to a narrower scope of information of which individuals usually have 
a reasonable privacy expectation, 110 though this may not be a universally-held view.
In addition, data protection rules are applied to the limited context of automated data 
processing or the processing of structured data sets, in contrast to privacy protection rules 
which can be applied to any information of a person. Moreover, data protection rules do not 
typically recognize a general public interest override, as witnessed in the European Union 
Directive 95/46/EC with specific exceptions for data processing and data transfer, and 
limited scope of exemptions allowed to be made by Member States.111 Apart from these 
102 Ibid.
103 Paul M. Schwartz and Daniel J. Solove, “The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally 
Identifiable Information”, (2011) New York University Law Review, Vol. 86, pp. 1828-1832, available at <http://
papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1909366>.
104 Jocelyn Watkins, “My Life Is Not My Own: Do Criminal Arrestees’ Privacy Interests in Mug Shots Outweigh 
Public’s Desire for Disclosure”, (2013) John Marshall Journal of Information Technology and Privacy Law, Vol. 
30, No. 2, p. 311.
105 Lauren Henry Scholz, ‘”Information Privacy and Data Security”, (2015) Cardozo Law Review de Novo, , p. 110, 
available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2600495>.
106 See Australian Privacy Commissioner, “What Is Information Privacy and Why Do We Need to Protect It?,” 
August 1997, available at <http://www2.austlii.edu.au/itlaw/national_scheme/national-PART.html>.
107 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), (2014) Handbook on European Data Protection Law, 
Luxembourg: Publications Offices of the European Union, pp. 43-44, available at <http://fra.europa.eu/en/
publication/2014/handbook-european-data-protection-law>.
108 Privacy International, “What Is Data Protection?”, available at <https://www.privacyinternational.
org/?q=node/44>, accessed 30 May 2015.
109 “Certain elements of data protection regimes are covered by the right to privacy”. Toby Mendel et al., 
(2012) Global Survey on Internet Privacy and Freedom of Expression, UNESCO Series on Internet Freedom, 
Paris: UNESCO, p. 101, available at <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-and-information/
resources/publications-and-communication-materials/publications/full-list/global-survey-on-Internet-
privacy-and-freedom-of-expression/>.
110 Ibid., pp. 101 and 105.
111 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 2015, 
available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML>.
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differences, another aspect to keep in mind is that in continental Europe it is the general 
practice to talk about data laws or data protection laws, while in other English-speaking 
countries such kinds of laws are referred to as privacy protection laws.112 It is nevertheless 
the general tendency that data protection rules may have more overlaps with privacy 
protection rules in the context of increasing digitalization of information. 
As technological advances have been influencing the nature of many societies, ICT is 
having an unprecedented impact on privacy, particularly on data privacy. In the digital era, 
these technologies have enhanced the capacity of governments, and the State now has ‘…
greater capability to conduct simultaneous, invasive, targeted and broad-scale surveillance 
than ever before…’113 Such collected information (data) can be used, abused and misused 
by government bodies, business institutions and individuals for any number of purposes, 
without the knowledge of the data subjects.114 On numerous occasions, this can lead to 
privacy violations with considerable consequences on individuals’ lives. In this context, it 
is important for individuals to exercise control over their own data, including by knowing 
who has access to such personal information, how personal information is processed, and 
for what purposes personal information is processed.115 
Moreover, other rights, such as the right to freedom of opinion and expression, the freedom 
of peaceful assembly and association and to family life, may also be affected by the 
interception of digital communications, the collection of personal data in various forms, 
and different types of surveillance.116 All these rights are connected closely with the right to 
privacy in the digital age and they are exercised more and more via digital media.117
3.3  Privacy protection mechanisms: a brief review
3.3.1  International law framework
The right to privacy, albeit not fully elaborated, is well established in international law. The 
core privacy principle can be found in Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR), and the right to privacy was given formal legal protection in Article 17 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Also, the UN Human Rights 
Committee (HRC) states—in General Comment No. 16 on Article 17 of the ICCPR—that the 
112 OECD, OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal 
Data, Section ‘Activities at national level’, available at <http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/
oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm>, accessed 26 May 
2015.
113 Navi Pillay, “The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age: Report of the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (A/HRC/27/37)”, 30 June 2014, para. 2; see A/HRC/23/40, para. 33, available 
at <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A.HRC.27.37_
en.pdf>.
114 Thomas B. Kearns, “Technology and the Right to Privacy: The Convergence of Surveillance and Information 
Privacy Concerns”, (1999) William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 976-977, available at <http://
scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol7/iss3/10/>.
115 Navi Pillay, “The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age: Report of the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (A/HRC/27/37)”, 30 June 2014.
116 Ibid., para. 14.
117 Ibid.
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right to privacy circumscribes the right to protection ‘…against all such interferences and 
attacks whether they emanate from State authorities or from natural or legal persons…’118
Regarding data protection, General Comment No. 16 states that the collection and holding 
of personal information must be regulated, whether such collection and holding are 
performed by public or private bodies. The General Comment also states that individuals 
have the right to acknowledge what information is kept about them, for what purposes, 
and by whom it is kept.119 Furthermore, the UN General Assembly Resolution 68/167 
reaffirms that: ‘…The exercise of the right to privacy is important for the realization of the 
right to freedom of expression and to hold opinions without interference and is one of 
the foundations of a democratic society…’ It also expresses the UN’s deep concern about 
the negative impacts of mass surveillance and interception of communications on human 
rights.120
In terms of the right to data protection, within the UN, the General Assembly Resolution 
45/95 adopted Guidelines for the regulation of computerized personal data files,121 which 
set out ten principles on data protection. While these principles are pertinent mainly to 
national legislation, they are also relevant to intergovernmental organizations.122 The 
guidelines include a number of principles governing the collection and use of personal 
data, which acknowledge that there may be a need for exceptions for the first five principles, 
but which specify that such exceptions can only occur to protect national security, public 
order, health and morals, or the rights and freedom of others.123 
In UNESCO context, it is important to note that the Organization has reaffirmed, including 
through the Connecting the Dots conference Outcome Document endorsed by its 38th 
General Conference in November 2015, that the right to privacy applies and should be 
respected online and offline in accordance with Article 12 of the UDHR and Article 17 of 
the ICCPR. As relevant within UNESCO’s mandate, Organization also supports the efforts 
related to UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/69/166 of December 2014 on the Right 
to Privacy in the Digital Age. UNESCO, as an intergovernmental organization, also works 
to supporting best practices and efforts made by Member States and other stakeholders 
to address concerns on the Internet in accordance with their international human rights 
obligations, and includes consider in this respect the key role played by actors in the private 
sector.
118 OHCHR, CCPR General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (The Right to Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and 
Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and Reputation), 8 April 1988, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I), 
para. 1, available at <http://www.refworld.org/docid/453883f922.html>, accessed 29 May 2015.
119 Ibid., para. 10; see also Toby Mendel et al., (2012) Global Survey on Internet Privacy and Freedom of Expression, 
UNESCO Series on Internet Freedom, Paris: UNESCO, p. 52, available at <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/
communication-and-information/resources/publications-and-communication-materials/publications/full-
list/global-survey-on-Internet-privacy-and-freedom-of-expression/>.
120 UN General Assembly, “Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 18 December 2013 [on the Report 
of the Third Committee (A/68/456/Add.2)] 68/167. The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age”, December 2013, 
available at <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/DigitalAge/Pages/DigitalAgeIndex.aspx>.
121 UN General Assembly, Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal Data Files, 14 December 
1990, UN Doc. A/RES/45/95, available at <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/45/a45r095.htm>.
122 Toby Mendel et al., (2012) Global Survey on Internet Privacy and Freedom of Expression, UNESCO Series on 
Internet Freedom, Paris: UNESCO, p. 63, available at <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-
and-information/resources/publications-and-communication-materials/publications/full-list/global-
survey-on-Internet-privacy-and-freedom-of-expression/>.
123 Ibid., p. 64.
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3.3.2  Regional privacy protection mechanisms
Council of Europe
The Council of Europe has defined a number of privacy protection mechanisms at the regional 
level. Firstly, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), in Article 8, provides that 
everyone has the right to respect for a private and family life, a home and correspondence. 
Secondly, in a series of rulings the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has tried to 
clarify the scope of the ECHR’s privacy protection, government actions for potential privacy 
breach and further features of the right.124 Thirdly, the Council of Europe (CoE) adopted the 
‘Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data’—i.e. Convention 108—which entered into force in 1985.125 
The Convention—ratified by all EU Member States and amended to enable the EU to 
become a Party, and having all Member States of the CoE Contracting Parties by 2014, as 
well as Uruguay as the first non-European country to become such a party (acceded in 
2013)126—is the only international treaty across the world for privacy protection. Its purpose 
is “…[t]o secure in the territory of each Party for every individual, whatever his nationality 
or residence, respect for his rights and fundamental freedoms, and in particular his right 
to privacy, with regard to automatic processing of personal data relating to him (‘data 
protection’)”. In line with this, the Convention fulfils a number of functions, including those 
of: a) regulating abuses relating to the collection, processing and cross-border transfer of 
data; b) prescribing principles of data collection and processing, such as regarding: i) the fair 
and lawful collection and automatic processing of data; ii) the storage of data for specified 
legitimate purposes; and iii) the quality of data; c) granting each data subject the right to 
know the storage of his/her personal information, as well as the right to correct personal 
information when necessary; and d) providing several exceptions, justified by overriding 
interests such as those of State security and defence. 
European Union
The protection of fundamental human rights is one of the basic tenets of EU law.127 
The adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in late 2009 provided a strong legal ground for the 
development of a “clear and effective” data protection system.128 Through a number of 
amendments of the Treaty, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union became 
legally binding,129 the Union acceded to the European Convention of Human Rights,130 and 
124 Ibid., pp. 54-55.
125 Council of Europe, Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data Regarding Supervisory Authorities and Transborder Data Flows, ETS 
No. 181, available at <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/HTML/181.htm>, accessed 30 May 
2015.
126 FRA, (2014) Handbook on European Data Protection Law, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European 
Union, pp. 16-17, available at <http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2014-handbook-data-protection-
law-2nd-ed_en.pdf>.
127 European Parliament, “Respect for Fundamental Rights in the Union”, available at <http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_2.1.2.html>, accessed 30 May 2015; see Article 
2 of the Treaty of the European Union: “the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect of human rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities.”
128 Ibid.
129 Article 6 Paragraph 1, Treaty of the European Union.
130 Article 6 Paragraph 2, Treaty of the European Union.
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the fundamental rights guaranteed by the ECHR became binding principles of the Union 
law.131 Another important change is that the protection of personal data has been recognized 
as a fundamental right under Article 16 Paragraph 1 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU). 
The core EU secondary legislation on the protection of personal data is Directive 95/46/
EC, which lays down that Member States shall protect fundamental rights and freedoms 
of natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy, with respect of the processing 
of personal data.132 The Directive applies to data processed by automated means and data 
contained in or intended to be part of non-automated filing systems. However, it does not 
apply to the processing of data in the course of ‘…operations concerning public security, 
defence, State security […] and the activities of the State in areas of criminal law…’133
Another important legal instrument at the European Union level is the Council Framework 
Decision 2008/977/JHA on the protection of personal data processed in the framework 
of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.134 Although this area is not covered 
by Directive 95/46/EC, the Framework Decision generally echoes the provisions of the 
Directive.135 It aims at providing protection for the personal data of natural persons when 
such data are processed for preventing, investigating, detecting or prosecuting a criminal 
offence, or exacting a criminal penalty136. These EU legal instruments are now set to be 
replaced and enhanced by the General Data Protection Regulation and a Directive on data 
protection in the criminal justice sector approved by the European Parliament on 14th April 
2016.
Other regional privacy protection frameworks
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHR) does not contain elaborated 
protection for privacy. The relevant provisions of the ACHR state the following: “…No one 
may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life, his family, his 
home, or his correspondence, or of unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation. Everyone 
has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks”.137 The 
Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS) has a legal framework on personal 
131 Article 6 Paragraph 3, Treaty of the European Union.
132 See Article 1Paragraph 1, Council Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data [1995] OJ L281/31.
133 The Directive shall not apply either “in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of Community, 
such as (…) operations concerning public security, defence, state security….” (Article 3 Paragraph 2, 
Directive 95/46/EC).
134 “Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the Protection of Personal Data 
Processed in the Framework of Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters”, January 2009, available 
at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32008F0977>. The legal bases for this 
measure are Articles 30, 31 and 34, Treaty of the European Union.
135 Paul De Hert and Vagelis Papakonstantinou, “The Data Protection Framework Decision of 27 November 
2008 Regarding Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters - A Modest Achievement However Not 
the Improvement Some Have Hoped for”, (2009) Computer Law & Security Review, Vol. 25, No. 5, p. 237.
136 FRA, (2014) Handbook on European Data Protection Law, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European 
Union, p. 149, available at <http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2014-handbook-data-protection-law-
2nd-ed_en.pdf>.
137 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, available at <http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/>. 
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data protection, namely, the Supplementary Act A/SA. 1/01/10, which aligns with much of 
the EU Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC).138 
Article 11 of the American Convention on Human Rights prescribes that: “Everyone has 
the right to have his honor respected and his dignity recognized. No one may be the 
object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life, his family, his home or his 
correspondence, or of unlawful attacks on his honour or reputation. Everyone has the right 
to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks”.
The General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) adopted Resolution 
2661 (XLI-O/11) on Access to Public Information and Protection of Personal Data.139 
The main Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) rules on privacy can be found in the 
APEC Privacy Framework, which addresses the need to preserve consumer trust in order to 
advance economic benefits from electronic commerce. It also acknowledges the need to 
grant countries flexibility regarding the implementation. The key principles in the framework 
resemble the UN Guidelines, OECD and European standards. However, as opposed to the 
European standards, the Framework contains a particular degree of flexibility.140 
3.3.3  National legal frameworks
Privacy law
The right to privacy as a human right has been recognized by most countries across the 
world and is protected by various legal mechanisms and legal instruments. The right to 
privacy is first recognized as a constitutional right against the interference from State 
authorities with private life. For instance, though the right to privacy was not originally 
written into the USA’s Constitution, it was later developed from different constitutional 
amendments, including the First, the Second, the Third, the Fourth, the Fifth, the Eight, the 
Ninth, and the Fourteenth.141
Most European countries—following the EU basic law, the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
and the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR)—recognize the fundamental right 
to privacy in their constitutions, in different forms. For instance, the right to privacy and 
private family life is protected by German constitution under the rubric of “personality right” 
in particular, and the right to dignity in general under Articles 1 and 2 of the Basic Law. 
The constitutional personality right protects the personal sphere or “essential sphere of 
privacy” within which an individual can decide who s/he is and how s/he is related to the 
138 Graham Greenleaf, “The Influence of European Data Privacy Standards Outside Europe: Implications for 
Globalisation of Convention 108”, (2011) International Data Privacy Law, Vol. 2, No. 2, available at <http://
papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1960299>.
139 “AG/RES. 2661 (xli-O/11) Access to Public Information and Protection of Personal Data” (General Assembly 
of the UN, 7 June 2011), 2, available at <http://www.networkworld.com/news/2012/012612-privacy-
scandals-255357.html>.
140 Toby Mendel et al., (2012) Global Survey on Internet Privacy and Freedom of Expression, UNESCO Series on 
Internet Freedom, Paris: UNESCO, p. 65, available at <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-
and-information/resources/publications-and-communication-materials/publications/full-list/global-
survey-on-Internet-privacy-and-freedom-of-expression/>.
141 The Ninth Amendment prescribes that «…enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage other rights retained by the people.» See Anita Allen, (2011) Privacy Law 
and Society, Second Edition, Minneapolis: West Academic Publishing. 
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rest of the world, and “personality right includes protection of information privacy”. 142 The 
German Federal Constitutional Court has derived a constitutional right to “informational 
self-determination” from Article 2 Paragraph 1 containing the general personality right of 
the Basic Law in 1983.143 
Privacy invasions can be tackled using a variety of legal instruments, including contractual 
obligation, criminal offenses, tort liabilities, defamation tort, and confidentiality 
responsibilities. Contractual obligation is one of the most important legal instruments 
for protecting individual privacy in that, for instance, Internet Service Providers must fulfil 
certain contractual duties previously agreed by both parties of a contract. The violation 
of such duties would infer legal consequences, mostly in the form of economic loss. 
Such obligations are mostly provided by privacy clauses in terms of service in consumer 
contracts. For instance, banks have the contractual duty to prevent consumer’s personal 
data from being disclosed without the consumers’ consent. Upon data breaches that lead 
to privacy invasion, victims can resort to contractual liability for remedies and/or damages.
Data Protection law
Nowadays, over 100 countries around the world have enacted comprehensive data 
protection legislation, and many other countries are in the process of passing such laws. 
Moreover, countries not having comprehensive data protection legislation may have privacy 
laws applicable to certain sectoral areas, including those of child protection or financial 
records.144 Data protection law is the most used legal instrument to protect personal data 
and provides more comprehensive privacy protection. EU Member States have transposed 
the EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC into domestic laws, which include detailed rules 
covering the whole scope of data processing, including lawful data processing, code of 
conducts, notification duty of data processors, data subjects’ rights, data transfer to third 
non-EU countries and the setting up of data protection supervising bodies.145 Outside 
Europe, many jurisdictions have passed data protection laws or similar laws that secure 
data privacy.146
Other legal instruments 
Criminal law is a strong legal instrument to tackle privacy invasion. Online privacy 
invasion can be punished by criminal law when other people’s information is hacked and 
considerable harm is caused. For instance, in Virginia, USA, a person is guilty of the crime 
of Computer Invasion of Privacy when he or she “uses a computer or computer network 
142 Edward J. Eberle, “Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in German and American Constitutional Law”, 
(1997) Utah Law Review , p. 976.
143 Douwe Korff and Ian Brown, The Use of the Internet and Related Services, Private Life and Data Protection: 
Trends and Technologies, Threats and Implications, Report, Council of Europe, March 2013, p. 2, available at 
<https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/cybersecurity-capacity/content/use-Internet-and-related-services-private-life-
and-data-protection-trends-and-technologies>.
144 Privacy International, “What Is Data Protection?”, available at <https://www.privacyinternational.
org/?q=node/44>, accessed 30 May 2015.
145 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection 
of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 
available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML>, 
accessed 26 April 2015.
146 Graham Greenleaf, “Global Data Privacy Laws: 89 Countries, and Accelerating”, (2012) Privacy Laws & Business 
International Report, No. 115, available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2000034>.
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and intentionally examines without authority any employment, salary, credit or any other 
financial or personal information relating to any other person”.147
Privacy tort is an important legal instrument to protect privacy in many legal systems, but 
not limited to common law jurisdictions. In the USA privacy tort traditionally covers four 
categories of actionable offenses, namely: a) appropriation of name and likeness; b) false 
light; c) disclosure of personal information; and d) intrusion of solitude and seclusion.148 
Of these, the first three can be generally applied for the protection of privacy in online 
contexts. Similarly, the tort of defamation can be used to protect online privacy, indirectly, 
because of the frequent links between an individual’s reputation and privacy. For instance, 
private information might contain secrecies of an individual whose disclosure may have 
great influence on one’s reputation, as well as cause economic loss and psychological 
distress.149 In some circumstances, privacy and libel, the two legal avenues of complaint, 
seem to be merging into one big “protection of reputation lump”.150 Also there are the 
overlaps between false light and defamation as observed in legal practices.151
Since 2008 there has been a marked increase in criminal defamation cases in the new 
media environment.152 However, many jurisdictions do not apply criminal defamation law 
in practice, leaving the crime merely on paper.153
Other legal instruments include a law of confidentialities in different professions including, 
amongst others, medical service, legal services, consulting services, banking services, and 
journalism. For such professions and vocations, privacy protection is central to mutual trust 
between the parties involved and the functionality of these private and public services. 
For example, lawyers are required by law not to disclose their clients’ personal information 
to third parties if disclosure may counter the interests of their clients. Journalists in many 
jurisdictions enjoy some privilege not to disclose the sources of information, in order 
to protect informants and promote future disclosures that promote transparency and 
democracy. Recognition of this underpins UNESCO’s position that in the digital age there is 
a need for enhanced protection of the confidentiality of journalism sources.154
In addition, there are sectoral laws and regulations to protect the privacy and private life of 
individuals coming from special social groups—especially when such individuals would be 
in a much weaker position, for various reasons—from invasion by others. For instance, the 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA) is a USA Federal law that imposes 
certain requirements on operators of websites or online services directed at children under 
13 years of age, and on operators of other websites or online services that have actual 
147 Under 18.2-152.5 of VIRGINIA COMPUTER CRIME ACT, at Virginia Computer Crimes Act (Excerpts), available at 
<http://courses.cs.vt.edu/professionalism/Crime/virginia.law.html>, accessed 26 April 2015. 
148 William L. Prosser, “Privacy”, (1960) California Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 3, p. 383. 
149 Richard A. Posner, “Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation”, (1978) Buffalo Law Review Vol. 28, p. 1.
150 Siobhain Butterworth, “Privacy, Libel or Protection of Reputation?”, The Guardian, 8 April 2011, available at 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/butterworth-and-bowcott-on-law/2011/apr/08/privacy-libel-protection-
of-reputation>.
151 Nathan E. Ray, “Let There Be False Light: Resisting the Growing Trend Against an Important Tort”, (1999) 
Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 84, p. 715.
152 Mei Ning Yan, “Criminal Defamation in the New Media Environment - the Case of the People’s Republic of 
China”, (2011) International Journal of Communications Law and Policy, No. 14.
153 International Press Institute, Out of Balance: Defamation Law in the EU and Its Effect on Press Freedom, Report, 
July 2014, available at <http://www.freemedia.at/ecpm/defamation-law-report.html>.
154 Outcome Statement of CONNECTing the Dots, endorsed in Resolution 53 at UNESCO’s 38th General 
Conference: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002340/234090e.pdf 
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knowledge that they are collecting personal information online from a child under 13 years 
of age.155 
Other privacy protection legal instruments include special privacy clauses in multiple laws 
and regulations in other regulatory contexts. For instance, there may be special clauses 
governing law enforcement actions in searching suspects during crime investigation, and 
particular privacy rules in healthcare systems for privacy protection, such as the privacy 
rules of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) in the USA, 
which regulates the use and disclosure of Protected Health Information (PHI) possessed by 
covered entities.
3.3.4  Alternative instruments
In addition to the examples of legal protection instruments listed above, one can find in the 
private sector alternative means, which also play an important role in protecting the privacy 
of data subjects. As elaborated below, these include various instruments, such as self-
regulation, co-regulation, market mechanisms for privacy protection, user empowerment 
measures, nudging mechanisms and professional ethics.
The first two (i.e. self-regulation and co-regulation) are often regarded as important means 
for the protection of privacy in the private sector. Self-regulation refers to situations when 
a non-State group engages in a rule-making process, by developing a set of rules, such as 
codes of conduct, a process of enforcement of the rules, or a comprehensive regulatory 
system altogether. It is supposed to replace the procedural, substantive, and implementation 
functions that might otherwise be included in State legislation/regulation.156 Self-regulation 
institutions use such tools as codes of conduct and privacy seals to protect the users’ 
privacy and improve mutual trust in privacy protection.157, 158 For instance, the US Federal 
Trade Commission’s moving for direct regulation, in 1998, by issuing a set of Guidelines for 
Online Privacy Policies, has led to the formation of the Online Privacy Alliance (OPA) in the 
mid-1990s, a group consisting of Internet firms.159
Co-regulation implies that State regulation and self-regulation cooperate together in 
the regulation of particular activities, with the State on the one hand providing a legal 
framework that enables the creation, operationalization and enforcement of rules, and self-
governing bodies on the other hand creating rules and administering them, sometimes 
through joint structures or mechanisms.160
Regarding the third instrument (i.e. market mechanisms for privacy protection), market 
solutions can improve privacy protection by means of market competition. Private 
companies can improve their market position by competing with rivals in providing greater 
155 Federal Trade Commission, “Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule (‘COPPA’)”, available at <https://
www.ftc.gov/enforcement/rules/rulemaking-regulatory-reform-proceedings/childrens-online-privacy-
protection-rule>, accessed 26 April 2015
156 Ibid., pp. 197-200.
157 Jedidiah Bracy, “Will Industry Self-Regulation Be Privacy’s Way Forward?”, The Privacy Advisor, available at 
<https://privacyassociation.org/news/a/will-industry-self-regulation-be-privacys-way-forward/>, accessed 
27 April 2015
158 Norman E. Bowie and Karim Jamal, “Privacy Rights on the Internet: Self-Regulation or Government 
Regulation?”, (2006) Business Ethics Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 3,pp. 323-342.
159 Dennis D. Hirsch, “The Law and Policy of Online Privacy: Regulation, Self-Regulation or Co-Regulation?”, 
2010, p. 34, available at <http://works.bepress.com/dennis_hirsch/1>.
160 Jeanne P. Mifsud Bonnici, (2008) Self-Regulation in Cyberspace, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, pp. 15-16.
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privacy protection. When users are not demanding more privacy protection, following the 
theory, users value the service provided on market more than the privacy they are losing, so 
that there is no urgent need for regulatory interference.161
The fourth instrument—user empowerment measures—refers to users who may favor 
the use of empowering measures to protect their personal information and privacy on 
the Internet, including by encrypting sensitive personal data (particularly in the context of 
Cloud computing such as by participating in such initiatives as the Cloudprotect project162) 
—or by using Tor and GNUnet technologies.
The fifth instrument—nudging mechanisms—refers to a recent tendency for governments 
to facilitate tools of a soft-paternalism nature—i.e. commercial nudging mechanisms—
designed to improve consumers’ privacy self-protection online by “ameliorating” their 
privacy decisions.163 An example of this is an alert to inform smartphone users of the 
privacy risk of storing sensitive personal data in certain locations or using certain apps that 
appropriate unnecessary private data.164
The sixth - professional ethics - refers to the use of constructs, such as codes of ethics, which 
act as moral bindings on data controllers and data processers to take the data subject’s 
privacy into account. As an example of this, already mentioned earlier, some professions—
e.g. lawyers, doctors, accountants, spiritual leaders and journalists—are bound to protect 
the data subject’s privacy, by not disclosing confidential information, unless justified to do 
so in accordance with international legal standards, in order to ensure the trust necessary 
to support their general functioning.
3.3.5  Legitimate exceptions 
The right to privacy is not an absolute right and must be balanced with other human rights 
and values; there are lawful exceptions to restrict the right to privacy whether online or 
offline. To what extent such legitimate purposes or ends may compromise the right to 
privacy will be case-dependent in diverse socio-legal contexts. However, there are certain 
general exceptions recognized by most legal systems, although their expressions or terms 
may differ. Unlike the right to freedom of expression as described in the ICCPR, Article 17 of 
the ICCPR does not provide an explicit limitation clause for privacy. Consequently, the related 
limitations have to be found from multiple sources; mainly the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the Siracusa Principles, general comments by the Human Rights Committee, 
regional and national case law and the views of independent experts.165 Following these 
authoritative sources, any legitimate limitations of the right to privacy by State authority, 
161 Ibid, p. 25.
162 M.H. Diallo et al., “CloudProtect: Managing Data Privacy in Cloud Applications”, in (2012) 2012 IEEE 5th 
International Conference on Cloud Computing (CLOUD), pp. 303-310.
163 Wainer Lusoli et al., Pan-European Survey of Practices, Attitudes and Policy Preferences as Regards Personal 
Identity Data Management, JRC Scientific and Policy Report, European Commission, Joint Research Center, 
2012, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, pp. 17-18, available at <http://is.jrc.
ec.europa.eu/pages/TFS/documents/EIDSURVEY_Web_001.pdf>.
164 Rebecca Balebako et al., “Nudging Users towards Privacy on Mobile Devices”, in Proc. CHI 2011 Workshop 
on Persuasion, Nudge, Influence and Coercion, 2011, p. 2, available at <http://www.researchgate.net/
profile/Pedro_Leon6/publication/268199850_Nudging_Users_Towards_Privacy_on_Mobile_Devices/
links/548f29130cf2d1800d862282.pdf>.
165 Navi Pillay, “The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age: Report of the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (A/HRC/27/37)”, 30 June 2014, para. 22.
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when balancing with other rights and freedoms, must be in accordance with the principles 
of legality, necessity and proportionality to achieve legitimate aims.166 
In legal practice, there are thematic limitations on the right to privacy that are generally 
accepted and integrated in national laws in most democracies around the world. For instance, 
under the EU Data Protection Directive (DPD), exemptions or derogations are allowed when 
the use of data is solely for journalistic purposes or for artistic or literary expression. This 
is on the condition that the actors concerned will reconcile the right to privacy with the 
rules governing freedom of expression, and that the actors apply such exemptions and 
derogations according to law and respect the principle of proportionality in a democracy. 
Other exceptions are also allowed under European State laws regarding matters of: (a) 
national security and defence; (b) public security; (c) the prevention, investigation, detection 
and prosecution of criminal offences; (d) an important economic or financial interest of 
a Member State or of the European Union, including monetary, budgetary and taxation 
matters; (e) a monitoring, inspection or regulatory function connected, even occasionally, 
with the exercise of official authority in cases referred to in (c), (d) and (e); (f ) the protection 
of data subjects and the rights and freedom of others. 167 The above exemptions cover most 
legitimate grounds that are allowed to compromise the right to privacy of data subjects 
and may be recognized to different extents in other jurisdictions.
There are sometimes certain special contexts and reasons to limit the right to privacy of 
specific individuals. For instance, public figures or public celebrities, in particular political 
figures, may enjoy more restricted privacy protection by law and/or custom than other 
ordinary citizens because of the public status they occupy and the corresponding influence 
they have on others, especially when the issues at stake are of public interest, or of a 
legitimate concern to the public. Even in a jurisdiction that grants comparatively strong 
privacy protection to public figures, there are still many limitations on the activities of such 
figures if such activities are of public interest.168 The USA Restatement of Torts (Second) 
did recognize that public figures have some expectation of privacy, but it clarified that the 
scope of tort liability depends on the plaintiffs’ status, further observing that: “the common 
law of privacy has always embraced the public/private figure distinction and that the Court 
has used the doctrine in a related area—the individual’s right of informational privacy 
against the government”. 169 
As suggested in the case of public figures, the protection of individual privacy is not absolute 
and must be balanced with other equally important values and public interests. How to 
optimize these values in particular circumstances, especially in case of public figures, will 
be discussed further in Chapter 7, in which we explore the interplays (and balancing) of 
privacy, transparency and freedom of expression. 
166 For detailed explanations of the three principles, see Ibid., para. 23.
167 Recital 37, Article 9 and Article 13 Restrictions and exemptions. See Directive 95/46/EC. (Though the right 
to data protection is different from the right to privacy, the overlap of the protection is obvious in this 
context.)
168 Scott. J. Shackelford, “Fragile Merchandise: A Comparative Analysis of the Privacy Rights for Public Figures”, 
(2012) American Business Law Journal, Vol. 49, No. 1,pp. 72-75.
169 Susan M. Gilles, “Public Plaintiffs and Private Facts: Should the Public Figure Doctrine Be Transplanted into 
Privacy Law”, (2005) Nebraska Law Review Vol. 83, No. 4, pp. 1205 and 1214.
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3.3.6  Cross-border data transfer
National States may be sufficiently capable to protect the information privacy or data 
privacy of their own citizens within their own territories. However, as cross-border data 
transfers continue to prevail and to be unavoidable for the well-functioning of the Internet, 
it is increasingly challenging for States to protect their citizens’ data privacy, especially in 
the case of large trans-border data flows. This challenge relates to conflicts of national 
laws and jurisdictions that present issues of a political and diplomatic, rather than legal, 
nature. As with poor international protection of data privacy, the same phenomenon on an 
extraterritorial basis, may lower general trust in the Internet, and it may also further lead to 
fragmentation of the Internet. International society has made considerable efforts to cope 
with the challenge, as elaborated below. 
In 2000, the European Commission adopted the Decision 520/2000/EC—i.e. the ‘Safe 
Harbour decision’—recognizing the Safe Harbour Privacy Principles and Frequently Asked 
Questions and providing adequate protection for the purposes of personal data transfers 
from the EU. The Decision allowed the free transfer of personal information from EU Member 
States to companies in the USA, 170 which had signed up to the Principles in circumstances 
where such data transfers would otherwise—given the substantial differences in privacy 
regimes between the two sides of Atlantic—not meet the EU standards for adequate levels 
of data protection.171 After the Snowden revelations, the ECJ invalidated the Safe Harbour 
Program,172 and a new round of negotiations had led to a “Privacy Shield” arrangement at 
the time of writing this report.173
Members of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperate (APEC) have made developments in 
completing the Cross-Border Privacy Rules (CBPR) system for the protection of personal 
data throughout the Asia-Pacific area.174 The system, which is based on a similar approach 
to EU BCR, employs internal binding rules for cross-border transfers of personal data that 
are subject to prior approval by EU Data Protection Authorities or by APEC-recognized 
Accountability Agents. These requirements are designed to align a company’s privacy 
policies with certain established standards for the protection of personal information,175 
which must be validated by APEC-recognized Accountability Agents.176
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has also brought 
its contribution to protecting privacy through its recently-revised non-binding Guidelines 
170 The above does not exclude the application to the data processing of other requirement that may exist 
under national legislation implementing the EU data protection directive; also data transfers from the 
three States Parties to the EEA are similarly affected, following extension of Directive 95746/EC to the EEA 
Agreement, Decision 38/1999 of 25 June 1999, OJ L 296/41, 23/11/2000.
171 See <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/com_2013_847_en.pdf>. 
172 ECJ, C-362/14 Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner, Judgment, 6 October 2015.
173 Michelle Gyves, “How Safe? The Future of the US-EU Safe Harbor”, Privacy Law Blog, 31 March 2015, available 
at <http://privacylaw.proskauer.com/2015/03/articles/european-union/how-safe-the-future-of-the-us-eu-
safe-harbor/>.
174 Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), “APEC Cross-Border Privacy Rules System”, available at <http://
www.apec.org/Groups/Committee-on-Trade-and-Investment/~/media/Files/Groups/ECSG/CBPR/CBPR-
PoliciesRulesGuidelines.ashx>, accessed 26 May 2015.
175 “Promoting Cooperation on Data Transfer Systems between Europe and the Asia-Pacific - Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation”, available at <http://www.apec.org/Press/News-Releases/2013/0306_data.aspx>, 
accessed 26 May 2015.
176 Ibid.
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on the Protection of Privacy and Trans-border Flows of Personal Data.177 Another area of the 
OECD’s work in relation to information privacy lies in its efforts to improve cross-border co-
operations amongst privacy law enforcement authorities by proposing, in 2007, an OECD 
Recommendation on Cross-border Co-operation in the Enforcement of Laws Protecting 
Privacy.178
177 The new Guidelines constitute the first update of the original 1980 version that served as the first 
internationally agreed upon set of privacy principles, see OECD, OECD Guidelines on the Protection of 
Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data – OECD, available at <http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/
oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm>, accessed 26 May 
2015.
178 OECD, “OECD Recommendation on Cross-Border Co-Operation in the Enforcement of Laws Protecting 
Privacy”, available at <http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdrecommendationoncross-borderco-operati
onintheenforcementoflawsprotectingprivacy.htm>, accessed 26 May 2015.
47
CHAPTER 4  Online freedom of expression and protection 
mechanisms 
4.1  Defining freedom of expression 
The term ‘freedom of expression’ has existed since ancient times and has been widely 
used and conceptualized by various groups, including scholars, politicians, activists, and 
laypersons.179 With the advance of civilization and politics, in particular since the 20th 
century, there have been commonly agreed understandings of freedom of expression.180 
Its value and importance to individuals and society have been recognized among different 
communities and it has gained legal protection both under international human rights law 
and national State laws across the world.181
Freedom of opinion and expression is an essential pre-requisite in a free and democratic 
society.182 It supports a free flow of ideas that guarantees public accountability and 
transparency, and ensures the free exercise of civil and political rights by a well-informed 
and empowered public.183 In addition, freedom of opinion and expression enables societies 
to achieve stability and adaptability,184 and is crucial for the development of individuals,185 
assuring their self-fulfilment,186 including by allowing them to pursue and search for truth 
and knowledge.187
Freedom of opinion and expression is protected under Article 19 of the ICCPR. It includes the 
protection of the right to hold opinions without interference, as well as the right to change 
an opinion whenever and for any reasons a person so freely chooses. 188 Moreover, such 
freedom includes the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas regardless 
of frontiers.189 This implies rights both to send and to receive information. In this second 
respect, freedom of opinion and expression is taken as embracing the right of access to 
information held by public bodies regardless of the form in which the information is stored, 
its source or the date of production.190
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The scope of information protected under this right covers information from political 
discourse,191 commentary on one’s own192 and on public affairs,193 canvassing,194 discussion 
of human rights,195 journalism,196 cultural and artistic expression,197 teaching,198 and religious 
discourse;199 and it may also include commercial advertising.200 Additionally, the scope of 
Paragraph 2 of the ICCPR includes expressions that may be regarded as deeply offensive 
by some actors.201 Moreover, the ICCPR protects all forms of expression, including spoken, 
written, sign language and non-verbal expressions such as images and objects of art,202 and 
all means used for the dissemination of such expressions, including books, newspapers,203 
pamphlets,204 posters, banners,205 dress and legal submissions;206 as well as all forms of 
audio visual, electronic and Internet-based modes of expression.207 However, as elaborated 
below, the provisions of Articles 19, Paragraph 3, and Article 20 of the ICCPR may limit other 
expression under certain exceptional conditions.208
In particular, the universal right to freedom of opinion and expression embraces the 
protection of freedom of the press. A free, uncensored and unhindered media is essential 
in any society to ensure freedom of opinion and expression and the enjoyment of other 
rights.209 The free communication of information and ideas about public and political issues 
between citizens, candidates and elected representatives is essential, and this implies 
191 HRC, Essono Mika Miha v. Equatorial Guinea, Communication No. 414/1990, UN Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/414/1990 
(1994).
192 HRC, Anthony Fernando v. Sri Lanka, Communication No. 1189/2003, UN Doc. CCPR/C/83/D/1189/2003 
(2005).
193 HRC, Patrick Coleman v. Australia, Communication No. 1157/2003, UN Doc. CCPR/C/87/D/1157/2003 (2006).
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library/ja/kokusai/humanrights_library/treaty/data/CO_JPRep6_ICCPR140820.pdf>, accessed 23 August 
2015.
195 HRC, Mr. Vladimir Velichkin v. Belarus, Communication No. 1022/2001, UN Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1022/2001 
(2005).
196 HRC, Mavlonov and Sa’di v. Uzbekistan, Communication No. 1334/2004, UN Doc. CCPR/C/95/D/1334/2004 
(2009).
197 HRC, Hak-Chul Shin v. Republic of Korea, Communication No. 926/2000, UN Doc. CCPR/C/80/D/926/2000 
(2004) (2004).
198 HRC, Ross v. Canada, Communication No 736/1997, UN Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/736/1997 (2000).
199 Ibid.
200 “[…] Information of a commercial nature cannot be excluded from the scope of Article 10, para. 1, which 
does not apply solely to certain types of information or ideas or forms of expression”. See ECtHR, Mark Intern 
Verlag GMBH and Klaus Beermann v. Germany, Judgment, 20 November 1989, Application No. 10572/83, 
para. 26; see also Council of Europe Publishing, “Freedom of Expression in Europe, Case-Law Concerning 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights”, Human Rights Files, No. 18, March 2007, para. 79, 
available at <http://www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/DG2/HRFILES/DG2-EN-HRFILES-18%282007%29.pdf>.
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that a free press is able to comment on public issues without censorship to inform public 
opinion.210 In addition, Articles 19 and 25 of the ICCPR provide a right whereby the media 
has access to information on public affairs,211 and the right of the general public to receive 
media output.212 It is in the light of these dimensions that UNESCO conceptualizes press 
freedom as a corollary of the right to expression.213 
Furthermore, the protection of journalists and press freedom is an issue of central 
importance for the full exercise of freedom of opinion and expression, insofar as journalism 
is a necessary activity in any society, providing individuals and society as a whole with 
essential information to allow them to develop their own thoughts as well as their 
conclusions and opinions.214 Journalists—including media workers, support staff, as well 
as community media workers and the so-called ‘citizen journalists’ especially in the digital 
age—observe, describe and analyse events, statements, policies, and any propositions that 
can affect and shape society.215 Moreover, journalists play a significant watchdog role in 
society by scrutinizing the government and other entities, as well as by providing necessary 
information to individuals. This enables individuals, by exercising the right to “seek and 
receive information”, to make informed decisions and express their opinions freely and 
participate actively in a democratic society. 216
Nowadays, journalists across the world continue to face risks and challenges in undertaking 
their professional work, despite the existence of provisions in international human rights 
law, which protect the journalists’ right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of 
all kinds.217 These risks and challenges range from restrictions of movement, deportations 
and denial of access to a country; to arbitrary arrests and detention; torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; confiscation of and damages to equipment; 
illegal surveillance and office break-ins; information theft; death threats; stigmatization or 
campaigns to discredit journalists; and abductions or enforced disappearance to killings.218 
One of the biggest challenges to ensuring the protection of journalists is impunity, or the 
failure to bring to justice the perpetrators of such human rights violations.219 These issues are 
of great concern to UNESCO, which leads the UN Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists 
and the Issue of Impunity, and has a range of activities and mechanisms on these issues.
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In general, freedom of opinion and expression is a pre-requisite for the full exercise of other 
human rights.220 For example, it is a guarantor of free and fair electoral processes.221 It also 
enables a well-informed and empowered public to freely exercise its civil and political 
rights, and creates the conditions for a free and open political communication, which is 
an essential element to ensure fair and democratic electoral processes. 222 Moreover, it 
interrelates with the right to privacy. For instance, respect for privacy of communications is 
a prerequisite for trust by those engaging in communicative activities, which is successively 
a pre-condition for the exercise of the right to freedom of expression.223 The interplay of 
freedom of expression and opinion and privacy will be discussed further in Chapter 6. 
Previously, the right to freedom of expression has not been connected with the protection 
of children’s rights. International legal instruments dealing with children’s rights—such 
as the Geneva Declaration on the Rights of the Child of 1924 and the Declaration of the 
Rights of the Child224—have not included any reference to the issue, assuming that given 
their immaturity children were not able to make meaningful choices.225 In contrast, the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) proclaims the right to children to freedom of 
expression.226 Article 13 of the CRC, in conjunction with provisions sets out in Articles 12 and 
17 of the Convention—which protect the right to be heard and the right to have access to 
information—provides a level of protection of the child’s right to freedom of expression.227 
In CRC, freedom of expression has been regarded as having a developmental aspect, since 
its objective is to enable children to develop themselves in society with others and become 
participative citizens in public life.228 Furthermore, according to the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child, Article 13 of the CRC can be exercised not only against the State but also 
within the family, in the community, at school, in public policy decisions and in society.229
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G14/071/50/PDF/G1407150.pdf?OpenElement>.
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4.2  Freedom of expression in the digital age 
It is widely accepted that innovations in ICTs have created new opportunities for individuals 
to spread information to a wider audience and thus to have a more significant impact on the 
right to freedom to access and receive information. The invention and worldwide diffusion 
of the Internet is reshaping global access to information, communication and services.230 
The Internet is an integral part of the daily life of many individuals and has become a central 
and key medium for an increasing number of individuals to exercise their right to freedom 
of expression. However, the Internet may also challenge this right, insofar as the legal and 
regulatory initiatives that have been created to restrict and control the use of the Internet for 
information and communication may be used to diminish or violate freedom of expression.
Although access to the Internet is not a human right as such, the UN Special Rapporteur 
on the promotion of freedom of opinion and expression has reiterated that States have a 
positive obligation to facilitate the enjoyment of the right to freedom of expression and the 
means necessary to exercise the right, which include the Internet.231 Similarly, the Human 
Rights Committee has underscored that States Parties should take all necessary steps to 
promote the independence of new media and guarantee access to it to all individuals.232 
Also, the Special Rapporteur highlighted that both Article 19 of the UDHR and Article 19 
of the ICCPR were drafted with forethought to comprise and adapt to future technological 
developments through which individuals could exercise their right to freedom of 
expression.233 He subsequently concluded that therefore, “the framework of international 
human rights law remains relevant today and equally applicable to new communication 
technologies such as the Internet”.234 Furthermore, the UN Human Rights Council adopted 
a landmark resolution in 2012 affirming “the same rights that people have offline must also 
be protected online”.235 
In the digital age, ICTs also have major impacts on information dissemination in terms 
of shifting the powers of different actors. For instance, since the Internet has become a 
crucial and cheap medium for communicating news to a global audience, most of the 
offline media have developed online alternatives, 236 and this is leading to an emergence of 
“online journalists”—both professionals and “citizen journalists”—who play an increasingly 
important role in modern society by documenting and communicating news online. 237 In 
230 William H. Dutton et al., Freedom of Connection, Freedom of Expression: The Changing Legal and 
Regulatory Ecology Shaping the Internet, Report, 2013, Paris: UNESCO, p. 8, available at <http://
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relation to such a power shift, the safety of journalists in the online context—e.g. formally 
recognized journalists, their support staff or others such as citizen journalists, bloggers, 
social media actors or human rights defenders—is a necessary condition for the freedom 
of press and expression.238 Nonetheless, the shift of power towards individuals in regard 
to information dissemination coincides with increasing concerns over the protection of 
others’ privacy or private sphere when “reporting” or “recording” can happen at any time and 
anywhere, which may go against the will of the subject or a given law.239
Furthermore, the right to freedom of expression can be enhanced or restricted by the 
increasing mediating role played by Internet intermediaries. Internet intermediaries are 
defined as “entities that enable the communication of information from one party to another” 
In 2010, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) stated in its 
report that Internet intermediaries bring together or facilitate transactions between third 
parties on the Internet. “They give access to, host, transmit and index content, products 
and services originated by third parties on the Internet or provide Internet-based services 
to third parties”. The range of intermediaries includes entities such as search engines, ISPs, 
hosting providers, Cloud computing services, online social networks and media houses, 
which provide for user-generated content such as comments, blogs or citizen-journalism 
posts.240
On the one hand, Internet intermediaries are crucial in facilitating and protecting the rights 
to free expression and privacy. On the other hand, they can serve as instruments that 
enable them and/or governments to monitor, regulate and control an individual’s online 
activities and access to information, thus violating people’s rights to privacy and freedom 
of expression.241 The potential tensions in this are outlined in UNESCO’s study Fostering 
Freedom Online: the role of Internet intermediaries.242 
4.3  The protection mechanisms: a global review
4.3.1  International law framework
The most authoritative concept in relation to freedom of expression is prescribed by Article 
19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Article 19 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The former contains the first and most widely 
recognized statement on the right to freedom of expression,243 stating that everyone has 
the right to freedom of opinion and expression, including freedom to hold opinions without 
interference and to seek, receive and impact information and ideas through any media and 
despite the frontiers. Even though the UDHR is not a binding treaty, it is a recommendatory 
resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly that, due to time and universal acceptance, 
238 Council of the European Union, “EU Human Rights Guidelines on Freedom of Expression Online and Offline” 
(Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 2014), p. 2, available at <http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/
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and Romney’s 47% Speech”, Nomadic Politics, 14 March 2013, available at <http://nomadicpolitics.blogspot.
nl/2013/03/privacy-laws-and-citizen-journalism.html>. 
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has gained the status of customary international law.244 The latter, in Paragraphs 1 and 2, 
requires: a) protection of the right to hold opinions without interference; and b) States 
parties to guarantee the right to freedom of expression, including the right to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds regardless of frontiers, respectively. 
Furthermore, the latter is regarded to embrace the right of access to information held by 
public bodies. 245 
The UN Human Rights Committee, as a treaty monitoring body for the ICCPR, provided 
interpretations of Article 19 of the latter in General Comments, with the most authoritative 
being provided in 2011 in General Comment 34 (UNHRC/GC34).246, 247 In this General 
Comment the Committee has elaborated on the meaning of the right to freedom of 
expression, and required States parties to ICCPR to contemplate the significance for freedom 
of expression of developments in ICTs, such as the Internet and mobile-based electronic 
information dissemination systems.248
In 1993, the UN Commission on Human Rights had established the mandate of the 
Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion 
and expression, and in March 2014 the Human Rights Council had extended the office 
of the Special Rapporteur for a further period of three years.249 The annual reports and 
missions identify new trends and clarify the meaning and scope of the right to freedom 
of expression. The Human Rights Council unanimously adopted in 2012 the landmark 
Resolution on the promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet, stating 
that the same rights that people have offline must also be protected online, in particular 
freedom of expression, which is applicable regardless of frontiers and through any media of 
one’s choice in accordance with Articles 19 UDHR and ICCPR.250
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4.3.2  Regional law framework
European Union and Council of Europe
The protection of fundamental human rights is one of the basic tenets of EU law.251 Article 
2 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) prescribes that: ‘…The Union is founded on the 
values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and 
respect of human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities…’ 252
Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union defines the right to 
freedom of expression as including the freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. It 
also affirms that everyone has the right to freedom of expression and that the freedom and 
pluralism of the media shall be respected.253
Article 11 of the EU Charter corresponds to Article 10 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR). However, the latter does not prevent States from requiring the 
licensing of broadcasting or television.254 Other forms of expression, which are entitled to 
particular protection in a broader sense by the EU Charter—Articles 10, 12 and 13—include: 
a) freedom of thought, conscience and religion; b) freedom of assembly and of association; 
and c) freedom of the arts and sciences.255
The ECHR guarantees a wide range of human rights to inhabitants of Member States of 
the Council of Europe. In Article 10 it states that everyone has the right to freedom of 
expression, including freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and 
ideas without interference. However, it also states that these freedoms may be subjected 
to restrictions as prescribed by law and as necessary in a democratic society, such as 
restrictions for reasons of national security, public order or public health.
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe monitors the execution of judgments, 
in particular to ensure payment of remedies or compensations awarded by the Court to the 
applicants in compensation for the damage they have caused.
The Convention established the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which can be 
used to bring a case by any person who feels his or her rights have been violated under 
the Convention by a State Party, when all domestic remedies have been exhausted. The 
ECtHR judged the first case in 1960, De Becker, concerning Article 10 of the ECHR in view 
of the lifelong prohibition on carrying on the occupations of journalist and author.256 Then 
in 1979 the ECtHR delivered the first judgement on freedom of expression and information 
in a case unequivocally emphasizing the significance of freedom of expression as one of 
251 For more details, see <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/displayFtu.
html?ftuId=FTU_2.1.2.html>.
252 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
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253 European Union (EU), Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000, p. 11, available at <http://
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the essential foundations and conditions of a democracy and for the development of every 
man.257
In 2014, the Council of European Union issued the EU Human Rights Guidelines on Freedom 
of Expression Online and Offline, which state that freedom of opinion and expression are 
fundamental rights of every human being,258 and affirm that such freedoms are crucial 
for peace, stability, individual dignity and fulfilment as well as essential requirements for 
democracy, rule of law,, sustainable inclusive development and participation of public 
affairs. 259 The guidelines also emphasize the importance of these freedoms for the fulfilment 
and enjoyment of other human rights, such as the freedom of association and assembly, the 
freedom of thought, religion or belief, and the right to education. 260 
Other regional instruments
The American Convention on Human Rights—Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica—implemented 
by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Inter-American Commission, introduces 
the right to freedom of thought and expression in Article 13,261 which in Paragraph 2 states 
that the exercise of the right shall not be subject to prior censorship but shall be subject to 
subsequent imposition of liability. According to Article 13, liability should be established by 
law to the necessary extent to ensure respect for the rights of others and the protection of 
national security, public order or public health.
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, implemented by the African Commission 
on Human and People’s Rights, introduces the right to express and disseminate opinions 
within the law by Article 9 Paragraph 2.262 The Declaration of Principles on Freedom of 
Expression in Africa, implemented by the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, 
reaffirms in its Preamble the right to receive information and the right to free expression, 
protected by Article 9 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights. Article 1 of the 
Declaration guarantees the freedom of expression and information, including “the right to 
seek, receive and impart information and ideas, either orally, in writing or in print, in the 
form of art, or through any other form of communication, including across the frontiers”.
The Declaration on Principles of Freedom of Expression (OAS) states, in Principle 1, that 
freedom of expression in all its forms and manifestations is a fundamental and inalienable 
right of all individuals, as well as an indispensable requirement for the very existence of a 
democratic society.263 Furthermore, in Principle 2 it recalls that every person has the right to 
257 ECtHR, Handyside v. The United Kingdom, Judgment, 7 December 1976, Application No. 5493/72, para. 49. 
See also ECtHR, The Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom, Judgment, 26 April 1979, Application No. 6538/74, 
64.
258 Council of the European Union, “EU Human Rights Guidelines on Freedom of Expression Online and Offline” 
(Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 2014), p. 1, available at <http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/
documents/eu_human_rights_guidelines_on_freedom_of_expression_online_and_offline_en.pdf>.
259 Ibid.
260 Ibid.
261 Organization of American States (OAS), American Convention on Human Rights ‘Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica’ 
(B-32), 1969, available at <http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-32_American_Convention_on_Human_
Rights.htm>.
262 Organization of African Unity, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter), 1981, available 
at <http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/>.
263 Organization of American States (OAS), Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression, “Declaration 
of Principles on Freedom of Expression”, 2000, available at <http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/
showarticle.asp?artID=26>.
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seek, receive and impart information and opinions freely under terms set forth in Article 13 
of the American Convention on Human Rights.
4.3.3  National law framework
All Member States of the European Union have constitutional protections for freedom of 
opinion and expression, as they have implemented the main provisions of the Treaty on 
the European Union, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Upon the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, 
a number of amendments were made for implementation. The Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of European Union became legally binding,264 the Union acceded to the European 
Convention of Human Rights,265 and the fundamental rights guaranteed by the ECHR 
became binding principles of the Union law.266 Under the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR), press freedom, like the right to reputation and privacy, is not interpreted as 
an absolute right but as a qualified right to be balanced with other rights.267 The majority 
of countries have constitutional protection from the national laws with the possibility of 
appeal to the European Court of Human Rights for violations of freedom of expression and 
other fundamental rights. 268 
In the USA, the protection granted by the First Amendment and the related case law 
have gradually established one of the world’s strongest freedom of expression protection 
mechanisms, securing a wide range of speeches and speech actions. The mechanism includes 
several common law exceptions, relating to obscenity,269 defamation,270 incitement,271 
incitement to riot or imminent lawless action,272 fighting words,273 fraud, speech covered by 
copyright, and speech integral to criminal conduct. The USA ratified the ICCPR in 1992. After 
ratification, the ICCPR became the “supreme law of the land” under the Supremacy Clause 
of the United States Constitution, which gives acceded treaties the status of federal law.274 
The United States must comply with the implementation of the provisions of the treaty just 
as it would do with any other domestic law, subject to Reservations, Understanding and 
Declarations (RUDs) entered when it ratified the treaty. 275 Canada acceded to the ICCPR 
in 1976. Freedom of expression in Canada is guaranteed by Section 2 Paragraph b of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which among various freedoms states that 
264 Article 6 Paragraph 1, Treaty of the European Union, available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12012M/TXT&from=EN>.
265 Ibid., Article 6 Paragraph 2.
266 Ibid., Article 6 Paragraph 3.
267 UNESCO, World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media Development: Regional Overview of 
Western Europe and North America, 2014, Paris: UNESCO, p. 8, available at <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/
images/0022/002277/227741e.pdf>.
268 Ibid.
269 Eric Neisser, (1991) Recapturing the Spirit: Essays on the Bill of Rights at 200, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, p. 
68.
270 Donald E. Biederman, (2007) Law and Business of the Entertainment Industries, Westport: Greenwood 
Publishing Group, p. 457.
271 Ibid.
272 Ibid.
273 Eric Neisser, (1991) Recapturing the Spirit: Essays on the Bill of Rights at 200, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 
p. 68.
274 ACLU, FAQ: The Covenant on Civil & Political Rights (ICCPR), Parliament of Canada, Constitution Act 1982, 
Part I, The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, available at <https://www.aclu.org/faq-covenant-civil-
political-rights-iccprl>. 
275 Ibid. 
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everyone has the freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of 
press and other media of communication.276 
Most countries in Latin America and the Caribbean provide constitutional guarantees or 
laws that protect freedom of expression as a fundamental right, though cases of prior 
censorship have been frequent.277 Asia and the Pacific have been in the process of aligning 
with international standards of freedom of expression.278 A total of 41 countries (93%) in the 
region have guaranteed freedom of expression in their constitutions, even though there has 
been a wide range of implementation levels and possibilities for the right to be overridden 
by other laws.279 The national constitutions of 47 African countries contain a guarantee of 
the right to freedom of expression. However, sub-clauses or other pieces of legislation often 
stipulate limitations based upon concepts/values such as national security, public order, 
public morality and public health, without providing a more elaborated understanding of 
these concepts/values. Nevertheless, journalists have increasingly resisted constraints, and 
citizens have been able to express themselves relatively freely by means of public media, 
particularly on Internet forums and in radio talk shows.280 
4.3.4  Limitations and restrictions
The Human Rights Committee interprets protection of free expression broadly to include 
expressions that may be regarded as deeply offensive,281 although certain expressions 
may also be limited accordingly with the provisions of Article 19 (in Paragraph 3) and are 
required to be limited under Article 20.282
At the same time, freedom of expression is not an absolute right and can be limited when 
conflicting with other equally important human rights and public interests. Paragraph  3 
of Article 19 of the ICCPR articulates that ‘…the exercise of the rights provided for in 
Paragraph  2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities and provides 
the restrictions to this right…’ These limitations are legitimate if they fall within the narrow 
conditions defined in the three-part test in Article 19 of the ICCPR, in Paragraph 3.283 First, 
the limitation must be provided by a law or regulation with clarity and precision pursuant 
to the principle of legal certainty.284 Second, there must be a legitimate aim to limit the 
right to freedom of expression. The legitimate aims provided in Article 19 Paragraph 3 ICCPR 
are exclusive and cannot be added to, including: for respect of the rights or reputations of 
others, or for the protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or 
276 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, available at <http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/const/page-15.
html>.
277 UNESCO, World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media Development: Regional Overview of 
Western Europe and North America, 2014, Paris: UNESCO, p. 8, available at <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/
images/0022/002277/227741e.pdf>.
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281 HRC, CCPR General Comment No. 34: Article 19 (Freedoms of Opinion and Expression), 12 September 2011, 
UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34, para. 11, available at <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/gc34.
pdf>.
282 Ibid.
283 OHCHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur to the Human Rights Council on Key Trends and Challenges 
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Internet, 16 May 2011, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/27, para. 8, available at <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/
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58
morals. Third, any limitation of the right to freedom of expression must be truly necessary 
for the protection of that legitimate aim.285
The right to privacy, family, home, correspondence, honour and reputation is protected 
under Article 17 of the ICCPR. The Human Rights Committee has indicated that: “This 
right is required to be guaranteed against all such interferences and attacks whether they 
emanate from State authorities or from natural or legal persons”.286 However, at the same 
time, the HRC has observed that “as all persons live in society, the protection of privacy is 
necessarily relative”. Thus, it remains a challenge to balance rights to privacy and protection 
of reputation with the right to freedom of expression. Nevertheless, the measures taken to 
limit freedom of expression to protect these rights must comply with the conditions laid 
down in Article 9 of the ICCPR, in Paragraph 3.
Article 19 of the ICCPR, in Paragraph 3, permits restrictions aimed at protecting public 
order and national security. For instance, the prohibition of unlawful and harmful activity 
threatening public order would be a permissible ground when complying with the 
requirements of necessity and proportionality. This prohibition was considered by the 
Human Rights Committee specifically with regard to its application to counter-terrorism 
measures such as broad offences of “praising”, “glorifying” or “justifying” terrorism.287 
Respect for “public morals” is a permissible justification for restricting the right to freedom of 
expression and information. The HRC, in General Comment No. 34, recalled the observation 
made in General Comment No. 22 that: “The concept of morals derives from many social, 
philosophical and religious traditions; consequently, limitations […] for the purpose 
of protecting morals must be based on principles not deriving exclusively from a single 
tradition [and] any such limitations must be understood in the light of universality of human 
rights and the principle of non-discrimination”. 288
In the online context, the following, amongst other specific types of information mentioned 
by the Special Rapporteur, can be legitimately limited: a) child pornography (to protect 
the rights of children); b) hate speech (to protect the rights of affected communities); c) 
defamation (to protect the rights and reputation of others against unwarranted attacks); 
d) direct and public incitement to commit genocide (to protect the right of others); and e) 
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, 
hostility or violence (to protect the right of others, such as the right to life). 289 The Rabat Plan 
of Action290, developed by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights provides 
further guidance in terms of preserving expression from potential overreach in regard to 
limitation of advocacy of hatred that constitutes incitement (See Chapter 6 below). 
285 Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, 16 May 2011, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/27, para. 8, available at 
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No. 34: Article 19 (Freedoms of Opinion and Expression), 12 September 2011, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34, para. 
12, available at <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/gc34.pdf>.
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CHAPTER 5  Transparency, freedom of information and their 
protection mechanisms
5.1  Freedom of information and transparency: definitions 
and contexts
Freedom of information (FOI) and transparency are closely related concepts with long 
traditions in human civilization, which can be interpreted differently, and which cover 
diverse ideas and practices in various political-societal contexts. This Chapter analyses the 
two concepts in different contexts, as well as the related legal-political practices, briefly 
discussing their distinctions. Additionally, in view of their many overlaps, the Chapter 
provides an overview of the mechanisms employed to protect them against infringements. 
While the interplay between the concepts of transparency and FOI forms an indispensable 
part of this Chapter, it is also discussed further in Chapter 6.
5.1.1  Transparency: in contexts 
Transparency as a social value has become important to good governance and it has gained 
symbolic significance across the world. However, its meaning and history are obscure, as 
well as its consequences.291 Despite the explosion of transparency literature, there is still 
no dominant conceptual definition.292 Nevertheless, a representative view from the Asian 
Development Bank, for instance, defines ‘transparency’ as ‘…the availability of information 
to the general public and clarity about government rules, regulations and decisions…’293
In general, transparency as a doctrine of governance covers a variety of characteristics, 
including: a) decision-making in accordance to known and clearly established rather than 
ad hoc principles, guidelines, rules, processes and procedures; b) methods of accounting or 
public reporting that clarify who gains from, and who pays for any public measures; and c) 
governance that is intelligible and accessible to the general public.294 
There are multiple strains of ideas to be traced as partial forerunners for the modern concept 
of transparency, including: a) the notion of administration by publicly-known rules as one of 
the oldest ideas in political thought; b) the doctrine of good society that social affairs more 
generally should be conducted with a high degree of frankness, openness and candour; 
and c) the idea that the social world should be made knowable by methods analogous to 
those used in the natural sciences.295 Since the twentieth century, transparency is found 
reflected in many doctrines of governance. At the international level, transparency doctrines 
are important in international governance concerning the way that States relate to one 
another and to inter- or supra-national bodies, including in diplomacy and the execution of 
arms control and disarmament treaties.296 For example, the Paris COP21 agreement includes 
291 Christopher Hood, “Transparency in Historical Perspective”, in Christopher Hood and David Heald (Eds.), 
(2006) Transparency: The Key to Better Governance?, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 4.
292 Jonathan Klaaren, “The Human Right to Information and Transparency”, in Andrea Bianchi and Anne Peters 
(Eds.), (2013) Transparency in International Law, Cambridge Mass: Cambridge University Press, p. 225.
293 Asian Development Bank, “Governance: Sound Development Management”, August 1995, p. 11, available 
at <http://www.adb.org/documents/governance-sound-development-management>.
294 Christopher Hood, “Transparency in Historical Perspective”, in Christopher Hood and David Heald (Eds.), 
(2006) Transparency: The Key to Better Governance?, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 5.
295 Ibid., pp. 5-10.
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60
a transparency framework intended to prevent misreporting of nationally determined 
contributions to combating greenhouse gases.297
At the national level, three transparency doctrines concern how a State should relate 
to citizens in the way it makes decisions or keeps accounts: a) the idea of government 
according to predictable rules; b) the idea of freedom of information (see below) in dealings 
between citizens and executive government as a dimension of the above general idea, 
witnessed in Freedom of Information laws and “sunshine” acts of different States; and c) a 
different strain of ideas called “transparency” related to the EU usage of the term, namely, 
that government should operate accounting regimes to separate out different kinds 
of activities, specifically to make it possible to identify who pays and who benefits from 
particular programmes and measures. Such doctrines are also increasingly developed in 
business affairs and most recently corporate governance, relating to the way that managers 
should relate to stockholders and the financial market about how they conduct and record 
their affairs.298
In their present use, the terms ‘transparency’, ‘openness’ and ‘access to government-held 
information’ are widely used interchangeably, and regarded as remedies for the deficiencies 
and operations of governments that fall short of their rhetoric.299 There are also close 
relations between the notions of ‘transparency’ and ‘FOI’, to the point that they too are 
on occasions used interchangeably. However, it is important to make a clear distinction 
between ‘transparency’ and ‘FOI’. Conceptually, FOI has been historically linked to access 
to public documents and information, and some have suggested that such a right to 
information should not be limited only to information held by a state.300 In this perspective, 
access to information about governance is wider than access to information about 
governments. However, FOI has generally been narrowly conceived in laws as a qualified 
right to the information held by a state. On the other hand, ‘transparency’, according to 
Heald, in present days is intertwined with a range of social values and public goods in both 
positive and negative ways, in different contexts, i.e. effectiveness, trust, accountability, 
autonomy, control, confidentiality, privacy, anonymity, fairness and legitimacy,301 as well as 
in the context of the values of accountability and participation.302
However, the realization of these ends and values may itself necessitate limits on 
transparency. Scholars have identified three distinct reasons to limit transparency: a) 
inappropriate varieties of transparency may impose heavy costs in relation to the realization 
of certain public goods and rights such as effectiveness and privacy; b) all varieties of 
transparency may impede the social functions of ignorance, in particular ignorance that may 
preserve social harmony; and c) transparency is not a “free-for-all”, in that it should and must 
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298 Ibid., pp. 13-19.
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not imply immediate or complete satisfaction of everyone’s demands for governmental 
information.303
There are overlaps between transparency and FOI in terms of legislation. In order to achieve 
transparency and openness of government, ‘sunshine’ laws are passed to ensure the public 
access to government – not only to official documents, but also drawing on transparency 
and ‘openness’ doctrine to include proceedings. For example, in the USA the principal 
federal laws providing access to government records are the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) and the Privacy Act, and the main laws providing access to government meetings 
are the Federal Advisory Committee Act and the Government in the Sunshine Act. In this 
specific context, FOI law is a component of ‘sunshine’ law in the governance realm.
Technological advances in the digital age have reduced the costs to achieve transparency 
for the public sector, the private sector, and governmental bodies. This not only enables 
more transparency in such institutions, but also enhances the expectation of the public 
for more information. However, sunlight that is transformed into searchlight can become 
uncomfortable for other rights, and sunlight that evolves into torchlight may become 
destructive.304 The traditional boundaries between the expectation of transparency and 
other public interests as listed above—i.e. including privacy, accountability, fairness, 
effectiveness—have to be redefined for their optimization in adapting to new circumstances
5.1.2  Freedom of information in contexts
Freedom of information can be defined briefly as ‘access by individuals as a presumptive 
right to information held by public authorities’.305 The UN General Assembly, during its first 
session in Resolution 59(1), in 1946, recognized the notion of FOI—or the right to access 
information—in an expanded sense, with the Resolution reading: “Freedom of information 
is a fundamental human right and is the touch stone of all freedoms to which the UN is 
consecrated”.306 It is further explained in the Resolution that “freedom of information implies 
the right to gather, transmit and publish news anywhere and everywhere without fetter”.307
In this particular wording, FOI as a right legitimizes the free flow of information within society. 
However, in general, this would include receipt of information, and not only the creation 
and transmission. This indeed is the perspective of the world’s first law on these issues, 
passed in the territory of present day Sweden and Finland in 1766 (see below). Subsequently, 
laws relevant to the receiver side in as much as this entailed access to information held by 
public bodies, were recognized as FOI laws.308 The right to access information is sometimes 
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referred to as the ‘right to information’309 or the ‘right to know’.310 The value and scope of FOI 
will be further illustrated in Section 5.1.3. 
UNESCO’s 38th General Conference has endorsed a resolution for the proclamation of 
28 September as the “International Day for the Universal Access to Information”311, which 
reiterated that the right to information is an integral part of the right to freedom of expression, 
as recognized by Resolution 59 of the United Nations General Assembly adopted in 1946, 
and defined in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), and Article 
19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Freedom of information has been interpreted by the Special Rapporteur in his 1998 Annual 
Report, as a derived right under Article 19, in that “the right to seek, receive and impart 
information imposes a positive obligation on States to ensure access to information, 
particularly with regard to information held by governments”.312 While this reinforces the 
idea that the right to freedom of expression includes the right to access the information held 
by government,313 legally speaking, freedom of information is itself also an independent 
entitlement, deeply rooted in the long tradition of civil law of mandate, or the concept of 
agency in common law, in that an individual can only implement his or her plans by relying 
on other persons who can be supervised only imperfectly.
The significance of FOI rests in the potential tendency of public agents to pursue their own 
objectives to the detriment of the tasks for which they are hired.314 One effective measure 
is the transparency duty of the mandated agent to allow access to related information by 
principals or mandators. The spirit of this doctrine is reflected in modern liberal democracy, 
in that elected politicians and public bodies shall, acting as the mandatory, be responsible 
to the public and provide sufficient information for the supervision of the mandate. 
For many, ‘FOI’ and ‘transparency’ are used interchangeably, or FOI is approached as a specific 
feature of transparency with reference to access to government information.315 According 
to Birkinshaw, the notion of transparency has a much wider meaning in comparison with 
the concept of FOI, at least in the EU context. He states that “access to information is a 
component of transparency, and the latter also entails conducting affairs in the open or 
subjecting these to public scrutiny”. This implies keeping observable records of official 
decisions and activities for subsequent access by others, and making public processes 
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and law-making as accessible and comprehensible as possible, so that the involvement of 
interested parties is enabled as much as possible. 316
In this sense, the notion of ‘transparency’ is close to that of ‘openness’, where the latter 
covers such items as opening up the processes and meetings of public bodies.317 The 
notion of ‘openness’ however, has a wider scope, such as in the UNESCO concept of 
Internet Universality where it designates technical interoperability, Net Neutrality, Open 
Access knowledge principles and opportunities for new entrants (as distinct from closed or 
monopolized environments).318 Unlike FOI, transparency has, generally, not been recognized 
as a human right in international law. Nonetheless over the last decade it has become a 
frequently used word in both international law scholarship and practice.319 By contrast, 
the recognition of FOI as a fundamental human right can be well observed in the global 
trend towards recognizing the right to information and its importance by authoritative 
international organizations including the United Nations (UN), the Commonwealth of 
Nations, Organization of American States (OAS), Council of Europe (COE) and African Union 
(AU), as well as the popular protection of the right by national FOI laws across the world in 
recent years.320 
The origin of freedom of information law can be traced back to Sweden in the 18th century.321 
Colombia also has a long history of freedom of information legislation that dates back to 
the 1888 Code of Political and Municipal Organization, which allowed individuals to request 
documents held by government bodies or in government archives. 322 The USA passed its 
Freedom of Information Law in 1976,323 followed by other countries. Overall, while only 13 
countries had adopted FOI laws by 1990,324 about 100 countries had done so by 2006.325 By 
2016, this number had risen to 112.326
Meanwhile, transparency has been recognized by multilateral development banks and 
various international financial institutions. For instance, the World Bank and all other four 
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regional development banks have adopted information disclosure policies.327 UN bodies 
are also adopting access to information policies, and initiatives like the Carbon Disclosure 
Project have enlisted large companies to report on their environmental impact.
Combined with these initiatives, overall it is safe to say that ‘there has been a veritable 
revolution in recent years in terms of the right to information’328 In these developments, 
it is worth noticing the shift in the terminology used when referring to FOI. While in the 
past the most commonly used term was ‘freedom of information’, nowadays the term ‘right 
to information’ is gaining popularity amongst both civil society actors and officials; e.g. as 
reflected in the title of the 2005 India law granting access to information held by public 
authorities.329 While the right to information has a logical link to the notion of access to 
information, the latter has a wider scope that covers enabling conditions, and extending 
into issues of accessibility, as outlined in the UNESCO 2015 Study Keystones to foster 
inclusive Knowledge Societies.330
5.1.3  The value and scope of freedom of information
FOI is indispensable to, inter alia, fostering citizens’ effective participation, building trust 
in government, reducing corruption, and enabling the realization of other human rights. 
This view coincides with six other views. First, that FOI is crucial to democratic states and 
good governance. This is based on the ideas that: information must be accessible to 
members of the public in the absence of an overriding public interest in secrecy;331 that 
the public has the right to scrutinize the actions of their politicians and to engage in open 
and full debate about those actions to promote good governance;332 and that citizens 
more specifically must have access to public information related to State activity to achieve 
effectiveness in democratic procedures.333 Second, that freedom of information is crucial 
for the development of individuals,334 since it assures their autonomy and self-fulfilment335 
and allows them to pursue and search for truth and the advance of knowledge.336 Third, 
that journalists and actors in civil society play a critical role by using the right to access 
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330 http://www.unesco.org/new/en/internetstudy
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Freedom of Expression, Safety and Protection of Journalists and Media Professionals in Conflict Zones, and 
Right of Access to Information in Situations of Extreme Poverty, 30 April 30 2009, UN Doc. A/HRC/11/04, 
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information to expose wrongdoings and help with finding remedies.337 Fourth, that the 
right to information is used to facilitate effective business practices. Public bodies have 
important information relating to economic matters that can be useful for businesses, 
therefore the right to information facilitates the promotion of information flows between 
government and the business sector.338 Fifth, that the right to access information is crucial 
for the realization of other human rights. It is an intrinsic part of the full exercise of the right 
to freedom of expression.339 
Furthermore, a particular dimension of the right to seek and receive information concerns 
access to information on human rights violations, insofar as such access often determines 
the degree of enjoyment of other rights. 340 Furthermore, the right of access to one’s personal 
information is part of the fundamental value of human dignity. For instance, access to 
medical records can help individuals make decisions on treatment and financial planning 
and, therefore, access to one’s personal information will facilitate effective personal decision-
making. Nevertheless, in line with Heald’s views, the relationship between transparency and 
other values may not always be positive,341 as evident from the conflicts that may exist 
between transparency and information privacy.
The right to access information is widely seen today as encompassing both the right 
to access information held by public bodies, as well as the right of citizens and media 
actors to access information by other actors and which is of public interest or which is 
information concerning them that can affect their rights.342. With regard to Article 17 of 
the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee has observed that every individual should also 
be able to ascertain which public authorities or private individuals or bodies control his or 
her files, and for what purposes.343 Moreover, every individual should also be able to know 
which public authorities or private individuals or bodies control or may control his or her 
files.344 Furthermore, if such files contain incorrect personal data or have been collected or 
processed contrary to the provisions of the law, every individual should have the right to 
have his or her records rectified. 345 These latter rights of access and rectification, have been 
of course, also closely related to privacy and data protection law especially in the sphere of 
those European countries which have adopted such principles as part of their transposing 
into their national laws the Council of Europe’s 1981 Convention 108.
337 OHCHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur to the General Assembly on the Right to Access Information, 4 
September 2013, UN Doc. A/HRC/68/362, para. 69, available at <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/
UNDOC/GEN/N13/464/76/PDF/N1346476.pdf?OpenElement>. See also Maeve McDonagh, “The Right 
to Information in International Human Rights Law”, (2013) Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 1, p. 4, 
available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2446424>.
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GEN/N13/464/76/PDF/N1346476.pdf?OpenElement>.
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The definition of ‘information’ varies in different jurisdictions.346 In most circumstances, 
laws define information in broad terms to comprise all forms in which content may be 
recorded, such as in written form, in electronic form, or in other storage systems. 347 The 
right to access information, as is often taken to be implied by UDHR and ICCPR, includes 
records held by a public body, regardless of the form,348 in which the information is stored, 
its source or the date of production.349 Such right comprises information from political 
discourse,350 commentary on one’s own351 and on public affairs,352 canvassing,353 discussion 
of human rights,354 journalism,355 cultural and artistic expression,356 teaching,357 and religious 
discourse;358 and it may also include commercial advertising. Generally, the right to access 
information applies to all information regardless of the purpose for which it is held, though 
some laws may restrict the scope of the ‘information’, for instance in regard to information 
held for official purposes that merit exemption from access.359
The ICCPR is binding on every State Party as a whole. 360 All branches of the State and other 
public or government authorities at any level—i.e. national, regional or local—are in a 
position to exercise the responsibility of the State Party.361 Such responsibility may also be 
incurred by a State Party under certain circumstances with respect to acts of semi-State 
entities.362 The designation of such bodies may also include other entities when carrying out 
public functions.363 Moreover, the obligation requires State Parties to guarantee individuals’ 
protection from any acts by private persons or entities that would undermine the enjoyment 
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p. 142, available at <http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/ev.php-URL_ID=26159&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_
SECTION=201.html>.
347 Ibid.
348 “[…] either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice […]” 
(Article 19 ICCPR). 
349 HRC, CCPR General Comment No. 34: Article 19 (Freedoms of Opinion and Expression), 12 September 2011, 
UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34, para. 18, available at <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/gc34.
pdf>.
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351 HRC, Anthony Fernando v. Sri Lanka, Communication No. 1189/2003, UN Doc. CCPR/C/83/D/1189/2003 
(2005).
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of Covenant rights, insofar as they are amenable to application between private persons or 
entities.364 Furthermore, State Parties are required to guarantee that the rights contained in 
Article 19 of the ICCPR are given effect within the domestic law. Additionally, this should 
be done in a consistent manner and with the guidance provided by the Committee on the 
nature of the general legal obligation imposed on State Parties to the Covenant.365 
The Human Rights Committee has further emphasized that in order to give effect to the 
right to access information, States Parties should place government information of public 
interest in the public domain, proactively.366 The Committee stated that States Parties should 
make efforts to ensure “easy, prompt, effective and practical access to such information”.367 
The Special Rapporteur stated, in 2010, that governments should take necessary legislative 
and administrative measures to improve access to public information for everyone.368 It also 
specified that there are specific legislative and procedural characteristics that any policy 
on the access to information must have, such as: a) the requirement of the observance of 
the principle of maximum disclosure; b) the presumption of the public nature of meetings 
and key documents; c) broad definitions of the type of information that is accessible; 
d) reasonable fees and time limits; e) independent reviews of any refusals to disclose 
information; and f ) sanctions for non-compliance with the policy.369
5.1.4  Moving into the digital age 
Since late 1990s, the invention and global diffusion of the Internet and ICTs have made 
great impacts on FOI, transparency and openness. The Internet has gradually become a 
central, prevailing medium for many individuals to disseminate expression, and to access all 
kinds of information.370 Many governments have increasingly used novel ICTs—e.g. social 
media—as an efficient means to curtail corruption, promote openness and transparency, 
and improve e-governance and e-democracy.371 According to the UN Special Rapporteur, 
“[t]he Internet can primarily be used as a positive tool to increase transparency over the 
364 HRC, General Comment No. 31 on the Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to 
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Parties to the Covenant, 29 March 2004, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, para. 4, available at <https://
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conduct of those in power, access diverse sources of information, facilitate active citizen 
participation in building democratic societies and counter authoritarian regimes”.372
With respect to FOI, what has accompanied this big change is the rise of the private sector 
players, in that they are taking over more and more of the public functionalities that 
previously belonged exclusively to public bodies in relation to the processing of personal 
data. Additionally, these private sector players collect and control a large bulk of personal 
data to which individuals have equally the FOI right, such as when personal privacy and 
data security are of concern.373 Such changes are opening a debate on the accountability of 
the private sector in regard to its impact on human rights. 
For instance, in 2000 the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) contended that 
the State-centred model of accountability must be extended to the obligations of non-
State actors. 374 In the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights endorsed by the 
Human Rights Council in 2011, it is explained that while governments have a primary duty 
to protect human rights, companies have a responsibility to respect these rights, and both 
governments and companies should provide access to effective remedy. Guidance is also 
given for companies to fulfil these norms. In this evolving context, the developments in 
the storage and processing of public information have increasingly allowed the FOI laws to 
cover information and data that is held—even if only partially—by the private sector. In this 
way, the right to seek and receive information is a cornerstone for data protection regimes 
and their role in protecting the right to privacy. With the rise of “big data” and algorithms 
that process huge samples, new issues arise as to the extent to which access to “information” 
includes access to “data”, “metadata” and algorithms that convert data into information.
5.2  Transparency and freedom of information protection mechanisms
5.2.1  International frameworks
Article 19 of the UDHR provided the first and most widely recognized statement of the 
right to freedom of expression, including the right to seek and receive information. 
Additionally, Article 19 of the ICCPR guarantees the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression, also including reference to the right to seek and receive information within 
the broader expression right. In 1993, the UN Commission on Human Rights established 
the Office of the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression, and called 
on the Special Rapporteur to “develop further his commentary on the right to seek and 
receive information and to expand on his observations and recommendations arising from 
communications”.375 Fulfilling these obligations, the Special Rapporteur’s report issued in 
1998 referred to Article 19 as imposing “a positive obligation on states to ensure access 
372 UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur to the General Assembly on the Right to Freedom 
Opinion and Expression Exercised through the Internet, 10 August 2011, UN Doc A/66/90, para. 12, 
available at <http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/66/290>. 
373 The Court has recently moved towards a broader interpretation of the notion of freedom to receive 
information and thereby towards the recognition of a right to information. ECtHR, Társaság a 
Szabadágjogokért v. Hungary, Judgment, 14 April 2009, Application No. 37374/05, para. 35. 
374 Mazhar Siraj, “Exclusion of Private Sector from Freedom of Information Laws: Implications from a Human 
Rights Perspective”, (2010) Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 215.
375 OHCHR, “Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression”, 11 April 1997, C.H.R. Res. 1997/27, ESCOR Supp. (No. 
3) at 100, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/27, para. 12(d), available at <http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.
nsf/TestFrame/3b49a725e658647280256643005969e6?Opendocument>.
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to information, particularly with regard to information held by governments”,376 which 
view is reinforced by a report issued in 2005.377 The 2000 Special Rapporteur’s report on 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression pointed out the fundamental importance of the FOI 
for both freedom and democracy; and the right to participate and to realization of the 
right to development.378 In the 2000 report, the Rapporteur also reiterated concern about 
“the tendency of Governments, and the institutions of Government, to withhold from the 
people information that is rightly theirs”.379 Further, he elaborated on the specific content 
of the right to information. 380 In 2004, the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion 
and Expression co-issued a joint declaration with other rapporteurs, recognizing the right 
to access information as a fundamental human right based on the principle of maximum 
disclosure.381 Moreover, in 2010, UNESCO marked the World Press Freedom Day by issuing 
the Brisbane Declaration, which called on national governments that had not already 
adopted access to information laws to do so “based on international standards and the 
principle of maximum disclosure”.382 The Finlandia Declaration at the UNESCO World Press 
Freedom Day conference in 2016, amplifies these messages.383
The UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) reviews and comments on the regular reports 
that States provide to the HRC to implement the ICCPR obligations. It also hears individual 
complaints about human rights violations from States that have ratified the First Optional 
Protocol to the ICCPR.384 In 2011, the HRC published General Comment No. 34 with an 
authoritative interpretation of the freedom of opinion and expression guaranteed by Article 
19 of the ICCPR, expressly acknowledging that Article 19 of the ICCPR embraces a general 
right of access to information held by public bodies. Moreover, General Comment No. 34 
noted that Article 19 of the ICCPR, in conjunction with Article 25 of the ICCPR, had previously 
been interpreted by the Committee as including a right to media to access to information 
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on public affairs385 and the right of the general public to receive media output.386 Also, 
General Comment No. 34 further states that in order to give effect to the right of access 
to information, States Parties should put in the public domain government information of 
public interest, proactively.387
Furthermore, the HRC referred to General Comment No. 16 regarding Article 17 ICCPR, 
addressing the right to privacy, which addresses access to, and amendment of personal data 
relating to individuals.388 The HRC also observed that General Comment No. 32 regarding 
Article 14 of the ICCPR, addressing the right to a fair trial, sets out the various entitlements to 
information that are held by those accused of a criminal offence.389 The HRC further referred 
to the fact that Article 10 of the ICCPR, addressing the right to liberty, had been interpreted 
by the Committee as preserving the right of prisoners to access medical records.390 Finally, 
the HRC noted that, as observed in General Comment No. 31, persons should be in receipt 
of information regarding their Covenant rights according to Article 2 of the Covenant.391
In 1998, the UN Economic Commission for Europe adopted the Aarhus Convention on 
Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters. The Convention establishes a number of rights of the public with 
regard to the environment,392 including the right of everyone to receive environmental 
information held by public authorities, which can include information on the state of the 
environment and on policies or measures taken, or on the state of human health and 
safety where this can be affected by the state of the environment. 393 In Article 13 of ZZ, the 
Convention against Corruption, which was adopted by the General Assembly Resolution 
58/4 in 2003,394 prescribed that participation should be strengthened by measures such as 
ensuring that the public has effective access to information.395
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umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/hrcom31.html>.
392 EU, Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice 
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5.2.2 Regional framework
Council of Europe
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), implemented by the 
European Court of Human Rights, prescribes that everyone has the right to freedom of 
expression, which includes “freedom […] to receive […] information and ideas without 
interference”.396 In 2008, the Convention on Access to Official Documents and its Explanatory 
Report were adopted. This first multilateral treaty affirms and articulates an enforceable 
general right to information that can be exercised by all persons without demonstrating a 
particular interest in the information requested.397 This treaty came a full generation after 
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted Recommendation No. R 
(81) 19 on the Access to Information Held by Public Authorities, prescribing that everyone 
under the jurisdiction of a Member State shall have the right to information held by public 
authorities other than legislative bodies and judicial authorities.398 
The Recommendation Rec (2002) 2 on Access to Official Documents includes general 
principles on access to official documents.399 It recommends that Member States guarantee 
the right of everyone to have access, upon request, to official documents held by public 
authorities, and highlights that such principle should apply without discrimination on any 
ground, including national origin.400 In 2014, the Council of the European Union issued the 
EU Human Rights Guidelines on Freedom of Expression Online and Offline to promote and 
protect freedom of opinion and expression, which state that ensuring access to information 
can serve to promote justice and reparation, particularly after periods of grave violations of 
human rights.401 
European Union
Article 42 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 15 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) give “any citizen of the Union, and 
any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State, […] a 
right of access to documents of the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, 
whatever their medium”. It follows from Article 15 of the TFEU, in that the right is “subject 
to the principles and the conditions to be defined” in legislation.402 In 2003, the European 
Parliament and the European Council adopted Directive 2003/98/EC on the re-use of 
public sector information, which sets out the rules and practices for accessing public sector 
396 See also ECtHR, Guerra and others v. Italy, Judgment, 19 February 1998, Application No. 14967/89.
397 EU, Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention).
398 Recommendation No.R (81)19 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the Access to 
Information Held by Public Authorities, Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, 25 November 1981, 2, 
available at <http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/doc/cm/rec%281981%29019_EN.asp>.
399 Recommendation Rec(2002)2 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Access to Official 
Documents, Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, 21 February 2002, 2, available at <https://wcd.coe.
int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=262135>.
400 Ibid.
401 Council of the European Union, “EU Human Rights Guidelines on Freedom of Expression Online and Offline” 
(Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 2014), p. 3, available at <http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/
documents/eu_human_rights_guidelines_on_freedom_of_expression_online_and_offline_en.pdf>.
402 EU, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
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information resources for further exploitation.403 In 2001, Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 
regarding Public Access to European Parliament, Council and Commission Documents 
defined the right of access to documents of the three institutions. This regulation also 
applies to the majority of other EU bodies and agencies, when there is no provision in their 
establishing legal acts.404
The Commonwealth of Nations 
In 1980, the Law Ministers of the Commonwealth stated that: “public participation in the 
democratic and governmental process was at its most meaningful when citizens had 
adequate access to official information”.405In 1991, the Commonwealth adopted the Harare 
Commonwealth Declaration and ensured each individual’s democratic right to participate 
in framing his or her society.406 The Commonwealth has subsequently taken a number of 
important steps to further expand the content of that right. In 1999, the Commonwealth 
Secretariat created a Commonwealth Expert Group to discuss the right to information, 
which adopted a document establishing a number of principles and guidelines on freedom 
of information,407 which were supported by the Commonwealth Law Ministers at the 1999 
meeting in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago.408 
After considering the Law Ministers’ communiqué, the Committee of the Whole on 
Commonwealth Functional Cooperation issued a report, approved later by the Heads of 
Government, in which they expressed their recognition of the importance of public access 
to official information, both in promoting transparent and accountable governance and 
in encouraging full participation of citizens in democratic process.409 The Commonwealth 
Secretariat took steps to promote the right to information in member countries, such as by 
drafting model laws on the right to information and on privacy.410
403 Directive on the re-use of public sector information, see 2003/98/EC European Union (EU), Directive 
2003/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 November 2003 on the Re-Use of Public 
Sector Information, vol. L 345/90, 2003, available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.
do?uri=OJ:L:2003:345:0090:0096:en:PDF>. 
404 EU, Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 Regarding Public Access to European Parliament, Council and Commission 
Documents, 2001, available at <http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:vjgb_-4_
QNwJ:www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/PDF/r1049_en.pdf+&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk>.
405 Quoted in “Promoting Open Government: Commonwealth Principles and Guidelines on the Right to 
Know” (Commonwealth Expert Group Meeting on the Right to Know and the Promotion of Democracy 
and Development, London, 1999), available at <http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/programs/ai/rti/
international/cw_standards/commonwealth_expert_grp_on_the_rti_99-03-00.pdf>. 
406 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, 20 October 1991, paras. 4 and 9. Heads of Government 
in Harare, “Harare Commonwealth Declaration” (Harare, Zimbabwe: The Commonwealth, 1991), paras. 4 
and 9, available at <http://thecommonwealth.org/history-of-the-commonwealth/harare-commonwealth-
declaration>. See also The Common Wealth, “Millbrook Commonwealth Action Plan on the Harare 
Declaration” (London, 12 November 1995), available at <http://thecommonwealth.org/history-of-the-
commonwealth/millbrook-commonwealth-action-plan-harare-declaration>.
407 Toby Mendel, (2008) Freedom of Information: A Comparative Legal Survey, Second Edition, Paris: UNESCO, 
pp. 12-13, available at <http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/ev.php-URL_ID=26159&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_
SECTION=201.html>.
408 “1999 Meeting of Commonwealth Law Ministers and Senior Officials”, Vol. 2 (Port of Spain, Trinidad and 
Tobago, 3-7 May), available at <http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/commonwealth/governance/1999-meeting-
of-commonwealth-law-ministers-and-senior-officials_9781848597624-en>.
409 Communiqué, Commonwealth Functional Cooperation Report of the Committee of the Whole (Durban: 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, 15 November 1999), para. 20.
410 The Freedom of Information Act, available at <http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/programs/ai/rti/
international/cw_standards/Cth%20model%20law%20-%20FOI%20Act.pdf>; see also Privacy Act, available 
at <http://www.thecommonwealth.org/shared_asp_files/uploadedfiles/%7B82BDA409-2C88-4AB5-9E32-
797FE623DFB8%7D_protection%20of%20privacy.pdf>.
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The African Region
Article 9 of The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, which was adopted in 1981, 
provides that every individual shall have the right to receive information.411 The African 
Charter on Democracy, Elections and Good Governance was adopted by the African Union 
in 2007. Article 2 of the Charter emphasizes the importance to promote the establishment of 
the necessary conditions to foster citizen participation, transparency, access to information, 
freedom of the press, as well as accountability in the management of public affairs. Article 19 
provides that in electoral processes each State Party shall guarantee conditions of security, 
free access to information, non-interference, freedom of movement and full cooperation 
with the electoral observer mission.412 
Article 6 of the African Charter on Values and Principles of Public Service and Administration 
protects the right of access to information held by public service and administration 
regarding procedures and formalities pertaining to public service delivery.413 Article 9 of 
the African Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption demands that each party 
adopts legislative and other measures to give effect to the right of access to any information 
required to fight against corruption and related offences. 414 Article 1 of The Declaration 
of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa states that freedom of expression and 
information—which includes the right to seek, receive and impart ideas—is a fundamental 
and inalienable human right and an indispensable component of democracy.415 The Model 
Law on Access to Information for Africa provides specific guidelines of forms and contents 
of such legislation.416 
The American Region
Adopted in 1969, the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José) is 
implemented by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Inter-American Commission. 
Article 13 of the Convention protects the right to freedom of thought and expression.417 The 
General Assembly resolution AG/RES. 2516 of the Organization of American States (OAS) 
demanded the preparation of The Model Inter-American Law on Access to Information.418 
It provides Member States with the legal foundation to guarantee the right to access to 
information. The Implementation Guide for the Model Law provides a roadmap to ensure 
411 Organization of African Unity, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter).
412 African Union (AU), African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, 2007, available at <http://
webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:67DX2NO2UXwJ:www.ipu.org/idd-E/afr_charter.
pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk>.
413 African Union (AU), African Charter on Values and Principles of Public Service and Administration, 2011, 
available at <http://www.au.int/en/content/african-charter-values-and-principles-public-service-and-
administration>.
414 African Union (AU), Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, 2003, available at <http://www.
au.int/en/sites/default/files/AFRICAN_UNION_CONVENTION_PREVENTING_COMBATING_CORRUPTION.
pdf>.
415 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, “Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression 
in Africa”, 17 October 2002, available at <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/achpr/expressionfreedomdec.
html>.
416 See <http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/3642/en/gambia:-african-commission-adopts-
model-law-on-access-to-information>. 
417 Organization of American States (OAS), American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San Jose, Costa 
Rica” (B-32).
418 OAS, “Model Inter-American Law on Access to Information, A/RES/2514 (XXXIX-O/09)”, 8 June 2010, 
available at <http://www.oas.org/en/sla/dil/access_to_information_model_law.asp>.
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that the law may function in practice.419 The model law incorporates the principles outlined 
by the Inter-American Court on Human Rights in Claude Reyes v. Chile, and the Principles 
on Access to Information adopted by the Inter-American Juridical Committee.420 Principle 2 
recalls that every person has the right to seek, receive and impart information and opinions 
freely under terms set forth by Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights.421 
The OAS also adopted the Resolution on Access to Public Information: Strengthening 
Democracy in 2009.422
5.2.3  National law framework
National laws vary with respect to the rules to be adopted in processing requests 
for information. In general, all laws require that such requests be made in writing, or 
electronically, including the name and contact details of the applicant, and a detailed 
description of the information sought for identification.423 Whilst most countries do not 
require the provision of a reason upon request, others, such as Sweden, request the provision 
of additional information for the processing of the application, including the reason for the 
applicant’s request.424 Most laws provide special provisions to assist applicants when they 
encounter difficulties; for instance, when a written request is not possible due to illiteracy 
or disability.425
Nearly all laws provide time limits for responses to requests for information, which range 
from 7 to 30 days. Additionally, most laws require the information to be provided as soon 
as possible within a maximum period,426 allowing for an extension in case of, for instance, 
a complicated search through a record not located at the main office, or the need of 
consultations with others. 427 Furthermore, nearly all laws require public bodies to give 
written notice of responses to requests of information. For a granted request, such a notice 
may include any fees and the form in which the request is to be granted. For a refused 
request, the notice normally includes the grounds of refusal, along with information about 
the right to appeal against the refusal,428 which allows the requester to decide whether or 
not to follow any appeal options. 429
Moreover, many countries allow applicants to select from a range of forms of access, 
including: personal inspection of the document in question, transcripts, electronic copies, 
photocopies, and official copies. It is complex to determine the extent of the efforts that 
public bodies should be required to make to present information in a form in which it is 
419 Ibid.
420 OAS, “Principles on the Right of Access to Information CJI/RES.147 (LXXIII-O/08)”, 7 August 2008, available 
at <http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:FroG00C8QK0J:www.oas.org/cji/eng/CJI-
RES_147_LXXIII-O-08_eng.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk>.
421 OAS, “Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression”, Text, (1 August 2009), available at <http://www.
oas.org/en/iachr/expression/showarticle.asp?artID=26>.
422 “Resolution on Access to Public Information: Strengthening Democracy, AG/RES. 2514 (XXXIX-O/09)” 
(Organization of American States (OAS), 4 June 2009), available at <http://www.oas.org/dil/AG-RES_2661-
XLI-O-11_eng.pdf>.
423 Toby Mendel, (2008) Freedom of Information: A Comparative Legal Survey, Second Edition, Paris: UNESCO, 
p. 144, available at <http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/ev.php-URL_ID=26159&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_
SECTION=201.html>.
424 Ibid.
425 Ibid. 
426 Ibid. 
427 Ibid., p. 145.
428 Ibid. 
429 Ibid. 
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disposable for the applicant or extract information from different forms in which it may 
be held. Many of the systems/techniques used to extract and present such information 
apply fees regimes. 430 Such fees would relate to the four principal costs involved in the 
provision of information, namely costs of searching for the information; costs associated 
with preparing or reviewing the information; costs of reproducing or providing access to 
the information; and costs of sending the information to requesters. 431
5.2.4  Limitations and restrictions
The right to information is not an absolute right and will be compromised when conflicting 
with other equally important rights and public interests. Paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the 
ICCPR prescribes that the exercise of a right carries with it special duties and responsibilities 
as restrictions. As observed by the NGO ARTICLE 19, the exception regime is one of the 
most difficult issues facing those drafting a freedom of information law, since effective laws 
are undermined in many cases by an excessively broad regime of exceptions.432 However, 
it is evidently important that all legitimate secrecy interests are accounted by law in an 
adequate manner, otherwise public bodies will be required to disclose information that 
may bring about unwarranted harm.433
The UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom 
of opinion and expression examined the limitations on the right, and he recalled that 
whenever States impose restrictions on the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, 
these should not jeopardize the right itself. An example could be when the requested 
information relates to human rights violations. 434 The limitations on freedom of information 
are legitimate if they meet the narrow conditions defined by the three-part test in Article 
19 of the ICCPR, in Paragraph 3.435 
Although the substantive grounds restricting the FOI right rely on the political, social and 
cultural circumstances of each country, common elements are found in international and 
regional FOI laws. Generally speaking, limitations should be set down precisely, clearly 
and narrowly in FOI law. Article 19 of the ICCPR sets out exclusive legitimate aims in 
Paragraph 3, namely the respect of the rights or reputations of others; and the protection 
of national security or of public order, or of public health or morals. A more detailed list 
of such legitimate grounds, provided by the Council of Europe, includes national security, 
defence and international relations; public safety; the prevention, investigation and 
prosecution of criminal activities; privacy and other legitimate private interests; commercial 
and other economic interests, be they private or public; the equality of parties concerning 
court proceedings; nature; inspection, control and supervision by public authorities; the 
economic, monetary and exchange rate policies of the State; and the confidentiality of 
deliberations within or between public authorities during the internal preparation of a 
430 Ibid. 
431 Ibid., p. 144. 
432 ARTICLE 19, “International Standards: Right to Information”, 28 May 2015, available at <http://www.article19.
org/resources.php/resource/3024/en/international-standards:-right-to-information#_ftn16>.
433 Ibid.
434 OHCHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur to the General Assembly on the Right to Access Information, 4 
September 2013, UN Doc. A/HRC/68/362, para. 12, available at <http://daccess-dds-qny.un.org/doc/
UNDOC/GEN/N13/464/76/PDF/N1346476.pdf?OpenElement>.
435 OHCHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur to the Human Rights Council on Limitations to the Right to 
Freedom of Expression, Safety and Protection of Journalists and Media Professionals in Conflict Zones, and 
Right of Access to Information in Situations of Extreme Poverty, 30 April 30 2009, UN Doc. A/HRC/11/04, 
para. 11, available at <http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/11/4>. 
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matter.436 Other specific types of information, whose access is restricted by law, 437 include 
child pornography,438 hate speech,439 defamation, direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide,440 and advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement 
to discrimination, hostility or violence.441
436 Recommendation R(2002)2 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Access 
to Official Documents, adopted on 21 February 2002, available at <https://wcd.coe.
int/ViewDoc.jsp? Ref=Rec%282002%292&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&Site= 
COE&BackColorInternet=DBDCF2&BackColorIntranet=FDC864&BackColorLogged=FDC864>.
437 See UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur to the General Assembly on the Right to 
Freedom Opinion and Expression Exercised through the Internet, 10 August 2011, UN Doc A/66/90, para. 
61, available at <http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/66/290>.
438 Dissemination of child pornography is prohibited under international human rights law. See Office of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Optional Protocol to the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, A/RES/54/263, 
2000, Article 3 Paragraph 1 under C, available at <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/
OPSCCRC.aspx>.
439 See, for example, HRC, Robert Faurisson v. France, Communication No. 550/1993, UN Doc. CCPR/
C/58/D/550/1993 (1995).
440 See, for example, Article 38 under c of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide. UN General Assembly, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide, No. 1021, 1948, available at <http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/
search?q=cache:EQ1HT4W5EHIJ:https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%252078/volume-
78-I-1021-English.pdf+&cd=5&hl=en&ct=clnk>.
441 See, for example, Article 20 Paragraph 2 ICCPR. 
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CHAPTER 6  The interplay of privacy, transparency and freedom 
of expression 
6.1  Introduction
The fact that humanity is increasingly embracing the digital age and partly living in new 
Internet eco-systems is changing the relationships between privacy, transparency and 
freedom of expression. The previously settled moral norms and laws defining and regulating 
their conflicts and boundaries, together with the related “rights and obligations”, are in 
the process of being re-delineated. In practice, the conflict and interplay among privacy, 
transparency and freedom of expression can be analysed at multiple levels and from 
different aspects in the digital age. This Chapter analyses this interplay from an individual’s 
perspective, discussing how each value may conflict with or complement and support the 
two other values in the context of daily life realities. While its focus is on the relationship 
between privacy, freedom of expression and transparency, it also includes a supplementary 
analysis of the relationship between transparency and freedom of expression.
6.2  Privacy and freedom of expression 
The relationship between the right to privacy and the right to freedom of expression is a 
complex one,442 which implies that it can be analysed from multiple perspectives and at 
multiple levels. Both are inalienable human rights and are generally mutually supportive 
and interdependent. They have a central role along with the values of autonomy, identity 
and dignity in the realization of human self-development. In the digital age, the two rights 
are more closely related than ever before in the context of managing and controlling 
personal information (data) and information flow, insofar as the notion of privacy concerns 
the concealment of selected personal information. Moreover, the notion of freedom of 
expression relates to access to, and the disclosure and imparting of, information (including 
PII at times) in the community. 
6.2.1  Interdependence and mutual support 
The right to privacy is often considered an essential requirement for the realization of the 
right to freedom of expression,443 insofar as privacy protection plays an important role in 
the creation of the content required for adequate exercising of the rights to freedom of 
opinion and expression. For instance, it is well understood that individuals need private 
spaces protected against external pressures and interferences in order to develop their 
own thoughts, opinions and ideas, which is important not only for self-development but 
also to promote innovation and social development. It also helps in discovering facts for 
further communication and dissemination.444 Privacy protection can also create the context 
in which individuals can reflect on political change, create counterculture, engage in 
meaningful critique of society, have creative expressions, and develop their own political 
442 Eric Barendt, (2007) Freedom of Speech, Second Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, footnote 165.
443 OHCHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, 17 April 2013, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/40, available at <http://ap.ohchr.
org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/23/40>.
444 See Rosen’s understanding of privacy in the context of knowledge. Jeffrey Rosen, (2001) The Unwanted 
Gaze: The Destruction of Privacy in America, New York: Vintage Books USA.
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opinions and artistic expressions, as well as experiment with and formulate views and 
opinions before making them public.445
In short, privacy protection assists with creating the content for unhindered freedom of 
expression and opinion. 
Safe and secured communication is also important to freedom of expression—i.e. including 
the exchange of opinions and information dissemination—not only from the perspective of 
the information disseminators but also of the information receivers, as it supports the latter 
in receiving information free from arbitrary monitoring and interference by others, and 
in particular by State authorities. More generally, the protection of private spaces against 
other’s interference—be they physical spaces such as home and other private places, 
or virtual spaces like social network groups— encourages individuals to communicate 
more freely with each other within a self-defined environment, without fear of unwanted 
consequences. Respect for privacy of communications is a prerequisite for trust by those 
engaging in communicative activities, which is successively a pre-condition for the exercise 
of the right to freedom of expression.446
Restrictions on the extent to which offline and online communications may remain 
anonymous can have an evident chilling effect on victims of all forms of violence and 
abuse, including by contributing to the fear of double victimization that discourages the 
reporting of such violence and abuse.447 In such cases, the protection of privacy is essential 
to freedom of expression as a notion that encompasses freedom to communicate with other 
individuals or amongst a selected social group.448 Thus, privacy protection enhances mutual 
trust by securing confidentiality among selected individuals, and therefore encourages free 
flow of information and freedom of expression and opinions among these individuals. The 
special protection of the confidentiality of journalists’ sources is a telling example. In 2013 
UNESCO Member States recognized that “privacy is essential to protect journalistic sources, 
which enable a society to benefit from investigative journalism, to strengthen good 
governance and the rule of law, and that such privacy should not be subject to arbitrary or 
unlawful interference”.449 More broadly, in addressing a larger audience or people unknown, 
anonymity may encourage more free speech and expression about issues of public interest. 
These points help explain why nowadays encryption and anonymization technologies for 
anonymous access to, and imparting of, information and communicating securely without 
being identified, are important for privacy protection and online freedom of expression.450 
445 Daniel J. Solove, (2008) Understanding Privacy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 80.
446 Toby Mendel et al., (2012) Global Survey on Internet Privacy and Freedom of Expression, UNESCO Series on 
Internet Freedom, Paris: UNESCO, p. 95, available at <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-
and-information/resources/publications-and-communication-materials/publications/full-list/global-
survey-on-Internet-privacy-and-freedom-of-expression/>.
447 OHCHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, 17 April 2013, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/40, para. 24, available at <http://
ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/23/40>. 
448 Eric Barendt, “Privacy and Freedom of Speech”, in Andrew T. Kenyon and Megan Richardson (Eds.), (2006) 
New Dimensions in Privacy Law: International and Comparative Perspectives, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 11-12.
449 UNESCO General Conference 37 C/Resolution on “Internet-related issues: including access to information 
and knowledge, freedom of expression, privacy and ethical dimensions of the information society”. http://
unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0022/002261/226162e.pdf
450 OHCHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, 17 April 2013, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/40, paras. 13 and 22, available at 
<http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/23/40>.
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This is recognized in the Outcome Document451 of the Connecting the Dots conference 
endorsed by UNESCO Member States at their 38th General Conference in 2015.
The above is a brief illustration of how privacy protection can strengthen the right or the 
exercising of the right to freedom of expression. The other side of the coin is that freedom of 
expression equally strengthens the right to privacy both online and offline, to the point that 
freedom of expression and its correlative right to freedom of information are critical to the 
protection of privacy. For instance, freedom of information substantiates disclosures about 
large-scale data breaches and information privacy invasions—e.g. by big IT companies 
or by public bodies—which may otherwise not be disclosed. Lack of knowledge and 
awareness regarding privacy invasions is still a significant obstacle in privacy protection 
across the world. Edward Snowden’s revelations of reported secret mass surveillance led to 
a global public debate and reforms, which were enabled by free expression on the issue and 
subsequent FOI requests in various jurisdictions. It has been argued in the Connecting the 
Dots Outcome Document that: “Illegal surveillance of communications, their interception, as 
well as the illegal collection of personal data violates the right to privacy and the freedom to 
hold opinions without interference and can lead to restrictions on freedom of expression”.452
As interdependent rights, freedom of expression and privacy have an intersection 
concerning the notion of reputation. On the one hand, defamation law offers protection 
for the reputation and honour of an individual, which may be linked to the individual’s 
privacy. On the other hand, if defamation law were to offer too much protection for the 
reputation, honour and privacy of an individual, it could limit others’ right to freedom of 
speech, especially in cases where there is no provision for truth and public interest defence. 
Freedom to hold opinions may also be threatened by defamation law when defence of fair 
comment is not valid. For instance, while the misappropriation of names and likeness—e.g. 
in identity theft cases—may constitute an invasions of privacy under common law, as well 
as damage the reputation of some of the individuals involved,453 freedom of expression 
also includes satire and caricature, and this may override in certain cases. In other words, 
there may be either illegitimate or legitimate limitations of either privacy or of freedom of 
expression, in regards to whether a particular instance of defamatory expression is upheld 
or not.
The interdependence and mutual support between the right to privacy and the right 
to freedom of expression are also important for human political life, and especially for 
improving democracy. Safeguarding the private life and private sphere, will protect political 
critique and dissent, and allow for political change and development. These underwrite the 
freedom to vote, hold political discussions and free associations away from the glare of the 
public and without fear of reprisal.454 For this reason, adequate protections of privacy, just 
like freedom of expression, encourage more active participation in politics. The protection 
of privacy also encourages active political participation by defending the private spheres 
of political figures and their family members. In the absence of such protection, sensitive 
people could opt out from public life, distancing themselves and their family members from 
451 Outcome Document of the Connecting the Dots conference http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/
MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CI/CI/pdf/outcome_document.pdf
452 Ibid.
453 Nathan E. Ray, “Let There Be False Light: Resisting the Growing Trend Against an Important Tort”, (1999) 
Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 84, footnote 8.
454 C. Keith Boone, “Privacy and Community”, (1983) Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 8.
80
politics and media scrutiny.455 How to balance the privacy interests of public figures and 
persons who participate in public life, with the protection of other’s freedom of expression, 
is always an ongoing dialogue in the practice of law, in all jurisdictions.
Apart from this, the interdependences between the two rights can be witnessed in the 
context of law enforcement in the Internet age. As UNESCO pointed out in its Global Survey 
on Internet Privacy and Freedom of Expression report, poor protection of privacy has significant 
impacts on freedom of expression regarding digital communications, across the globe. The 
Survey reviewed three major reasons in this regard, including the increasing value of open 
source information to law enforcement due to enabling new technology developments; the 
difficulty in controlling electronic surveillance as compared to surveillance in the traditional 
offline world; and the fast growing legal regimes facilitating the use of digital information 
for law enforcement purposes. The Report also indicates that the combination of poor 
protection of both privacy and freedom expression led to a multiplier effect,456 including a 
chilling effect on online freedom of expression and online privacy interest.457
6.2.2  The conflicts and digital intensification 
The informational aspect of privacy is about the control and dissemination of personal 
information within certain self-chosen boundaries by individuals. This may conflict with 
the fact that the right to freedom of expression protects individuals’ freedom to hold, seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds. It also relates to the interest and 
personal need of data subjects to control information themselves—or through designated 
parties, and the need of people to access and disseminate information. From a legal 
perspective, there are in most jurisdictions mutual exceptions or derogations. For instance, 
Article 10 of the ECHR, in Paragraph 2, prescribes that the exercise of the right to freedom 
of expression must be subject to “the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for 
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the 
authority and impartiality of the judiciary”. Then Article 8 of the ECHR, in Paragraph 2, 
prescribes that: “There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right (right to respect for private and family life), except such as is in accordance with 
the law and is necessary in a democratic society, […] or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others”.
In legal practice, the mutual restriction between the right to privacy and that of freedom 
expression can be organized in four general types of circumstances, in which an individual’s 
right to privacy conflicts with other individuals’ or legal persons’ right to freedom of speech.
In the first circumstance, an individual’s privacy can be invaded, even if the exercise of 
freedom of expression and other related rights does not concern the person directly. This 
455 The delicate balancing between privacy and freedom of expression regarding public figures, especially, 
political figures will be discussed separately in Section 7.3. Eric Barendt, “Privacy and Freedom of Speech”, 
in Andrew T. Kenyon and Megan Richardson (Eds.), (2006) New Dimensions in Privacy Law: International and 
Comparative Perspectives, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 164. 
456 Toby Mendel et al., (2012) Global Survey on Internet Privacy and Freedom of Expression, UNESCO Series 
on Internet Freedom, Paris: UNESCO, pp. 95-97, available at <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/
communication-and-information/resources/publications-and-communication-materials/publications/full-
list/global-survey-on-Internet-privacy-and-freedom-of-expression/>.
457 In the sense that everything you published online can be turned against you in some cases. See Els De 
Busser, “Open Source Data and Criminal Investigations: Anything You Publish Can and Will Be Used Against 
You”, (2014) Groningen Journal of International Law, Vol. 2, No. 2, available at <http://grojil.org/volume-2/
issue-02-privacy-in-international-law/>.
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may happen where the mere dissemination of information may lead to the invasion of 
the solitude or seclusion (and therefore the private sphere) of the individual in an online 
context. In this context, the special manner in which someone expresses himself/herself 
and disseminates information, even if merely concerning oneself, may still constitute an 
invasion of another’s privacy, in the sense of breaching the ‘leave me alone’ meaning of 
privacy. For example, the Facebook or Twitter account/profile of a user may be flooded with 
messages and updates from someone, which messages the user would not be interested 
in at all, but within a context where the user does not have an option to un-subscribe 
or disconnect for some reason or another. Too much self-expression in social networking 
sites while ignoring others’ expectation for mental solitude and integrity in “a private virtual 
sphere”, may compromise their privacy expectation and infringe the rules of civility that 
exist in personal relationships.458 
The second circumstance refers to SPAM (i.e. unsolicited) e-mails, messages, leaflets 
and similar materials received against the will of the recipient—e.g. in the absence of a 
subscription by the recipient—even if such communications would be clearly and truthfully 
framed as of a commercial nature. This is because while such communications would in 
some senses operationalize the senders’ right to freedom of expression, they also constitute 
intrusions into the recipient’s private sphere. In fact, in the offline world, the distribution of 
door-to-door commercial leaflets is often regulated, allowing the receivers to opt in and/
or out by posting stickers on their doors. Similarly, anti-spam laws in many countries—
including in the EU and the U.S.—offer opt-in and/or opt-out choices.459
The third circumstance refers to the exercise of the right to freedom of assembly, which 
if not exercised properly can impact on others’ right to privacy in both online and offline 
contexts. While the right to freedom of assembly is protected by many national laws and 
allowed in manners prescribed by law, even law-permitted assembly may compromise the 
expectations of private and ordinary daily life that may be held by residents living adjacent 
to a permitted public assembly venue. Similarly, assemblies and gatherings at private 
venues or locations without the owner’s consent can violate the owner’s property right 
and expectation of seclusion and solitude. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
does not protect the freedom of association across private properties.460 Online protests 
or assemblies may take different forms targeting privately-owned Internet spheres, like the 
widespread DDoS attacks (that are criminalized by Convention 185);461 organized spamming 
in comment forums to protest online content; and organized spamming emails against 
some particular individuals. This raises the issue of how online intermediaries deal with 
the balance of freedom of association, expression and privacy in their corporate terms of 
service, and the extent to which private properties entail public space and corresponding 
entitlements.
The fourth circumstance refers to potential conflicts between an individual, X’s, right to 
privacy and another individual, Y’s, freedom of expression when Y’s utterances concern X in 
various ways. This may be when Y tells Y’s own story, Y may disclose private information of 
458 See the real case of a mother over-expressing her love of the new born on social networking sites of which 
others have no personal interest to know and complain openly as referred to in Section 2.1 supra. 
459 Sylvia Mercado Kierkegaard, “War Against Spam: A Comparative Analysis Of The US And The European 
Legal Approach”, (2015) Communications of the IIMA, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 5.
460 Ian Brown, Online Freedom of Expression, Assembly, Association and the Media in Europe, Report, Council of 
Europe Conference of Ministers Responsible for Media and Information Society, 15 October 2013, p. 17, 
available at <https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/Belgrade2013/Online%20freedom%20
of%20expression,%20assembly,%20association_MCM(2013)007_en_Report_IanBrown.pdf >.
461 Ibid., p. 19.
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those (i.e. instances of X) who are involved without X’s consent, thus potentially breaching 
X’s privacy. For instance, an autobiography author who is a public celebrity in the USA wrote 
about her sexual life with her ex-husband in detail. Her freedom of speech to talk about her 
own personal life was in conflict with her ex-husband’s interest of privacy.462 Note that a 
person has a stronger interest for legal protection in talking about his/her own life, even if 
this involves disclosures about others, than parties talking merely about other’s lives.
In the online world, the invasion of another’s privacy in the context of self-expression may 
also occur through the publication of photographs containing images of not only the 
individual(s) consenting to the photographs, but also of others, threatening the others’ 
privacy. The occurrence of this type of privacy breach is on rapid increase, due to the 
proliferation of portable devices and smartphones equipped with high definition cameras, 
which enable the capturing and generation of information about moments of life, as well 
as the dissemination of such information to a wide audience of Internet users. Other parties 
captured in the online disclosed multimedia content may not like being seen by the whole 
world, thus feeling that such publications compromise their privacy. Extreme cases of this 
type of privacy breach involve notorious websites on which male users have uploaded 
intimate pictures of their ex-girlfriends, for revenge.463 There is also the circumstance of 
pictures taken solely containing persons other than photographers themselves, whose 
publication has less protection of freedom of expression right, unless newsworthy or of 
public interest. This is the reason why German law and French law protect an individual’s 
right to control reproduction of photographs as an aspect of the privacy right.464 The 
freedom of expression right may prevail over privacy protection only when there is strong 
public interest under consideration. 
Described above are the common circumstances involving conflicts between privacy and 
freedom of expression that may occur when the privacy of an individual is compromised 
by expressions or expressed opinions made by others, or information disclosed by others 
that do not involve these addressers or speakers themselves, but for personal interest or 
for achieving certain ends. These types of privacy threats range from the unauthorised 
disclosure of other’s identities, to putting others in false light by publishing untrue, offensive 
and personal identifiable information to the public, through to publicizing confidential 
information about them, etc.465
In the ECtHR case of Gurgenidz v. Georgia,466 the private applicant, who was a former 
university teacher, complained that the publication of the information and his photograph 
in a newspaper by another private person was a violation of the applicant’s right to private 
life as protected under Article 8 ECHR. The defendant argued that the disclosed personal 
information was published to bring into public attention an issue of suspicious ownership. 
In the digital age, privacy cases such as this one have been on the rise, concerning 
rumours, false information and incorrect data regarding individuals flowing freely and thus, 
threatening individual seclusion and solitude. Numerous cases have been reported across 
462 Daniel J. Solove, (2007) The Future of Reputation: Gossip, Rumor, and Privacy on the Internet, New Haven, 
London: Yale University Press, pp. 135-136. 
463 The Editorial Board, “Fighting Back Against Revenge Porn”, The New York Times, 12 October 2013, available at 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/13/opinion/sunday/fighting-back-against-revenge-porn.html>.
464 Eric Barendt, “Privacy and Freedom of Speech”, in Andrew T. Kenyon and Megan Richardson (Eds.), (2006) 
New Dimensions in Privacy Law: International and Comparative Perspectives, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p. 237.
465 Ibid., pp. 230-240.
466 ECtHR, En l’affaire Gourguénidzé c. Géorgie, Judgment, 17 October 2006, Application No. 71678/01 (in 
French).
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the world involving the online disclosure of sensitive private information of victims—mostly 
adolescents and young adults—for such purposes as online shaming, stalking, harassment, 
or even monetary gain. These illegal activities have at times even resulted in significant 
distress, and can potentially trigger suicide. 467
Many of the privacy-free expression conflicts reported are between individuals and 
journalists/the media, in that the latter may disclose personal information for a variety of 
motives, including personal motives, such as to raise public attention for economic benefits, 
professional reputation, public interest or a mixture of these. Most legal cases against 
media are brought before court by private litigants—in particular public figures or public 
celebrities—who regard their privacy as being harmed or under threat. In Times, Inc. v. Hill, 
the USA Supreme Court protected the freedom of expression of the media in the context 
of the fictionalization of a story by the media that put a family under false light, arguing 
that: “Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized 
community. The risk of this exposure is an essential incident of life in a society which places 
a primary value on freedom of speech and press”.468 
In Germany, the Constitutional Court ruled in a number of cases, that the inaccurate 
attribution of remarks violated the privacy of the persons concerned and was not protected 
by freedom of expression.469 In such cases, the privacy of ordinary persons is, generally, 
better protected than that of public figures who willingly or otherwise occupy public roles 
in social life, unless the disclosed information is newsworthy or of public interest. 
Many such conflicts indeed concern public figures or public celebrities and journalists. 
Public figures and celebrities, unlike ordinary people, occupy a special social status and 
have social influence over the rest of society, having more channels to react to media 
disclosures and comments. Journalists and media, on the other hand, often merit special 
protection for their public function of informing and acting as the watchdog of society. 
Striking adequate balances between the two significant rights involves delicate work which 
depends on different cultural-political contexts.470 In the USA and other jurisdictions, in the 
pre-Internet era, the public figure doctrine or public figure rule, or similar, has facilitated 
the striking of balances between the protection of privacy and freedom of expression and 
provides prediction in law. However, the rise of the digital age, as well as the related power 
shifts relating to the collection, processing and sharing of information, have altered the two 
rights’ settled scopes, as well as the importance of finding adequate balances between the 
said rights.
It is worth noting that the right to freedom of information is in some cases not solely granted 
to individual citizens but also to legal persons. For example, in Társaság a Szabadságjogokért 
v. Hungary, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) decided that a civil society NGO in 
Hungary had the right to information about the complaint filed by a Member of Parliament. 
The Court said that the NGO played a role of social watchdog similar to that played by media 
467 One of them is Amanda, a Canadian girl abused online by a Dutch adult and killed herself. “Man Charged in 
Netherlands in Amanda Todd Suicide Case.”
468 United States Supreme Court, Time, Inc. v. Hill 385 U.S. 374 (1967), 388.
469 Eric Barendt, “Privacy and Freedom of Speech”, in Andrew T. Kenyon and Megan Richardson (Eds.), (2006) 
New Dimensions in Privacy Law: International and Comparative Perspectives, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p. 240.
470 The balancing of the privacy interest of public figures and freedom of expression will be further analysed 
below in Section 7.4.
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and thus needed such access to publicly-held information of public interest, especially 
when the request contained no personal data of the MP at stake.471
A third circumstance of conflict between privacy and freedom of expression lies in the 
context of increasingly strengthened State regulation and interference in the digital age. 
Nowadays, protecting individuals from the escalating large scale data breaches, privacy 
threats and related harms including online frauds, etc. has been one of the major tasks of 
national states across the world. State authorities may take advantage of public pressures 
to seek a kind of privacy protection that restricts the right to freedom of expression of some 
individuals including journalists and biographers. The protected social group might be 
government officials or politicians even including the deceased, 472 resulting in restrictions 
that do not match international standards for legitimate limitations. 
6.3  Privacy and transparency 
Transparency refers to a cluster of related ideas and concepts such as governmental and 
organizational action in the open, the availability of information, and accuracy and clarity 
of the information.473 According to Schauer, it can be understood in a passive or a negative 
attribute rather than an activity, like speaking or writing, or a power, referring more to 
availability and accessibility.474 A more positive conception of transparency indicates efforts 
to make information easily usable rather than simply available. Such efforts include, for 
instance, a requirement of publication as opposed to a requirement of access.475 As revealed 
in Chapter 5, transparency can facilitate the realization of good governance and regulation, 
democracy, efficiency and epistemology in the identification of truth.476 When reflecting on 
the roles that transparency has played in the digital age in individual life, the focus of the 
issue will be on both their conflicts and mutual support that has been enhanced by digital 
technologies. 
Some people argue for personal transparency and urge the acceptance of the idea of 
“zero privacy” in the digital age, or the notion of “personal transparency”. The idea is that 
transparency is not just an opportunity for institutions to generate trust and be more 
effective, but also one for individuals to do the same.477 The more transparent we are to 
others, the better we will behave morally; and the openness and transparency will render 
society more tolerant to the bad or embarrassing things that we do, insofar as everyone 
does so.478 The risks relating to such openness and transparency can be grouped into risks 
to one’s individual autonomy and dignity relating to the development, management and 
471 ECtHR, Társaság a Szabadágjogokért v. Hungary, Judgment, 14 April 2009, Application No. 37374/05, paras. 
35-38.
472 Bo Zhao, “Legal Cases on Posthumous Reputation and Posthumous Privacy”, pp. 90-92.
473 William B.T. Mock, “On the Centrality of Information Law: A Rational Choice Discussion of Information Law 
and Transparency”, (1999) The John Marshall Journal of Information Technology & Privacy Law, Vol. 17, No. 4, 
pp. 1069 and 1078-1081, available at <http://works.bepress.com/william_mock/12>.
474 Frederick Schauer, “Transparency in Three Dimensions”, (2011) University of Illinois Law Review, No. 4 (2011), 
pp. 1343-1344, available at <http://www.illinoislawreview.org/article/transparency-in-three-dimensions/>.
475 Ibid., p. 1344.
476 Ibid., pp. 1346-1351.
477 Don Tapscott, “Why Transparency and Privacy Should Go Hand in Hand”, The Huffington Post, 5 May 2011, 
available at <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/don-tapscott/why-transparency-and-priv_b_643221.html>.
478 Ibid.
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control of personal identity and life;479 and risks related to the blurring of the difference 
between individuals and institutions with different social obligations.480 
From an individual perspective, the conflict between privacy and transparency can lie in 
the potential threats to privacy from the access to personal information or personal data 
held by public bodies or other institutions with public functions. In short, the viability and 
access of personal information to the public should not be in violation of individual privacy. 
Approached in this way, the conflict of the two values can be viewed as one between the 
right to information and the right to privacy. The right to freedom of information enshrined 
by international human rights law grants individuals the right to have access to information 
“held by public bodies”, regardless of the form, source and data of production relating to 
the information, and in this context ‘public bodies’ also include other entities when carrying 
out public functions.481 The right includes the access to information regarding oneself and 
to correct such information if not correct, but also includes a right that: “the public and 
individuals are entitled to have access, to the fullest extent practicable, to information 
regarding the actions and decision-making processes of their Government, within the 
framework of each State’s domestic legal system”.482 
Information held by public bodies—like information or data of the same nature held by 
private sector performing public functionalities in the digital age—may, however, concern 
the privacy of other people who should be protected against potential privacy harm. In this 
context, accessing and publicly disclosing others’ personal data already openly available to 
the public, in hands of public bodies, may still constitute potential privacy invasion. Such 
information includes personal information in court records, social programme records, 
public registers, etc. This category of privacy invasion has been described by the USA 
Supreme Court as follows: “One did not necessarily forfeit a privacy interest in matters 
made part of the public record, albeit the privacy interest was diminished and another 
who obtained the facts from the public record might be privileged to publish it”.483 Further, 
the Supreme Court added: “Plainly there is a vast difference between the public records 
that might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files, county archives, and local 
police stations throughout the country and a computerized summary located in a single 
clearinghouse of information”.484 
In a similar vein with the Court’s reasoning regarding computerized information, an 
increasing threat posed by transparency to individual privacy lies in the collection and 
profiling of data based upon open-source data and information available to the public, 
whether online or offline. In one case, two convicted German murderers sued Wikipedia in 
Germany for disclosing their names on its website after serving their terms. Their request 
was eventually turned down by the German Federal Court of Justice based on a two-step 
479 See also Daniel J. Solove, “Why Privacy Matters Even If You Have ‘Nothing to Hide”, 15 May 2011, sec. The 
Chronicle Review, available at <http://chronicle.com/article/Why-Privacy-Matters-Even-if/127461/>.
480 Don Tapscott, “Why Transparency and Privacy Should Go Hand in Hand”, The Huffington Post, 5 May 2011, 
available at <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/don-tapscott/why-transparency-and-priv_b_643221.html>. 
481 “UN Human Rights Committee: General Comment No. 34”, 4 July 2011, available at <http://www.
opensocietyfoundations.org/publications/un-human-rights-committee-general-comment-no-34>.
482 Human Rights Council, “Resolution Adopted by the Human Rights Council/ Right to the Truth A/HRC/
RES/12/12”, 12 October 2009, available at <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/
G09/165/99/PDF/G0916599.pdf?OpenElement>.
483 “Peck v United Kingdom (2003) 36 EHRR 41”, 5RB, accessed 7 May 2015, available at <http://www.5rb.com/
case/peck-v-united-kingdom/>.
484 Ibid., para. 24.
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balancing test.485 However, the Google Spain case was judged on the presumption that easy 
access to the previous court-ordered bankruptcy finding of the plaintiff (by googling the 
plaintiff’s name) was still a violation of the plaintiff’s privacy interest.486 On other extreme 
occasions, even parents’ access to personal information of their deceased children can be 
rejected on the ground of a social networking site—e.g. Facebook or Twitter—protecting 
the deceased’s privacy.487
But transparency and privacy can also be mutually supportive, improving each other’s 
protection in the digital age. Transparency requirements of data protection law in many 
jurisdictions require data controllers to disclose sufficient information over the nature of 
their data processing to data subjects, including instances of data breach, data re-use or 
change of purpose in use, so that data subjects may know if their personal data and data 
privacy have been protected according to law. Under the EU’s Data Protection Directive 
95/46/EC, controllers have the legal duty to provide information to the data subjects in case 
of processing their data and data subjects have the right to access personal data.488 The fair 
processing principle of the EU data protection law requires transparency of data processing, 
including providing sufficient information to the data subject, including by the notification 
of data breaches.489 Transparency in this sense is an important instrument to ensure data 
privacy protection in data processing.
Another example from the private sector is that in recent years it has become a good 
practice of some IT giants—e.g. Google, Microsoft, Yahoo, Vodafone, etc.—to publish 
transparency reports to avert a decline in trust by their customers,490 hoping also to curtail 
the appetite of State authority to over-collect data, by opening up the extent of the 
practice and increasing public awareness. However, there has been lack of transparency 
on mass surveillance practices from the side of governments, across the world, as 
regards information engagements with Internet companies and other data controllers. 
The intermediaries themselves have been slow to disclose records of their own content 
intervention and identity sharing in response to requests by non-State actors. In a digitized 
and connected world, in which data processing and data flows are unavoidable, privacy 
cannot only be protected by means of secrecy and policing regarding what others know 
about us, like in the pre-Internet age. It can be better protected by stronger transparency 
and accountability in checking and denouncing questionable behavior concerning the use 
of collected data.491
485 Lawrence Siry and Sandra Schmitz, “A Right to Be Forgotten? - How Recent Developments in Germany May 
Affect the Internet Publishers in the US”, (2012) European Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 3-5, 
available at <http://ejlt.org/article/download/141/222>.
486 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de 
Protección de Datos (AEPD), delivered on 25 June 2013.
487 Geoffrey A. Fowler, “Life and Death Online: Who Controls a Digital Legacy?”, Wall Street Journal, 5 January 
2013, sec. Tech, available at <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732467720457818822036423
1346>.
488 Articles 10, 11 and 12, Directive 95/46/EC.
489 FRA, (2014) Handbook on European Data Protection Law, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European 
Union, pp. 95-99, available at <http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2014-handbook-data-protection-
law-2nd-ed_en.pdf>.
490 “Google Slams U.S. Government in Latest Transparency Report”, PCWorld, 14 November 2013, available at 
<http://www.pcworld.com/article/2063386/google-slams-u-s-government-in-latest-transparency-report.
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491 David Brin, “Why Transparency will save Privacy”, Text, The European, 16 October 2013, available at <http://
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The other side of the coin is that good privacy protection can help with achieving more 
transparency in other areas of information. This link is based on institutional actions for both 
government and private companies in improving trust that transparency will not violate 
the privacy of personal information. Strong privacy protection of personal information and 
data privacy such as via Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) will be a big advantage 
for companies in market competition and will encourage customers to give their personal 
information for service. There is also no doubt that good protection of information privacy 
and personal data by State authorities will improve government-citizen interaction in 
data processing, which in turn promotes transparency with more trust in government 
and more willingness to offer personal data by individual citizens. According to a recent 
report, transparency “requires public confidence, and one way to ensure that is to reassure 
the public that its privacy is a central concern whose protection is embedded in decision-
making processes”.492 
6.4  Transparency and freedom of expression 
Transparency itself is not a fundamental value equal to privacy and freedom of expression, 
but one derived partly from the right to information and partly for its value in enhancing 
democracy and other public goods including mutual trust, societal corporation, efficiency, 
justice, equality, anti-corruption, accountability and good governance. Transparency 
as a political end can be achieved by protecting and granting access to, and proactive 
disclosure of, desired information by the general public, for instance, by legal instruments 
protecting the right of freedom of information. When this right is well protected, the value 
of transparency is secured as a public good or a public interest. Transparency can also be 
strengthened by an environment in which press freedom and the right to impart information 
and opinion are well protected. In this sense, Schauer has pointed out that free speech may 
be best understood as a component, even if not the most important component, of a larger 
commitment to transparency.493
From the perspective of information control and management, transparency and freedom 
of information approach information flow from different endpoints. Transparency concerns 
the accessibility of desired information from the side of information or data controllers, and 
relates to the availability and usability of such information when requested. Freedom of 
expression and freedom of information refers to individuals as the subjects disseminating 
and accessing information for desired purposes. Freedom of expression and freedom of 
information are positive entitlements, while transparency is rather the desired open state 
in information flow. 
For individuals, transparency and freedom of expression and opinion are mutually 
supportive and supplementary to each other. Without transparency, in particular in terms 
of transparency as epistemology,494 freedom of expression makes less sense in imparting, 
receiving and accessing information when such information is broadly closed and not 
open to scrutiny in terms of truth and facts. It is recognized that transparency of ownership 
492 Kieron O’Hara, “Transparent Government, Not Transparent Citizens: A Report on Privacy and Transparency 
for the Cabinet Office”, 27 March 2014, p. 3, available at <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61279/transparency-and-privacy-review-annex-a.pdf>.
493 Frederick Schauer, “Transparency in Three Dimensions”, (2011) University of Illinois Law Review, No. 4, p. 1356, 
available at <http://www.illinoislawreview.org/article/transparency-in-three-dimensions/>.
494 That the open availability of information will facilitate the identification of truth and falsity and 
consequently produce more knowledge and greater progress. See Ibid., p. 1350. 
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is the precondition of independent media.495 In addition, transparency can and must be 
facilitated by freedom of expression and freedom to information, in that the availability and 
accessibility of information held by public bodies and other institutions with public duties 
per se does not mean that such information will reach the hands of those who need it. 
There is always a gap in the information flow chain between individuals and government 
bodies, which needs to be bridged by the exercise of press freedom and the wider freedom 
of expression by individuals, such as providing requested information and the related 
source online. Through the protection of online freedom of expression, transparency and in 
particular institutional transparency will be largely improved. 
6.5  Balancing privacy, freedom of expression, the right to 
information and transparency: practices and critiques 
As important human values and public goods, the optimization of these ends is the highest 
goal of human community because of the conflicting interests among individual citizens 
and diversified social groups. Balancing these values involves considering many variables 
important to society, and the criteria that any limitation of rights should be: a) prescribed 
in law; b) necessary; c) proportionate; and d) for legitimate purpose.496 Generally speaking, 
there are two categories of balancing: balancing by definition and ad hoc balancing. 497 
These are especially relevant to the cases of freedom of expression and privacy, and can also 
apply to the right to information and transparency.
Balancing by definition
The first approach is to define the precise scopes of each right by setting out clear rules to 
prevent potential conflict; for instance, by explicitly prescribing what genres of speeches 
are not allowed because they violate another’s privacy without meeting the international 
standards such as the test of necessity. Examples may be the confidentiality duty of those 
working at post office, law firms and medical services not to disclose their customers’ 
information to third parties. Limitations of confidentiality in such cases would have to be 
shown as necessary; for example, for law enforcement in the sense of being the only way 
to secure another right such as the right to security of the person. In data protection laws, 
data controllers usually have the legal duty not to transfer controlled personal data to a 
third party without the consent of data subjects. 
Recital 39 of the European Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC (DPD) prescribes that: “whereas, 
furthermore, data can be legitimately disclosed to a third party, even if the disclosure was 
not anticipated at the time the data were collected from the data subject; whereas, in all 
these cases, the data subject should be informed when the data are recorded or at the 
latest when the data are first disclosed to a third party”. 498 Article 9 of the DPD sets out 
categorical exemptions: “Member States shall provide for exemptions or derogations from 
the provisions of this Chapter, Chapter IV and Chapter VI for the processing of personal data 
carried out solely for journalistic purposes or the purpose of artistic or literary expression 
495 Access Info Europe, “Special Rapporteurs on Freedom of Expression Called to Endorse Transparency of 
Media Ownership”, available at <http://www.access-info.org/tmo/15958>, accessed 8 September 2015.
496 When balancing concerns rights online, UNESCO advocates that the exercise also take account of the 
principles of Openness, Accessibility and Multi-stakeholder participation (see below)
497 For a distinction of the two concepts of balancing, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, “Constitutional Law in the 
Age of Balancing”, (1987) The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 96, No. 5, p. 948.
498 Directive 95/46/EC, recital 39.
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only if they are necessary to reconcile the right to privacy with the rules governing freedom 
of expression”.499 
The limitation of freedom of expression in the interest of privacy would also need to be 
justified by the necessity criterion, and hence the proportionality principle. However, both 
rights can be limited by other imperatives. The law-prescribed derogations or limitations 
include extreme circumstances with international consensus such as the dissemination of 
child pornography materials. It is a universal practice of national laws, as revealed by the 
UN Human Rights Council, to forbid harmful speeches including online child pornography 
which violates children’s dignity and privacy.500 Other materials that are variously restricted 
are hate speeches which amount to advocacy of incitement to violence, hostility or 
discrimination, including those related to gender, race, sexual orientation and religion.501 
In some European countries such as France and Germany, Holocaust denial speeches are 
forbidden by law too. The privacy of those persons expressing such views may be limited in 
order to establish the identity of the actors involved for the purposes of law enforcement. 
Balancing rights in the case of adult pornography may depend on the interpretations of 
public morality, and neither expression nor privacy may be protected accordingly.
A significant benefit for the balancing by definition is that this should normally occur 
through legislation that can open the issue for sufficient public discussion and debate, 
before taking a decision on the potential scope, procedure, elaboration of derogations, and 
public interest exemptions. In the case of private intermediaries performing balancing by 
definition, this should be outlined in terms of service.
Ad hoc balancing
Much actual balancing practice has been done by capable courts—i.e. supreme courts, 
constitutional courts, regional courts or national courts—in an ad hoc manner. In this 
context, conflicts are resolved by deliberating on new circumstances, before adjudicating 
courts, with the intention to re-define or re-delineate the legal boundaries for privacy and 
free expression by gradually developing case law in that area. Though there are differences 
in the balancing mechanisms used in the various jurisdictions, and in the gravity that they 
grant to the two rights, such balancing mechanisms or processes usually follow the test 
that is well addressed by the Human Right Committee’s General Comment 27.
Accordingly, to assess whether a limit can be justified, the limit should satisfy criteria such 
as: a) any restrictions must be provided by the law; b) the essence of a human right is not 
subject to restrictions; c) restrictions must be necessary in a democratic society; d) any 
discretion exercised when implementing the restrictions must not be unfettered; e) for 
permissible restriction, it is not enough that it serves one of the enumerated legitimate 
aims, but it must be necessary for reaching the legitimate aim; and f ) restrictive measures 
must conform to the principle of proportionality, meaning that they must be appropriate to 
499 Ibid., Article 9.
500 UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur to the General Assembly on the Right to Freedom 
Opinion and Expression Exercised through the Internet, 10 August 2011, UN Doc A/66/90, para. 21, 
available at <http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/66/290>. 
501 See in general UNESCO, “Countering Online Hate Speech”, June 2015, available at <http://www.unesco.
org/new/en/media-services/single-view/news/unesco_launches_countering_online_hate_speech_
publication/#.Ve8wA5e5wg4>.
90
achieve their protective function; be the least intrusive instrument among possible means 
for the same result; and be proportionate to the protected interest.502
As UNESCO pointed out in the report presenting the results from the global survey on 
Internet privacy and freedom of expression, a public interest test is also a popular criterion 
applied in balancing the two rights, in deciding which right shall prevail. This has been well 
established in two ECtHR’s Von Hannover v. Germany cases,503 which concern: a) the conflict 
between the right to freedom of expression (in particular regarding mass media) and the 
privacy right of public figures; and b) the conflict between the right to privacy of individuals 
and the right to access information held by public bodies.504 
The balancing practice of the European Court of Human Rights includes the case of Axel 
Springer AG v. Germany,505 in which the Court set forth a number of conditions for achieving 
good balancing of the media’s right to freedom of expression and the public figures’ right 
to privacy. These conditions include: a) contribution to a debate of general interests; b) how 
well known are the person concerned and the subjects of the report; c) prior conduct of 
the persons concerned; d) the method of obtaining the information and its accuracy; e) 
the content, form and consequence of the publication; and f ) the severity of the sanction 
imposed. 
In Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France, the privacy interest of the family of a dead local 
French politician was at stake due to the publication of some death-scene photos. The 
Court investigated the legality of the State authority’s interference with the complainant’s 
freedom of expression, testing whether the State interference fulfilled the requirements of 
“prescribed by law”, “legitimate aim”, “necessary in a democratic society”, and proportionality 
or severity of the interference. 506 In Peck v. the United Kingdom, the Court ruled that the 
disclosure of two photographs taken from the CCTV footage covering the unmarked 
images of the plaintiff, as a private person, was disproportionate and constituted unjustified 
interference with the plaintiff’s private life, and violated his right as protected by Article 8 
of the ECHR.507 Balancing as a way to optimize human rights, as in the case law of ECtHR, 
has been implemented by European jurisdictions such as in the German law and other EU 
Member States. 
However, the balancing of fundamental rights in general is not immune to critiques. Some 
argue that accepting the assignment of different weights to some human rights, where such 
weights depend on the circumstances framing a particular case, gives a shifting character to 
human rights principles. They also argue that the process of balancing can possibly swallow 
up the rights. One solution against such critiques is to stick to the proportionality principle, 
by limiting power for interference.508 
502 Ct OHCHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, 17 April 2013, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/40, para. 29, available at <http://
ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/23/40>.
503 Toby Mendel et al., (2012) Global Survey on Internet Privacy and Freedom of Expression, UNESCO Series 
on Internet Freedom, Paris: UNESCO, pp. 98-99, available at <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/
communication-and-information/resources/publications-and-communication-materials/publications/full-
list/global-survey-on-Internet-privacy-and-freedom-of-expression/>.
504 Ibid.  
505 ECtHR, Axel Springer Ag v. Germany, Judgment, 7 February 2012, Application No. 39954/08.
506 ECtHR, Hachette Filipacchi Associes v. France, Judgment, 14 June 2007, Application No. 71111/01, paras. 29-
65.
507 ECtHR, Peck v. United Kingdom, Judgment, 28 January 2003, Application No. 44647/98.
508 Başak Çalı, “Balancing Human Rights? Methodological Problems with Weights, Scales and Proportions”, 
(2007) Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 253-254.
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Another important issue is the assumption that each balanced right involved in a balancing 
process is commensurable, which treats such rights as constructs that are context-sensitive, 
subject to utilitarian calculations of net benefit, which would run against the nature of 
human-right protection itself.509 Last, the public interest test exercise that is popularly 
applied in the practice of balancing the two rights can be problematic, insofar as it may 
create an artificial conflict between the individual and the collective. The nature of human 
rights should not be about the interest of a particular person, but about those of each and 
every person. 510
For its part, UNESCO, as part of the UN system, directly follows the principles set out in human 
rights documents for the reconciling of rights, namely the need for legality (and therefore 
predictability), necessity (and thence proportionality), as well as legitimate purpose. In 
addition, the objective of ensuring the least invasive solution is acknowledged, so that the 
essence of each right should not be impaired, and that limitations should be exceptional 
in nature. In regard specifically to hate speech, which entails balancing the expression of 
some with rights of others to dignity, equality and security (amongst others), UNESCO takes 
cognisance of the Rabat Plan of Action on the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial or 
religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.511 This 
document of the UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights goes beyond the 
“three part test” noted above, and outlines an additional six-part test. In terms of the latter, 
imposing restrictions on hateful speech should be decided only after assessing the context, 
the status and intent of the speaker, content and reach of the expression, and the likelihood 
including imminence of harm. To supplement all this, when it is a question of reconciling 
rights specifically on the Internet in particular, additional considerations may come into 
play. Such considerations are evident in the concept of Internet Universality adopted by 
UNESCO’s Member States in 2015. The concept calls for Internet decision-making to take 
cognisance of Human Rights, Openness, Accessibility and Multi-stakeholder participation 
(the ‘ROAM principles’). Accordingly, to preserve the universality of the Internet, the 
balancing of rights online should also consider any potential impact on the Openness and 
Accessibility dimensions of the Internet, and be achieved via multi-stakeholder processes.512 
509 Ibid., p. 259.
510 Ibid.
511 http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opinion/SeminarRabat/Rabat_draft_outcome.pdf
512 See http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CI/CI/pdf/news/sakharov_seminar
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CHAPTER 7 What is missing: a gap analysis of the status quo 
7.1  Introduction 
The proliferation of the Internet and increasing uses of novel mobile computing devices 
have raised numerous practical risks for, and challenges to, the rights of privacy, freedom 
of expression and freedom of information. Some of the threats underpinning such risks 
and challenges—at the individual, national and international levels—have already 
been illustrated in Chapter 2. So this Chapter elaborates further, by exploring the major 
threats to personal privacy and freedom of expression that emerge from advanced digital 
technologies. Section 7.2 contains a discussion of issues linked to privacy protection 
technologies and designs based on a detailed analysis of the privacy threats that emerge 
from recent related technological advancements, and it illustrates flaws in existing legal 
protection mechanisms. Section 7.3 provides an introduction regarding emerging threats 
to freedom of expression in online contexts. Finally, in section 7.4, which concludes the 
chapter, the focus is shifted to techniques that may be used to balance the two human 
rights in the digital age, as well as to three concrete cases that relate to such techniques.
7.2  Online privacy and data protection
7.2.1  New technologies and new privacy threats 
Though the traditional laws and social norms have been adapting to the rapid evolutions 
in Internet eco-systems, including to increasingly blurred boundaries in human interaction, 
rapid advances in ICT have persistently been steps ahead of reforms. If it is fair to assume 
that Moore’s Law will continue to apply during the next decade, such that we continue 
to experience rapid increases in computer processing power and storage capacities, as 
expected, then it is also reasonable to predict that significant advances in all aspects of 
ICT and the online environment will continue to influence individual privacy in many ways, 
and potentially more than ever before. This is likely to contribute to additional gaps and 
deserves due attention from policy and law makers. 513
One such influence on individual privacy is expected to result from the emergence and 
growth of the ‘Internet of People’ (IoP) and the ‘Internet of Things’ (IoT), especially when 
combined with continued advances in nanotechnology. The IoP and the IoT are anticipated 
to significantly extend the Internet from what it is to a network or group of networks that 
connect a substantially wider range of objects or groups of objects—e.g. including objects 
like home appliances (such as fridges and cookers); transportation vehicles (such as cars 
and trains); RFID-tagged items (such as living animals and stored items); and groups of 
nanosensors (such as ones injected into living bodies or into environments)—which will 
be assigned unique identifiers; e.g. IP addresses. The IoP and IOT, in doing so, are expected 
to constitute PITs, in that they shall enable the exercising of more control over data that 
fits current and/or future definitions of ‘PII’, including the collection, storage, processing 
and transmission of data—such as geo-location information, user-activity patterns, 
communication data, etc.—that will ultimately facilitate the creation of data profiles 
513 Douwe Korff and Ian Brown, The Use of the Internet and Related Services, Private Life and Data Protection: 
Trends and Technologies, Threats and Implications, Report, Council of Europe, March 2013, p. 3, available at 
<https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/cybersecurity-capacity/content/use-Internet-and-related-services-private-life-
and-data-protection-trends-and-technologies>.
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regarding those who use IoP- and/or IoT-connected devices and those regarding whom PII 
is captured by IoP- and/or IoT-connected devices.
Thus, it is clear that the combination of the IoP, the IoT and nanotechnology has the 
potential of generating vast amounts of data that either constitute or could be analysed 
to extract PII or other data that may lead to privacy breaches. More specifically, such 
combination of technologies and the resulting data can enable such activities as the 
generation of smart data, data profiling regarding people, and the seeking of underlying 
hidden patterns and unexpected correlations that lead to privacy breaches. For instance, 
future nanotechnology may enable the widespread automatic analysis of data collected 
from nanosensors implanted into one or more human bodies to determine facts about 
individuals’ health. Similarly, the scanning—and therefore the powering and reading—of a 
passive RFID implanted in a pet can generate data that alone or combined with other data 
would enable burglars to deduce or make educated guesses regarding whether the pet’s 
owners are likely to be at home. Similarly, data profiling can enable the identification of 
individuals by means of analyses of the individual’s behavioural patterns, allowing leeway 
under present legal protection frameworks.514
Additionally, note that such predictions do not account for the possibility that individuals or 
institutions could themselves become able to produce passive or active nanosensors and 
devices. If such ability would exist, then it could greatly enhance the range of attacks that 
could be devised against people and their assets. For example, it could be convenient for an 
individual to illegally and unethically use nanosensors to determine facts about the medical 
condition of someone to subsequently blackmail that person by threatening the publication 
of his or her medical condition, thus impinging on a wide range of rights. Moreover, since 
the combination of the IoP, the IoT and nanotechnology could facilitate the generation of 
vast amounts of data that may themselves constitute, or lead to the extraction of PII or other 
privacy-breaching data, such combination may also increase the risk of the occurrence of 
privacy breaches by the illegal and/or unethical access by third parties of the data collected 
and/or analysed.
Another critical risk and challenge to individual privacy emerges from the promising practice 
of Cloud computing, which conceptually refers to the reorganisation of how computing 
infrastructure (e.g. processing power and disk storage space), platforms (e.g. SNS platforms 
like Facebook and Twitter) and software (e.g. webmail systems like Google mail) are made 
available, publicly and/or privately, for use by the general public, corporates and other types 
of users. Using more mainstream terminology, these types of reorganisation are generally 
referred to by the following terms, respectively: a) ‘Infrastructure as a Service’ (IaaS); b) 
‘Platform as a Service’ (PaaS); and c) ‘Software as a Service’ (SaaS); as well as collectively by 
the term ‘Everything as a Service’ (EaaS).515
Despite the related benefits, Cloud computing raises significant data safety and information 
privacy concerns. Firstly, individuals’ data stored on Cloud-based storage locations (e.g. 
Dropbox, OneDrive or Google Drive) will be stored at a range of unknown places, thus 
514 See the discussion of the problems of PII in the U.S. law context by Schwartz and Solove. Paul M. Schwartz 
and Daniel J. Solove, “The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information”, 
(2011) New York University Law Review, Vol. 86, pp. 1836-1864, available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/
abstract=1909366>.
515 “The Future of Cloud Computing - Opportunities for European Cloud Computing beyond 2010”, p. 1, 
available at <http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/future-cloud-computing-opportunities-
european-cloud-computing-beyond-2010>, accessed 14 May 2015 
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being subject to different jurisdictions that provide different, and possibly inadequate types 
of privacy protection. For instance, current data protection legislation in Europe does not 
provide adequate solutions to the challenging problems uniquely linked to all aspects of the 
Cloud,516 negatively influencing both transparency in the Cloud and the exercise of freedom 
of expression broadly, including press freedom and the right to information. Secondly, 
Cloud computing—especially combined with such other technologies as distributed 
computing and grid computing, and with the availability of vast amounts of data—can 
facilitate information security breaches and privacy breaches. An example is that, insofar as 
vast amounts of processing power—as may be offered by the combination of millions of 
computer processors—could facilitate exhaustive searches which enable the illegal and/or 
unethical decryption of ‘ciphertext’ (encrypted plain text), or the de-anonymisation of data 
that would otherwise remain anonymised.
Other risks and threats to privacy emerge from the spread of biometric technologies, of 
which the main function is to authenticate relevant individuals’ live-ness and identity and 
which is based on the measurement and recording of their unique and distinctive physical, 
biological and behavioural characteristics, including their fingerprints, facial features, iris, 
voice, hand geometry, vein patterns, gait and DNA. Recently, biometric technology may 
also involve the use of genome data and ‘proteomics’ (the large-scale study of proteins), 
which can enable the identification of markers for specific diseases and treatments,517 
and which can also uniquely identify individuals. The use of these technologies has been 
increasing in the past decades in many contexts, including: a) public administration tasks, 
such as the registration of the identity of individuals in border control environments; and b) 
the administration and management of access to, and the enjoyment of rights. Such rights 
may cover civil rights, like the right to vote, and social rights, like the rights to health care 
and education.518
From a rights’ perspective, the use of biometric technologies poses serious risks and 
threats to privacy both intrinsically, insofar as it may lead to the unique identification of 
individuals, as well as to the breach of PII about the individuals being authenticated; and 
indirectly, because it may have a bearing on freedom of expression issues broadly, such 
as by discouraging privacy-aware citizens from engaging in the exercising of their right 
to freedom of expression, including right to information. Other related risks, which may 
materialise subsequent to and/or in the breach of these rights, include: a) fraud, theft 
and misuse (e.g. weaknesses in a biometric system leading to information leaks that may 
facilitate the illegal altering of financial records); b) misidentification and inaccuracies (e.g. 
false positive authentications leading to inappropriate access to PII); c) being exclusionary 
(e.g. biometric systems not equally functional in authenticating individuals from different 
ethnic backgrounds, or individuals with different capabilities); and d) the misuse of biometric 
516 Douwe Korff and Ian Brown, The Use of the Internet and Related Services, Private Life and Data Protection: 
Trends and Technologies, Threats and Implications, Report, Council of Europe, March 2013, pp. 8-9, 
available at <https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/cybersecurity-capacity/content/use-Internet-and-related-services-
private-life-and-data-protection-trends-and-technologies>.
517 Douwe Korff and Ian Brown, The Use of the Internet and Related Services, Private Life and Data Protection: 
Trends and Technologies, Threats and Implications, Report, Council of Europe, March 2013, p. 7, available at 
<https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/cybersecurity-capacity/content/use-Internet-and-related-services-private-life-
and-data-protection-trends-and-technologies>.
518 Privacy International, “Biometrics: Friend or Foe of Privacy? | Privacy International”, p. 4, available at <https://
www.privacyinternational.org/?q=node/48>, accessed 14 May 2015.
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data (e.g. to facilitate passive surveillance or data retention that breach the rights of the 
individuals involved).519
Big data and big data analytics—which in short refer to the accumulation and exploitation 
of vast and complex information databases,520 where the data contained in such databases 
includes data produced by and about people, things and/or the interactions between 
them521—are capable of results that may have significant impacts on individual privacy. 
The use of big data technologies, particularly in the absence of transparency, raises several 
privacy concerns, including regarding: a) the anonymity and pseudonymity of the data 
subjects; b) the re-use of data with changed purposes; c) the data subjects’ consent; d) 
lack of information regarding the accuracy of personal data; e) profiling by unknown data 
controllers; and f ) the sacrifice of information privacy in the absence of relevant information 
security checks and balances. The use of big data technologies also raises other issues, 
including in relation to: a) discriminations about the data subjects; and b) mistaken pattern-
matching.522
One of the most significant risks to individual privacy relates to the mass- and targeted-
surveillance activities that may occur in combination with some or all of the aforementioned 
technologies and/or other technologies.523 Today’s mass-surveillance activities include 
the use of well-known technologies and techniques, such as: data profiling, based on 
shared databases and collected data; the processing of communications data and meta 
data; geolocation tracking through multiple portable devices; Deep Package Inspection 
(DPI); malware, such as tracking malware and pre-installed backdoors; hacking tools and 
techniques, such as social engineering, pharming and phishing; social media monitoring; 
automated and manual Internet activity monitoring;524 and the use of CCTV systems and 
other data collection mechanisms. Such widely-acknowledged surveillance activities are 
accompanied by others that are either unknown or less known to the general public, such 
as the once less-known voice-processing technologies.525
7.2.2  Problems of privacy protection technologies and designs 
Many scholars and policy makers promote Privacy by Design (PbD) as a default solution 
for the protection of individual privacy and freedom of expression online, and consider the 
use of Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) to achieve better levels of online privacy; e.g. 
ones that enable: i) the anonymisation and pseudo-anonymisation of data; ii) the use of 
519 Privacy International, “Biometrics: Friend or Foe of Privacy?”, pp. 10-15, available at <https://www.
privacyinternational.org/?q=node/48>, accessed 14 May 2015.
520 Douwe Korff and Ian Brown, The Use of the Internet and Related Services, Private Life and Data Protection: 
Trends and Technologies, Threats and Implications, Report, Council of Europe, March 2013, p. 5, available at 
<https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/cybersecurity-capacity/content/use-Internet-and-related-services-private-life-
and-data-protection-trends-and-technologies>.
521 Primavera De Filippi, “Big Data, Big Responsibilities”, (2014) Internet Policy Review: Journal on Internet 
Regulation, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 1, available at <http://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/big-data-big-
responsibilities>.
522 Ibid., pp. 2-7.
523 For an explanation of the two categories of surveillance, see OHCHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, 17 April 2013, 
UN Doc. A/HRC/23/40, paras. 33-40, available at <http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/
HRC/23/40>.
524 See a short summary of the employed technologies, see Ibid., paras. 7-13.
525 Dan Froomkin, “How the NSA Converts Spoken Words Into Searchable Text”, The Intercept, available at 
<https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/05/05/nsa-speech-recognition-snowden-searchable-text/>, 
accessed 15 May 2015.
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cryptosystems and cryptographic primitives to achieve data confidentiality; and iii) the use 
of network security components, such as firewalls and onion-routing techniques to protect 
communications.526 However, PbD and PETs are not absolute, and they often themselves 
present privacy-related and other issues.
As Korff and Brown stated in 2013527, the key to suitable anonymisation does not revolve 
around the removal/replacement of direct identifiers from the relevant data—even 
when these removals/replacements would be complemented by the encryption of the 
underlying data—but around the size of the ‘anonymity sets’—i.e. ‘data pools’—that contain 
the anonymised data. Indeed, anonymization techniques involving the mere replacement 
of direct identifiers will be compromised when more and bigger data/anonymity sets are 
available for such activities as big data analytics, insofar as more data increases the possibility 
of discovering the identities linked to the anonymised data. Suitable solutions to such 
problem would include: a) transparency—i.e. lack of reliance on ‘security by obscurity’—
regarding the anonymization technologies adopted, enabling open peer-reviewing that 
will ultimately enhance security; and b) adequate procedures for disclosure, enabling 
early warnings to all the relevant parties. This said, like in many other security contexts, 
the key objective in the use of anonymization technologies is not to achieve absolute 
anonymization; rather, it is to ensure that the costs involved in achieving de-anonymization 
outweigh the benefits—i.e. from the intruder’s perspective—that may emerge from such 
de-anonymization.
PbD is widely recognized as lying ahead of PETs in the protection of privacy in online and 
other contexts, largely because it involves the adoption of built-in safeguards at the design 
stage of the development of services and/or artefacts (i.e. in ex-ante), rather than the bolting 
of safeguards onto existing services, technologies and/or artefacts as an afterthought, or 
late in the development lifecycle (i.e. in ex-post). The circumvention of PbD is essentially 
meant to be practically impossible or exceptionally difficult, because it requires forcing of 
the system or device to perform an act that it is not designed for.528 PbD solutions also 
go beyond PETs insofar as they may lead to measures that go beyond what is generally 
achieved as an afterthought; e.g. not only at the technological (i.e. hardware or software) 
level but also the physical, procedural, legal and other levels. Other characteristics of PbD-
based solutions include that these: a) are often unique and tailored to the service or artefact 
being designed; b) are technology or device concerned; and c) are developed to address 
any specific threat to privacy.529
However, PbD has its own challenges and limitations. A significant issue lies in the satisfaction 
or manifestation of existing legal norms, prescriptions and principles in the design of online 
solutions and the underpinning technologies. For instance, it is often difficult to bridge 
the gap between legal language (which is relatively ambiguous and imprecise) and the 
526 Onion routing is an infrastructure for private communication over a public network. It provides anonymous 
connections that are strongly resistant to both eavesdropping and traffic analysis. See Michael G. Reed, 
Paul F. Syverson and David M. Goldschlag, “Anonymous Connections and Onion Routing” (1998) IEEE Journal 
on Selected Areas in Communications, Vol. 16, No. 4, p. 482.
527 Douwe Korff and Ian Brown, The Use of the Internet and Related Services, Private Life and Data Protection: 
Trends and Technologies, Threats and Implications, Report, Council of Europe, March 2013, pp. 17-18, 
available at <https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/cybersecurity-capacity/content/use-Internet-and-related-services-
private-life-and-data-protection-trends-and-technologies>.
528 Demetrius Klitou, (2014) Privacy-Invading Technologies and Privacy by Design, Vol. 25, Information 
Technology and Law Series, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, p. 271, available at <http://link.springer.
com/10.1007/978-94-6265-026-8>.
529 Ibid., pp. 270-272.
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precision normally involved in the design, development, testing and implementation of 
computerised systems. It is also difficult to balance the benefits and costs that emerge from 
both specificity and flexibility. And there are definitional problems too, such as regarding 
what constitutes personal data under PbD.530 Additionally, the European Union Agency for 
Network and Information Security (ENISA), having analysed the limits of PbD from a technical 
perspective, has called for further research on the challenges relating to PbD, its application 
and the underpinning methods and techniques, which range from: a) the fragility of privacy 
properties; to b) privacy metrics and utility limitations; to c) increased complexity; and to 
d) obstacles to the implementation of PbD, such as unclear or too narrow interpretations 
relating to the function of PbD.531
In general, the use of technology to achieve anonymity in communications—e.g. single 
proxies, Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), onion routing, mesh-networks, and encryption 
technologies by most service providers—will go a long way in averting privacy invasion 
activities. However, some individuals’ use of such technologies will, paradoxically, often 
attract interception and monitoring by State authority, especially since most online users 
still employ poor privacy protection mechanisms. Furthermore, the use of technology 
to achieve anonymity/privacy online can hinder law enforcement activities, including in 
relation to the fight against online-enabled crimes relating to the rights discussed in this 
Report. For instance, it will be more difficult to identify who violates freedom of expression—
e.g. in defamation and hate speech—if the perpetrator employs anonymization technology 
to hide his/her identity.
7.2.3  Defective legal protections
As previously indicated, the evolution of the laws and regulations for the protection of 
privacy in online contexts has been slow compared to the corresponding advances in 
technology. Given that it is not possible to cover all the legal and policy gaps relating to 
the protection of privacy in this Report, this section is limited to a thematic illustration that 
outlines the major problems. The lack of regulatory action is becoming rather serious and 
particularly in view of the following thematic circumstances.
The first problem relates to the conceptual definitions adopted in different jurisdictions and 
legislations. As Bygrave noted in 2015, ICT law is increasingly characterized by the mixture 
of law and technology terms that may not fit well into each other, leaving gaps and conflicts 
in the implementation of law.532 For instance, with fast advances in ICT, the commonly used 
legal concept of PII is insufficient and subject to updates.533 Similarly, different laws and 
jurisdictions around the globe adopt different definitions for the same term—e.g. for the 
term ‘personal information’ as used in data protection and Freedom of Information (FOI) 
law—achieving different levels of clarity and contents.534 Definitional conflicts relating to 
530 Ibid., pp. 284-286.
531 ENISA, Privacy and Data Protection by Design: From Policy to Engineering, Report, December 2014, pp. 48-49, 
available at <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/identity-and-trust/library/deliverables/privacy-and-
data-protection-by-design>, accessed 24 April 2015.
532 Lee A. Bygrave, “Information Concepts in Law: Generic Dreams and Definitional Daylight”, (2015) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1, pp. 91-120.
533 Paul M. Schwartz and Daniel J. Solove, “The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally 
Identifiable Information”, (2011) New York University Law Review, Vol. 86, available at <http://papers.ssrn.
com/abstract=1909366>.
534 David Banisar, “The Right to Information and Privacy: Balancing Rights and Managing Conflicts”, World 
Bank Institute Governance Working Paper, 10 March 2011, p. 19, available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/
abstract=1786473>.
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such terms may also exist within the same jurisdiction; e.g. in the case of how the Irish 
define ‘personal information’ in their Data Protection Act (DPA) and FOI law.535
It is useful to note that such problems are on the rise with advances in ICTs, partly because 
new technology—e.g. that triggering the growth of categories of biometric data, and 
their use—continues to shape society’s understanding of such concepts as ‘PII’. And partly 
because novel technology will raise the need for novel terms and/or definitions for existing 
terms that are recognised as broad and/or vague, such as: ‘law enforcement’, ‘serious 
threats’, ‘national security’, ‘morals’ and ‘public order’. An additional problem relating to such 
definitional deficiencies is that these are, paradoxically, derogating the privacy protection 
of individuals. Indeed, such shortcomings threaten even the scope of the right to privacy 
enshrined by international human rights law; e.g. by means of vagueness in the right’s 
application.536 Thus, it is clear that more specific and concrete conceptual approaches must 
be adopted to secure the right to privacy and data protection.
The second problem relates to lack of legislation/regulation regarding the phenomenon 
of ‘data profiling’. As seen most recently from various privacy reports, this activity has 
become a major concern to privacy advocates, with the most worrying aspect being the 
data connectivity and/or linkability that is facilitated by the sharing of all sorts of databases 
amongst different data controllers. This often results in data subjects being unaware of, 
and lacking the means to discover what is happening in the ‘black box’, especially when 
the data being processed is categorized as anonymous or pseudonymous. Another issue 
relating to such data profiling is that it involves collaborations between the business sector 
and public authorities, where the former has defined business models that render it—and 
the underpinning data collection, storage and processing—profitable; and the latter find 
it useful, especially for the purposes of law enforcement and intelligence. Data profiling, 
framed within such a context, is especially problematic because, as noted by Korff and 
Brown, decisions made by either public authority or private sector on individuals for 
different treatments can be unfair and discriminating; and where grounds are unknown to 
individuals, the experience of injustice finds no proper remedy.537 
The third privacy-protection problem relates to lack of legislation—at both the national 
and international levels—regarding the cross-border transfer, storage and/or processing 
of data, which is on the rise globally, especially due to the increasing tendency towards 
the outsourcing of the processing and storage of data to the private sector; e.g. by means 
of Cloud computing. The main concern is about the processing of large quantities of data 
in foreign territories, under the laws of one or more foreign jurisdiction(s). The nature of 
such data varies significantly, ranging from: passenger name records (PNRs) to shared data 
used in mutual legal assistance and agreements against crimes, to online commercial 
transactions, to online gaming, to SNS-based interactions between users, etc.
The EU has made considerable efforts to secure data safety in cross-border data transfers, 
by establishing legal requirements for data controllers in Data Protection Directive 95/46/
EC, and by means of the Safe Harbour Program, however such efforts have not led to the 
535 Ibid.
536 OHCHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion 
and Expression, Frank La Rue, 17 April 2013, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/40, para. 21, available at <http://ap.ohchr.
org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/23/40>.
537 Douwe Korff and Ian Brown, The Use of the Internet and Related Services, Private Life and Data Protection: 
Trends and Technologies, Threats and Implications, Report, Council of Europe, March 2013, p. 30, available 
at <https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/cybersecurity-capacity/content/use-Internet-and-related-services-private-
life-and-data-protection-trends-and-technologies>.
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desired results. At the time of writing, the Safe Harbour had been overtaken by the ‘Privacy 
Shield’, but the latter was also not without controversy in terms of protecting Europeans’ 
rights. For national States, the protection of the safety and privacy of their citizens’ data 
abroad is a legal obligation to fulfil by means of proper legal and diplomatic measures. It 
seems that for many States personal data protection is not taken as an independent human 
right per se. In terms of the present international law framework, in many cases no effective 
legal remedies exist, for both minor or major data and data privacy breaches.538 Through 
what has been called ‘data nationalisation’, some States have relocated data storage and 
processing in attempts to reduce cross-border transfers, achieving dubious results that may 
lead to undesired effects, e.g. the fragmentation of the Internet. In general, the privacy 
problem of the cross-border transfer, storage and processing of data is subject to further 
international agreement and cooperation.
The fourth privacy-protection problem relates to lack of updates in many countries’ legal 
frameworks, which contribute to not addressing the threats and challenges that emerge 
from widespread communications surveillance in the digital age.539 The State authorities’ 
increasing electronic interception capabilities—which often occur for law enforcement 
purposes, intelligence service purposes, or for both purposes at the same time—can 
compromise the privacy interest of individuals, partly due to insufficient procedural 
protection relating to the processing of the personal information and data for such 
purposes, which is collected by public bodies themselves, or acquired from the private 
sector. In particular, the exterritorial mass surveillance activities carried out by some States 
in foreign territories are controversial because of their significance to the data subjects’ 
right to privacy and equal protection. This is why the UN General Assembly has called for 
reviews, and why many actors, including Internet intermediaries, call for the recognition of 
mechanisms, such as the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs), and for respect for the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Convention 108.540
7.3  Freedom of expression online and further improvements
According to a 2014 Freedom House report, Internet freedom is declining in 36 out of 
the 65 countries assessed. The key reasons provided are: a) the proliferation of repressive 
laws; b) new regulatory controls over online media; c) increased surveillance; d) increasing 
arrests of SNS users; e) intensified demands on the private sector to disclose information; f ) 
new threats facing women and the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) 
population; and g) more sophisticated and widespread cyber-attacks. 541 In line with this, 
according to UNESCO’s recent Internet survey, arbitrary blocking, filtering and content 
regulation are still a major factor that hinders freedom of expression online and State 
authorities have used technologies for the targeting and profiling of users to limit the right 
538 Kim Zetter, “Sony Got Hacked Hard: What We Know and Don’t Know So Far”, WIRED, 3 December 2014, 
available at <http://www.wired.com/2014/12/sony-hack-what-we-know/>.
539 OHCHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion 
and Expression, Frank La Rue, 17 April 2013, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/40, para. 17, available at <http://ap.ohchr.
org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/23/40>.
540 Douwe Korff and Ian Brown, The Use of the Internet and Related Services, Private Life and Data Protection: 
Trends and Technologies, Threats and Implications, Report, Council of Europe, March 2013, p. 33, available 
at <https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/cybersecurity-capacity/content/use-Internet-and-related-services-private-
life-and-data-protection-trends-and-technologies>.
541 Freedom House, “Freedom on the Net 2014”, available at <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/
freedom-net-2014#.VUczyJO5wg4>, accessed 4 May 2015
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to freedom of expression. 542 Note that such user-targeting can happen at multiple levels, 
including at the governmental, private companies and infrastructural levels.
Meanwhile, a number of State authorities have made efforts to restrict the widespread 
use of technical tools, such as VPN technologies, or the Tor network, or other encryption 
and anonymity technologies. Users could otherwise employ these to circumvent filtering, 
blocking and/or accessing users’ data. There have also been attempts to prescribe 
requirements for the disclosure of identity, and to press private companies in order to gain 
access to the service user’s information for various purposes.543 
According to Freedom House’s report between May 2013 and May 2014, 41 countries 
passed or proposed legislation that enables or would enable: a) the penalization of 
legitimate forms of online speech; b) increases in governmental control over content; and/
or c) expansions in governmental surveillance capacities. These laws also enable or would 
enable: a) the banning of online dissent; b) the criminalisation of online defamation; and c) 
the expansion of State regulators’ powers, by broadening national security laws, blocking 
content in the absence of court orders, increasing intermediary liability, and conducting 
intrusive surveillance.544 Also, according to the same report, blocking and filtering have 
been complemented by direct imprisonment of users to deter others and encourage 
self-censorship, to the point that more people were detained and prosecuted for digital 
activities in 2014 than ever before.545
Meanwhile, a report published by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights clearly noted the general lack of procedural safeguards and the shortage of effective 
oversight in relation to the surveillance activities carried out. Moreover, the same report 
pointed out that attention is increasingly being given to mixed models of administrative, 
judicial and parliamentary oversight;546 and effective remedies to the violation of the right 
to freedom of expression in online contexts are lacking.547
A number of other reports have also identified a general tendency for State authorities 
to impose on Internet intermediaries—e.g. ISPs, search engines and SNS Platforms—
responsibilities regarding content and access control. In many cases these intermediaries 
have to bend to State pressure and law requirements to filter, block and control published 
online contents, as well as to provide personal data/information to State authority. 
Moreover, some States decline to recognize such intermediaries’ limited liability, imposing 
criminal liabilities on them for objectionable content posted by third parties.548 Thus, while 
Internet intermediaries are central to the protection of the rights to freedom of expression 
and privacy, many are under increasing pressure from State authorities, from around the 
542 UNESCO, Keystones to Foster Inclusive Knowledge Societies: Access to Information and Knowledge, 
Freedom of Expression, Privacy, and Ethics on a Global Internet, Report, 2015, Paris: UNESCO, pp. 36-39, 
available at <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002325/232563E.pdf>.
543 OHCHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion 
and Expression, Frank La Rue, 17 April 2013, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/40, paras. 18-19, available at <http://
ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/23/40>.
544 Freedom House, “Freedom on the Net 2014”, pp. 4-7, available at <https://freedomhouse.org/report/
freedom-net/freedom-net-2014#.VUczyJO5wg4>, accessed 4 May 2015.
545 Ibid., pp. 1 and 7.
546 Pillay, “The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age”, 12-13.
547 Ibid., 13-14.
548 Freedom House, “Freedom on the Net 2014”, p. 6, available at <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
net/freedom-net-2014#.VUczyJO5wg4>, accessed 4 May 2015. 
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globe, and end up acting in ways that fall short of international standards for legitimate 
limitations to these rights. 549
Issues also persist regarding the extent to which societies respect the right to freedom of 
expression in online contexts as enjoyed by certain special social categories, such as women 
and members of the LGBTI community. Such groups, globally, still face socioeconomic 
and cultural barriers in accessing ICTs in the first place, and when they do overcome 
such barriers, they often become subject to increased risks of such illegalities as online 
harassment, threats and violence. In view of this, and given today’s technical and other 
forms of capabilities—e.g. the avenues opened by PbD—it is clear that more can be done 
to achieve higher levels of respect towards the right to freedom of expression in online 
contexts. 550 
7.4  Balancing in concrete contexts
Balancing the right to freedom of expression and the right to privacy, especially in online 
contexts, is a challenge in the digital age. However, such an endeavour is facilitated by 
general principles and guidelines found in international human rights law and in regional 
and State case law. In online contexts, new balances must be reached through judicial 
deliberation of the many factors at stake, including consideration of new or altered factors 
that result from situational changes; e.g. from the advent of new technologies that “upset” 
previously accepted equilibria. Such deliberation will involve, amongst other tasks: a) the 
assignment of weight to each right; and b) the search for possible approaches to optimizing 
one right while avoiding or at least mitigating the compromise of the other right(s). In the 
following three sections, we discuss three scenarios that have received global attention 
in order to show how new balances were struck with respect to the rights to freedom of 
expression and privacy, in different judicial contexts.
7.4.1 The Google Spain Case 
Google Spain is a landmark case in the EU that has achieved global influence due to the 
importance of the legal issue it addresses, and the judicial influences of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU).551
Facts
The facts of the case are as follows:
In 1998 the Spanish newspaper La Vanguardia published two announcements in its printed 
edition regarding the forced sale of properties arising from social security debts. The 
announcements—of which the purpose was to attract as many bidders as possible—were 
549 Rebecca MacKinnon et al., Fostering Freedom Online: The Role of Internet Intermediaries, UNESCO Series 
on Internet Freedom, Report, 2014, Paris: UNESCO, pp. 19-20, available at <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/
images/0023/002311/231162e.pdf>.
550 Demetrius Klitou, (2014) Privacy-Invading Technologies and Privacy by Design, Vol. 25, Information 
Technology and Law Series, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, p. 272, available at <http://link.springer.
com/10.1007/978-94-6265-026-8>..
551 ECJ, Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja 
González, Judgment, 13 May 2014.
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published on the order of the Spanish Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, and later made 
available on the Internet.
One of the properties described in the newspaper announcements belonged to the 
plaintiff, whose name was included in the announcements. In November 2009, the 
plaintiff contacted the newspaper to complain that a Google search for his name led to 
the announcements, arguing that the data relating to him was no longer relevant because 
the forced sale had been concluded years before; and that such data should therefore be 
removed. The newspaper replied that erasing such data was not appropriate because the 
publication had been on the order of the Spanish Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.
The plaintiff then contacted Google Spain in February 2010, asking that the links to the 
announcements be removed. Google Spain forwarded the request to Google Inc., whose 
registered office is in California, USA, taking the view that Google Inc. was the responsible 
body. The plaintiff subsequently lodged a complaint with the Spanish Data Protection 
Agency (Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, AEPD) asking both that the newspaper 
be required to remove the data; and that Google Spain or Google Inc. be required to remove 
the links to the data. On 30 July 2010, the Director of APED rejected the complaint against 
the newspaper but upheld the complaint against Google Spain and Google Inc., calling on 
them to remove the links complained of, and make access to the data impossible.
Google Spain and Google Inc. subsequently brought separate actions against the decision 
before the Audiencia Nacional (National High Court of Spain), basing their appeal on the 
following arguments:
Google Inc. was not within the scope of the EU Directive 95/46/EC (Data Protection Directive) 
and its subsidiary Google Spain was not responsible for the search engine;
There was no processing of personal data within the search function, and neither Google 
Inc. nor Google Spain could be regarded as a data controller in any event, thus the plaintiff—
who would be the data subject—did not have the right to erasure of lawfully published 
material.
Outcomes
The outcomes and results from the case—which include the CJEU’s delineation of new 
boundaries relating to the right to freedom of expression and the right to privacy— are, 
essentially, as follows:
An internet search engine operator is responsible—as a data controller—for the processing 
that it carries out of personal information which appears on web pages published by third 
parties. 552
Based on the CJEU’s interpretation of Article 4 Paragraph 1 under Directive 95/46/EC, the 
data controller’s processing of personal data is considered carried out in the context of the 
activities of an establishment of the controller on the territory of a Member State; i.e. in this 
case in Spain, since Google Inc. has such representation in the EU Member state. 553
Regarding the operations of intermediary search engine providers:
552 Ibid., para. 41. 
553 Ibid., para. 60. 
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Data subjects in similar situations may now request “the information in question no longer 
to be made available to the general public” by a search engine.
The search engine operator must consider requests from individuals to remove such 
information—i.e. links between their names and freely accessible web pages resulting from 
a search on their name—including where the person’s name or information is not erased 
beforehand or simultaneously from the web pages, and even, as the case may be, when 
the publication of the information in itself, on those pages, is lawful 554; and remove such 
links where the search result(s) “appear to be inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant or 
excessive in the light of the time that had elapsed”.
If the search engine rejects the request, the individual may take the case to relevant 
authorities, which may then order the removal of such links.
The decision aligns to the so-called right to be forgotten mooted in the proposed General 
Data Protection Regulation.
However, it can be noted that the Court did not explicitly grant such a right, depending 
instead on the data subject’s rights deriving from Article 7 (respect for private and family 
life) and Article 8 (protection of personal data) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union.
It ruled that the processing of personal data by the search engine operator is liable to “affect 
significantly the fundamental rights to privacy and to the protection of personal data”, 
because the search result provided “a structured overview of the information relating to 
that individual, [...and thus it] concerns a vast number of aspects” of the plaintiff’s life,555 and 
because the links that Google identified between the plaintiff’s name and the information 
in websites published by third parties were outdated and no longer relevant.
The Court also expressed that: “[the application] of Article  7(f ) (Directive 95/46/EC) [...] 
necessitates a balancing of the opposing rights and interests concerned, in the context of 
which account must be taken of the significance of the data subject’s rights arising from 
Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter (EU Charter of Fundamental Rights)”. 556
At the same time, the Court recognized that the individual’s fundamental rights under 
Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter “override, as a rule, not only the economic interest to the 
operator of the search engine but also the interest of the general public in having access to 
that information upon a search”. 557 It also recognised that the right to information access, 
in general, may—e.g. where the data subject would have played a role in public life, or if 
the access to the information is of preponderant interest to the general public—override 
the right to personal life and the right to personal data granted under the Charter’s Articles 
7 and 8.558
Thus, the new boundaries set by the CJEU may be characterised more generically by: a) the 
reshaping or extension of the duties and legal status of search engine providers like Google 
in EU jurisdictions; b) the exterritorial jurisdiction capacity of EU courts; c) the right of the 
554 Ibid., para. 62.
555 Ibid., para. 80. 
556 Italicized by authors, see Ibid., para. 74. 
557 Ibid., para. 91. 
558 Ibid.
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plaintiff to protect his/her own data privacy in claiming a ‘right to be forgotten’ or more 
accurately a ‘right to de-listing’; and d) the balancing of the right to privacy with other rights.
Consequences
The consequences of the case reach so far that they have not fully unfolded yet. Indeed, 
they may have much broader influences—which may be intended, unintended, direct or 
indirect—on both the industry and others’ right to freedom of expression and information.
A Right to be Forgotten?
The practical applicability of a ‘right to be forgotten’ is also problematic. Though personal 
information will not be available after removing the links made by search engines in Europe, 
it will often remain possible to access the information even in its original location by other 
means, due to the openness and connectivity of the Internet, even if this is with some 
difficulty.
Who should balance the Rights?
In line with such views, some people argue that it is improper to “leave the search engines 
as intermediaries the task of deciding whether to delete information or not, based on 
vague, ambiguous and unhelpful criteria”.559 For instance, since it is difficult to draw clear 
lines on the points substantiating the Court’s decision, the decision may cause fears from 
potential data privacy breach charges that lead to over-reaction by relevant intermediaries, 
and therefore to the inappropriate removal of non-privacy-invasive personal information, 
whether or not this would be directly related to persons’ names.
Impact on smaller online service providers
The House of Lords commented that the judgement “does not take into account the effect 
the ruling will have on smaller search engines, which unlike Google, are unlikely to have 
the resources to process the thousands of removal requests they are likely to receive”. 560 
Similarly, Small and Medium enterprises (SMEs)—which are more likely than their giant 
counterparts to want to prevent potential legal controversies—may be more susceptible 
to fears that may arise due to the difficulties in the drawing of clear lines on the points 
substantiating the Court’s decision; e.g. in balancing an individual’s right to privacy with 
others’ right to freedom of expression, thus risking that they overreact.
Impact on other types of intermediaries
The extension of this ruling to other types of intermediaries is not excluded. The guidelines 
provided by the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party regarding the application of the 
verdict, published recently, indicate that it is possible that the verdict would be applied 
559 House of Lords, House of Lords - EU Data Protection Law: A “Right to Be Forgotten”? - European Union 
Committee, 23 July 2014, available at <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/factsheets/
factsheet_data_protection_en.pdf>.
560 Ibid.
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to other intermediaries whenever the conditions established in the ruling are met. 561 
Additionally, Article 29, the association of Data Protection Authorities of EU Member States, 
whose opinions have soft law status, has called for an extension of the de-listing requirement 
to all Internet domains—including the ‘.com’ domain—for a satisfactory guarantee of the 
rights of data subjects. This measure is problematic in legal realities, insofar as it suggests 
the imposition of European jurisprudence on Internet users from countries outside the 
EU. A different option is to compel Google.com to provide a specific version of its search 
results for users accessing it from EU-based domains. Taking the measure to an extreme, on 
a global basis, each country could then end up with a fragmented but distinct experience 
of the Internet even when using the same Internet services. 
Impact on the Rights to Freedom of Expression and Information
The decision may also lead to an undesired chilling effect on the right to freedom of 
expression and the right to information of others. Firstly, it seems especially paradoxical 
where it would impose an obligation on the intermediary to remove links in cases where 
the original information published on third party websites is both deemed legal and not 
removed, as is the situation in the Google Spain case. Secondly, one commentator—who 
pointed out that in international human rights law “there is no right to be forgotten”, has 
argued that the decision indicates that Europe may have unintentionally established a new 
right to “censor some information that you don’t like”. 562 The commentator also contended 
that one of the main drawbacks of the decision is that it may lead to the privatization of 
censorship, insofar as the decision may now sanction search engines to censor personal 
data upon requests from individual data subjects, independently of further court decision-
making. 
Indeed, it may be argued that while it is still unclear how effective the Google Spain case is in 
terms of practical privacy protection, even though it has set new boundaries and extended 
the legal rights, it is clear that it has eroded the right “to receive and impart information and 
ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers”.563 While the CJEU 
has made the decision in favour of data privacy in this leading case to make it clear that a 
European citizen can choose to be delisted—at least on parts of the Internet under the EU 
jurisdiction, when the information disclosed online regarding the citizen’s past is deemed 
to be of no public interest—this might have severe repercussions on the wider rights to 
information online and expression. The academic Jonathan Zittrain has suggested that a 
‘right to reply’ could have provided a better balance than that struck by the Court.564
561 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on the Implementation of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union Judgment on “Google Spain and Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos(AEPD)
and Mario Costeja González” C-131/12, 2014, para. 17, available at <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/index_en.htm#h2-1>.
562 Natasha Lomas, “Jimmy Wales Blasts Europe’s ‘Right To Be Forgotten’ Ruling As A ‘Terrible Danger”, 
TechCrunch, 7 June 2014, available at <http://techcrunch.com/2014/06/07/wales-on-right-to-be-
forgotten/>.
563 Article 11, EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
564 See J. Zittrain, “Don’t Force Google to ‘Forget”, New York Times, 14 May 2014, available at <http://www.
nytimes.com/2014/05/15/opinion/dont-force-google-to-forget.html?_r=0>.
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7.4.2  Privacy of public figures and protection of freedom 
of expression 
Although public figures and public celebrities differ in whether being appointed to public 
office, both occupy special social status and thus exert more influence than ordinary people 
in a community. According to the definition by the Council of Europe, public figures are 
persons who hold public office and/or use public resources and, broadly speaking, include 
all those who play a role in public life, whether in politics, the economy, the arts, the social 
sphere, sport or in any other domain.565 It is also recognised that the special status of public 
figures comes at the price of compromises to their rights to reputation and privacy, to an 
extent; 566 and, in cases of conflict, priority to others’ right to freedom of speech and right to 
information, before law.
Prosser provided partial explanations on the rationales underpinning this legal doctrine 
in the USA legal context. First, he suggests that since most public figures seek publicity 
willingly, they cannot complain of being monitored and talked about. Second, public 
figures’ personalities and affairs have already become public and no longer can be regarded 
as private business. Third, public figures occupy a special social status and are thus in a 
better position than most ordinary people to respond to defamatory statements.567 In USA 
law, the public figure privilege doctrine is a well-established doctrine in privacy law for the 
publicity tort by 1964,568 and was recognized in the landmark Sullivan libel case.569 
While the public interest threshold counts in general, according to the Gertz doctrine570 
public figures include three categories of persons: a) public officials; b) those voluntarily 
playing prominent roles in specific public controversies; and c) all-purpose public figures. 
The terms representing the first two categories are self-explanatory. The third category—i.e. 
‘all-purpose pubic figures’—refers to those whose names are a household word, normally 
having prominent positions, persuasive power and influence. Additionally, similar to the 
second category, there are involuntary public figures who “simply [find themselves] at the 
centre of important societal events” and could in certain circumstances “be thrust into the 
role of a public figure”.571
Though the public figure doctrine has not been adopted explicitly by the US Supreme 
Court in constitutional analyses of privacy cases, it has always played a major role in the 
common law of privacy. For instance, the Court has used the doctrine in the context of 
individuals’ right to information privacy against the government.572
565 Resolution 1165 (1998) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the Right to Privacy, 
n.d., para. 7, available at <http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ta98/eres1165.
htm>.
566 William L. Prosser, “Privacy”, (1960) California Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 3, p. 411.
567 Ibid., pp. 410-411.
568 Catherine Hancock, “Origins of the Public Figure Doctrine in First Amendment Defamation Law”, (2006) 
New York Law School Law Review, No. 1, pp. 87-88.
569 New York Times co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
570 See a discussion of the case the related legal doctrine at: James C. Mitchell, “The Accidental Purist: 
Reclaiming the Gertz All Purpose Public Figure Doctrine in the Age of ‘Celebrity Journalism”, (2002) Loyola of 
Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review, Vol. 22, pp. 559-581.
571 Nathaniel Jurist Gleicher, “John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a Consistent Legal Standard”, (2008) Yale 
Law Journal, Vol. 118, No. 320, p. 118, available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1378742>.
572 Susan M. Gilles, “Public Plaintiffs and Private Facts: Should the ‘Public Figure’ Doctrine Be Transplanted into 
Privacy Law?”, (2005) Nebraska Law Review, Vol. 83, No. 4, pp. 1205 and 1212.
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Other jurisdictions adopt different, and at times substantially distinct, approaches to 
protecting freedom of expression. For instance, while Japanese law accepts the public figure 
doctrine, it limits the scope to a very small number of individuals who hold significantly 
prominent positions—e.g. top corporate executives and leading politicians—and thus are 
able to substantially affect society.573 In German law, public figures are clearly distinguished 
from private ones and organised in three categories, each granted a different type of 
protection: a) permanent public figures; b) celebrity public figures; and c) temporary public 
figures.574
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) follows a more elaborated approach towards 
the protection of the privacy of public figures in its case law. It refers to a public interest test 
involved, in combination with the distinction between public and private figures. It also 
considers the nature of the publicized information, such as: a) whether the information is of 
legitimate interest to the public;575 b) the formality and methodologies of the publication;576 
c) the proportionality of the interference measures;577 d) the location of the published 
images; and e) the style of the expression. 578In Hachette Filipacchi Associes v. France, the 
Court used more concrete criteria to achieve a balance in a conflict between the two rights, 
which included, amongst others: the measures and veracity of the information taken; 
contribution to a debate of general interest; official functions; and the nature of the person 
and the subject’s public profile. 579 
In the digital age, the Court is cautious in restricting online publication. The case Mosley v. 
the United Kingdom concerns the online publication of Internet content that has attracted 
a large audience. Albeit the disclosed matter is of a purely private nature, of limited public 
interest, and although the information was published mostly for entertainment purposes, 
the Court unanimously rejected the plaintiff’s complaint regarding the absence of a legal 
requirement to give individuals notice before publishing materials regarding their private 
life.580
The Court has made several decisions relating to the balance between the right to freedom 
of expression and the right to privacy (closely related to reputation) in online contexts 
(including online publication), and it still strives to clarify new legal issues and to seek 
balances between the two rights. On the one hand, it has emphasized the importance 
of the communicative and vast storage capabilities enabled by the Internet, as well as 
affirming that freedom of expression under Article 10 of the ECHR still applies online. On 
the other hand, it has also paid attention to the special character of the Internet and the 
differences between the online and the offline worlds.
The recent case law report by the Court revealed such changes, by deciding, for instance, 
that once private or personal information such as a person’s identity and name is online, 
the need to protect its confidentiality will no longer constitute an overriding requirement. 
573 Scott. J. Shackelford, “Fragile Merchandise: A Comparative Analysis of the Privacy Rights for Public Figures”, 
(2012) American Business Law Journal, Vol. 49, No. 1, p. 5.
574 Ibid., Section V.
575 ECtHR, Von Hannover v. Germany, Judgment, 24 June 2004, Application No. 59320/00.
576 ECtHR, Sapan v. Turkey, Judgment, 8 June 2010, Application No. 44102/04.
577 ECtHR, Hachette Filipacchi Associes v. France, Judgment, 14 June 2007, Application No. 71111/01.
578 ECTHR, Lillo-Stenberg and Saether V. Norway, Judgment, 16 January 2014, Application No. 13258/09.
579 ECtHR, Hachette Filipacchi Associes v. France, Judgment, 14 June 2007, Application No. 71111/01. (The case 
is still pending before the Grand Chamber after a recent hearing in April 2015) See also a discussion at 
Section 6.4. 
580 ECtHR, Mosley v. the United Kingdom, Judgment, 10 May 2011, Application No. 48009/08.
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The Court, however, has also considered the amplifying effect of the Internet which affects 
its specific balance between the protection of freedom of expression and respect for other 
rights. This is reflected in the Court’s strong support for protecting minors and children by 
national laws; the press’ responsibility not to air details of an individual’s private or family life 
which are available online, but not falling within the scope of any public or political debate 
on a matter of general importance; journalists’ responsibility to be extended to publications 
outside their employer’s website, but in their names; and the exemption of public figures 
from public pressure on account of cases concerning a member of his or her family, even if 
the related data is accessible on the Internet; as well as higher level of protection of political, 
militant and polemical expressions on the Internet. 581 
The Court’s exploration of the boundaries of the rights to freedom of expression and privacy 
will continue, especially where they conflict with each other or with other rights and values. 
One issue is the legal responsibilities of intermediaries on disclosure of private information 
without the consent of information subjects, and defamatory comments that are not 
controlled by them. In the most recent Delfi AS v. Estonia, the Court has favoured the plaintiff 
(in the capacity of data subject) by placing more responsibilities on the Intermediaries.582 
The ruling has effectively treated the particular platform as a form of media rather than 
an intermediary, and ruled that Delfi had a duty to pre-moderate content prior to its 
publication, rejecting the defence that the company had removed the offending content 
once it had been notified. This decision has serious consequences for, and could chill both 
freedom of expression and the right to information in online contexts. By requiring a form 
of prior restraint, it has seemingly weighed on the definitional side of balancing the two 
rights, which removes the flexibility of ad hoc balancing. In a subsequent case583, the Court 
produced a further opinion, deciding against imposing civil liability on website operators 
for third-party content, explaining that this was different from the Delfi case because the 
comments concerned did not include hate speech.
7.4.3  Anti-terrorism legislation and privacy protection 
As human societies are subjected to changes, such as those in the nature of pressing 
terrorist attacks and other security threats, they are continuously challenged to re-balance 
or re-coordinate the right to individual privacy and the right to public security. For instance, 
while mass- and targeted-surveillance are often justified in most countries based on reasons 
of public security, privacy protection is often seen to become compromised by quick 
legislation that justifies bulk surveillance measures, supposedly used to detect potential 
terrorists. And in this political climate characterised by terrorism and counter-terrorism, 
both domestically and in other jurisdictions, the relevant laws are increasingly permissive. 
For instance, often they authorise intelligence services to intercept communications—e.g. 
phone and email communications—in the absence of a judge’s approval. In other cases, 
such as Apple and the USA’s Federal Bureau of Investigation, the debate was sometimes 
framed as (individual data) security versus (national) security; and sometimes as an attempt 
by the authorities to interfere with “freedom of speech” in the mode of compelling “code as 
speech”. These examples point to some of the complexities involved.
581 ECtHR, “Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, Internet: Case-Law of the European Court 
of Human Rights”, June 2011, pp. 6-16, available at <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ee1d5bf1a.html>, 
accessed 9 September 2015.
582 ECtHR, Delfi AS v. Estonia, Judgment, 16 June 2015, Application No. 64569/09, para. 158.
583 Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete and Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary, Application No. 22947/13, European 
Court of Human Rights, 2016
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A 2012 UNODC report mentioned several uses of the Internet in terrorist activities, including 
as a propaganda tool, including for the incitement, recruitment and radicalization of 
individuals or groups of individuals; and as a means of cyberwarfare, including by enabling 
the financing, planning and execution of cyber-attacks.584 Thus it is clear that counter-
terrorism controls in cyberspace become useful. However, there are costs attached to 
such controls. Firstly, unless such controls are framed in adequate systems that follow legal 
requirements, and in particular the principles of proportionality and necessity, it would be 
reasonable to raise rule of law concerns and international standards in the first instance. 
Secondly, as pointed out in the same report, counter-terrorism initiatives relating to the use 
of the Internet can influence the enjoyment of a range of human rights, including the rights 
to freedom of speech, freedom of association, privacy and fair trial.585
The most frequently-raised issue is not with the collection and/or analysis of data that 
pertains to targeted suspects; but rather with the collection and analysis of data and 
metadata for “potentially suspicious behaviour”. The latter may threaten the privacy of each 
citizen by subjecting them to behavioural pattern analyses that violate the presumption 
of their innocence. The proportionality of such bulk surveillance measure, in general, is 
debatable in practice. As pointed out in the report issued by the UN Human Rights Council 
on the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age: “It will not be enough that the measures are 
targeted to find certain needles in a haystack; the proper measure is the impact of the 
measures on the haystack, relative to the harm threatened”.586 
The large-scale sharing of databases among State agencies—including Law Enforcement 
Agencies —can present issues, too. For instance, it can involve, amongst other irregularities: 
unauthorised changes in the purpose(s) underpinning the analysis of the data; the abuse 
or misuse of the shared data; and the circumvention of court orders by direct request for 
the access of data stored within the systems of private companies. These potential risks 
to data privacy require such anti-terrorism laws to be under some effective oversight, to 
be limited by procedural safeguards, as well as to be effectively remedied via proper legal 
procedures.587 Within this context, transparency, amongst other tools, may be used, to satisfy 
the public that adequate balances are achieved between privacy and security, and that 
there is no excessive erosion of the essence of the right to privacy. Transparency can also 
help to establish trust in the claim that any limits on privacy are only exerted for genuine 
security purposes, and exclude reasons that exist outside the international standards, such 
as narrow political advantage.
Usually, surveillance and law enforcement agencies have been eager to gain access to 
the wide range of personal information available from information systems created for a 
variety of purposes, including ones completely unrelated to public security.588 However, it 
is valuable to consider instruments like the ‘TheNecessaryandProportionate.org principles’ 
in order ensure the maintenance of a balance within the larger framework of human rights.
584 UNODC, The Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes, Report, September 2012, Vienna: United Nations, pp. 
3-13, available at <https://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Use_of_Internet_for_Terrorist_Purposes.
pdf>. 
585 Ibid., p. 13.
586 Pillay, “The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age”, 9.
587 Ibid., 11-14.
588 Douwe Korff and Ian Brown, The Use of the Internet and Related Services, Private Life and Data Protection: 
Trends and Technologies, Threats and Implications, Report, Council of Europe, March 2013, p. 15, available 
at <https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/cybersecurity-capacity/content/use-Internet-and-related-services-private-
life-and-data-protection-trends-and-technologies>.
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CHAPTER 8 Bridging the gaps: new tendencies in policy and law
8.1  Introduction: the shifting power of multiple players
On the whole, the rights to freedom of expression and privacy on the Internet can be 
assessed to be facing new threats. There have been significant evolutions in Internet eco-
systems in the past years, including in how state authorities, giant ICT service providers and 
intermediaries (hereafter referred to as ‘service providers’), Internet users and civil society 
organisations engage with the Internet. Indeed, globally, governments play a larger role in 
the online environment, enormous service providers control the majority market share, 589 
and more and more Internet users come to rely on an evolving range of services. These and 
other factors contribute to constant and evolving threats to privacy, freedom of expression 
and other values and rights in the online context.
State authorities
On the one hand, the increasing power that is gained by State authorities can enable the 
protection of the rights and values discussed in this Report, including privacy, freedom of 
expression, freedom of information and transparency. For instance, increasingly, new and 
updated legislation for the protection of data privacy and security enhances protections—
against data abuses and misuses by private individuals and the private sector, as well as 
against terrorist attacks, cybercrime and cyber-attacks—and prevent actions that could 
stifle and downright threaten desired values and rights. On the other hand, increases in the 
State’s involvement, including by means of similar legislation, can be exploited to weaken 
the same rights and values.
Service providers
The service providers’ engagement in private censorship and/or cooperation relating to 
secret mass surveillance programs can contribute to increasing public distrust, harming the 
same service providers. To address such distrust, the service providers have made efforts to 
build up internal and external transparency that helps them protect privacy and freedom of 
expression, including by fending off the pressures from State authority.
However, given that data constitutes the “oil” of the information economy, it is reasonable 
to expect more and more business models that would depend on the collection, storage 
and processing of personal data, and this may continue to contribute to further erosion 
and stifling of the rights and values discussed in this report, including in online contexts. 
Additionally, as data security and encryption may be or become drawcards and components 
of existing and upcoming business models, such models and the said technologies (including 
cryptographic and security technologies) depend largely on technology innovations that 
may die out because of stricter regulation and/or over-regulation. All this places the service 
providers in an ambiguous situation, which is compounded by transnational operations.
589 According to DeNadis, greater privatization of Internet Governance in some circumstances 
will be an invitation for greater government regulation. See Laura DeNardis, “The Privatization 
of Internet Governance”, Yale Information Society Project, Working Paper Draft, September 
2010, p. 11, available at <http://api.ning.com/files/8q30Xud1XrmD6Sd5rOiSolcw3agdQi5NNo 
WZrQGmOIpKc0fdqfKN0Ax5Z8ZypNexdCwBicqDKcADrRU5hs4ZQjBy0RPTg BmK/
DENARDISThePrivitizationofInternetGovernance.pdf>, accessed 17 September 2015.
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Internet users
While the rights of individual Internet users should lie at the core of the evolution of the 
Internet eco-systems, they are the most vulnerable to challenges and threats, not only 
in the senses already discussed in this Report but also due to several other factors. For 
instance, many Internet users (and therefore their rights) are vulnerable to the ‘privacy for 
service’ trade-off in online contexts, for many reasons, which include human tendencies for 
immediate gratification; and a lack of understanding and/or avoidance with respect to such 
complex notions as the operationalisation of the right and value of privacy in novel and 
evolving online contexts. Other users may understand or believe—whether substantially 
autonomously or not—that privacy is not substantial enough as an independent value for 
practical interest, possibly claiming a lack of concern relating to privacy breaches, based on 
the (often publicised) view that one should “have nothing to hide”.
Additionally, as a result of such weaknesses and other factors, few users are willing to read 
through the privacy clauses provided by the Service Providers in the relevant terms of 
service, and those willing to do so will normally find it difficult to do it consistently (e.g. 
to check for any changes in the terms) and/or to understand what they read. In general, 
it is currently widely recognised that individual private users are the weakest players in 
Internet eco-systems, that such weakness is already exploited, and that there is potential 
for significant increases in such vulnerabilities and the corresponding threats and potential 
impacts. It is therefore reasonable to call for more protection from State authorities, 
especially against the abuse and misuse of the users’ personal information,590 including, if 
not primarily, by means of regulatory safeguards and judicial oversight.
Civil society organisations
Civil society organizations also play an important role in Internet eco-systems, mitigating 
some of the threats. Their main role is to represent the public interest in regard to Internet 
users, and to actively participate in the making of Internet governance policy and law. For 
instance, after the Snowden revelations, civil society was prominent in promoting increased 
awareness, resorting to legal remedies and initiating Internet freedom campaigns.591 
International organizations—including several types of Internet governance organizations, 
whether commercial or NGOs—play a similar and equally important role. These include 
such influential organisations, corporations’ initiatives and groups as the Global Network 
Initiative (GNI); the Telecoms Dialogue; the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers (ICCANN); the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF); the United Nations-
sponsored World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS); the Internet Architecture 
Board (IAB); the International Telecommunications Union (ITU); the Working Group on 
Internet Governance (WGIG); and the Internet Governance Forum.592The Global Alliance for 
Media and Information Literacy seeks to empower users with competencies necessary to 
counter threats and protect rights. 
590 Although this does not mean that in many countries state authorities are more predatory. See Anita Allen, 
(2011) Unpopular Privacy: What Must We Hide?, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
591 Freedom House, “Freedom on the Net 2014”, p. 12, available at <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
net/freedom-net-2014#.VUczyJO5wg4>, accessed 4 May 2015 
592 For their specific roles in Internet governance, see Jovan Kurbalija, (2014) An Introduction to Internet 
Governance, Sixth Edition, Msida and Geneva: DiploFoundation, available at <http://www.diplomacy.
edu/resources/books/introduction-Internet-governance>; Lee A. Bygrave and Jon Bing, (2009) Internet 
Governance Infrastructure and Institutions, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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8.2  New policy developments on online privacy protection 
The common belief in the post-Snowden world is that Internet users, and the public in 
general, should be protected against wrongful surveillance activities, including by providing 
more transparency regarding mass-surveillance activities, and by enhanced scrutiny of the 
laws and policies that regulate these activities.
The problem is starting to be addressed to some extent, in various locations around 
the globe. In January 2014, the President of the USA called for an end to the NSA’s bulk 
surveillance on individuals.593 Later in the same month, the Department of Justice relaxed 
restrictions on the public disclosure of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 
as well as on the disclosure of orders and National Security Letters. The White House also 
proposed laws to restrict the NSA’s collection of bulk-calling records, with the proposal 
being received favourably.
The USA government has also released a six-year-old report on the NSA’s once-secret 
programme, which involved the collection of information on American citizens’ calls and 
emails.594 On 7 May 2015, a federal appeals court in the US ruled, in a landmark decision, 
that the bulk collection of telephone metadata that had occurred was unlawful, clearing 
the way for a full legal challenge against the NSA.595 The US has also been considering to 
improve transparency by a truly uniform federal standard for the notification of breaches.596
In Europe, a UK tribunal ruled that the regime governing the sharing of electronic 
communications between Britain and the USA, which were intercepted in bulk, was 
unlawful until last year.597 Likewise, the EU parliament declared the mass surveillance in 
some Member States in cooperation with the NSA illegal.598 Also, the EU has taken steps 
on privacy and data protection, by means of the ECJ’s invalidating of data retention law,599 
and clarified the house-hold exemption scope in CCTV use.600 Other efforts in this region 
include: a) the increased enforcement of EU Data Protection Rules across the EU; b) the 
revision of the Safe Harbour Program and debate around the “Privacy Shield” replacement; 
and c) the ECJ’s scrutinizing of the Passenger Name Records (PNR) exchange under EU’s 
data protection principles.601
593 “Transcript of President Obama’s Jan. 17 Speech on NSA Reforms”, The Washington Post, 17 January 2014, 
available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/full-text-of-president-obamas-jan-17-speech-on-
nsa-reforms/2014/01/17/fa33590a-7f8c-11e3-9556-4a4bf7bcbd84_story.html>.
594 “White House Releases Report on NSA Surveillance Six Years Later”, The Guardian, available at <http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/25/nsa-surveillance-report-white-house-releases-six-years-later>, 
accessed 16 May 2015.
595 Devlin Barrett and Damian Paletta, “NSA Phone Program Is Illegal, Appeals Court Rules,” Wall Street Journal, 7 
May 2015, sec. US, available at <http://www.wsj.com/articles/appeals-court-rules-nsa-phone-program-not-
authorized-by-patriot-act-1431005482>.
596 “Data Security/Breach Notification | U.S. Chamber of Commerce”, 23 April 2015, available at <https://www.
uschamber.com/issue-brief/data-securitybreach-notification>.
597 Owen Bowcott and Legal Affairs Correspondent, “UK-US Surveillance Regime Was Unlawful ‘for Seven Years”, 
The Guardian, available at <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/feb/06/gchq-mass-Internet-
surveillance-unlawful-court-nsa>, accessed 16 May 2015.
598 “US NSA Surveillance Programme, Surveillance Bodies in Various Member States and Impact on EU Citizens’ 
Fundamental Rights - P7_TA-PROV(2014)0230”, March 2014, available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2014-0230>.
599 ECJ, Joined cases C-293/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v. Minister for Communications and Others and C-594-
12 Kärntner Landesregierung and Others, Judgment, 8 April 2014.
600 ECJ, Case C-212/13 František Ryneš v Úřad pro ochranu osobních údajů, Judgment, 11 December 2014.
601 Dan Cooper and Maria-Martina Yalamova, “Top 10 International Privacy Developments of 2014”, 
InsidePrivacy.com, 4 February 2015, <http://www.insideprivacy.com/international/european-union/top-10-
international-privacy-developments-of-2014/>.
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Additionally, new data protection legislation has been gaining momentum across the globe. 
The EU is in the process of adopting a new data protection package, moving its old data 
protection mechanisms into the digital age. In the USA, in February 2015, the White House 
released its draft of the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights.602 More generally, the number of 
countries updating previous data protection laws or adopting new ones—i.e. including, 
amongst others, Singapore, Australia, Brazil (Data Privacy Bill & Marco Civil da Internet or 
the “Internet Law”), South Africa, Turkey and Chile—continued to grow throughout 2014.603
Moreover, the USA and Canadian Supreme Courts have, in three recent verdicts, restricted 
access to law enforcement to personal data on smartphones, with respect to searches 
incidental to an arrest, with the former recognizing the importance of modern smartphones 
as devices containing rich personal information. 604 The latter ruled that while “[i]nformational 
privacy is often equated with secrecy or confidentiality, and also includes the related but 
wider notion of control over, access to and use of information[, ]particularly important in 
the context of Internet usage is the understanding of privacy as anonymity”.605 It has also 
judged that: a) while such searches in the absence of a warrant are allowed consequent to 
an arrest, the searches are limited by detailed legal restrictions and requirements; and b) 
record-keeping is required for later judicial review.606
The UN Human Rights Council too has made efforts to curtail mass surveillance and protect 
online privacy. In addition to its past comment on privacy,607 a new Special Rapporteur 
was appointed in July 2015608 and a resolution was passed on the Right to Privacy in the 
digital age by the General Assembly, strongly affirming the core status of privacy in human 
freedom.609 Likewise, UNESCO has made continuous efforts in multiple events, investigating 
the impacts of ICTs on the right to privacy and contributing to better online privacy, access, 
trust and transparency.
As previously mentioned in this report, some private sector organisations have already 
taken initiatives against mass surveillance by publishing transparency reports that disclose 
information about requests they receive for access to personal data by USA- and EU-based 
national authorities. Some mobile companies—e.g. EE, O2 and Three—also took legal 
action against government agencies which made such requests. Others have rejected 
requests to cooperate, e.g. Apple’s refusal to compromise default end-to-end encryption 
within its device OS (operating system), leading to critiques from intelligence services 
602 Libbie Canter, “White House Privacy Bill: A Deeper Dive”, Insideprivacy, 27 February 2015, available at 
<http://www.insideprivacy.com/advertising-marketing/white-house-privacy-bill-a-deeper-dive/>.
603 Dan Cooper and Maria-Martina Yalamova, “Top 10 International Privacy Developments of 2014”, 
InsidePrivacy.com, 4 February 2015, <http://www.insideprivacy.com/international/european-union/top-10-
international-privacy-developments-of-2014/>.
604 United States Supreme Court, Riley v. California 573 U.S. (2014), paras. 21 and 17, available at <https://
supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/573/13-132/>, accessed 17 May 2015
605 Supreme Court of Canada, R. v. Spencer, 2014 SCC 43, 214.
606 Supreme Court of Canada, R. v. Fearon, 2014 SCC 77, [2014] S.C.R. 621 (2014), 623. 
607 OHCHR, CCPR General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (The Right to Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and 
Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and Reputation), 8 April 1988, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I), 
para. 1, available at <http://www.refworld.org/docid/453883f922.html>, accessed 29 May 2015.
608 Disclosure: the lead author of this report, Prof. Joseph A. Cannataci, was appointed as the Rapporteur. He 
and his team were commissioned for this research before his appointment. 
609 “Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 18 December 2013 [on the Report of the Third 
Committee (A/68/456/Add.2)] 68/167. The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age”, December 2013, available at 
<http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/167>.
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agencies.610 Other companies—like Google, Microsoft and Apple—have started to build 
local data centres, to store their consumers’ data within the consumers’ own homeland 
jurisdictions, and thus follow local law and avoid further judicial conflicts; ultimately gaining 
consumer trust.
Also, private sector organisations have made initiatives to negotiate and start industrial 
standards. For instance, the Global Network Initiative (GNI) has published a report titled 
Data Beyond Borders: Mutual Legal Assistance in the Internet Age, which recommends that 
States collaborate in creating a secure electronic system that involves the use of multiple 
resources for the management of Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) requests.611 Similarly, the 
USA’s Digital Advertising Alliance (DAA), a consortium of the nation’s largest media and 
marketing associations, has established self-regulatory standards for online advertising, 
and was to commence enforcement of the Application of Self-Regulatory Principles to the 
Mobile Environment (DAA Mobile Guidance) on September 1, 2015.612
The contribution of civil society organizations has included legal cases against the misuse 
and abuse of data from both public bodies613 and private companies. Possibly even more 
significant, users are more active in bringing class suits against digital giants to protect their 
own data privacy. In the Vidal-Hall et al v Google judgment, in March 2015, the UK Court of 
Appeal classified the misuse of private information as a tort, which implies that claimants 
are now, under the U.K.’s Data Protection Act of 1998, able to recover damages for non-
material loss.614
It is clear that in the past few years the protection of privacy, as well as its balancing with 
other values and rights, has become a major issue. 
8.3  Freedom of expression: still a long way to go 
Globally, the threats to freedom of expression differ from those endangering the right 
to privacy (and to reputation), at different levels. One key threat to the former is the 
disproportionate impinging by the latter. For instance, the Google Spain decision risks 
leading to such repercussions as the privatisation of censorship. Similarly, there are 
considerable threats to freedom of expression from defamation law, and in particular from 
criminal defamation law. For example, according to a recent report, criminal defamation 
laws in the EU threaten freedom of expression—favouring public figures, and especially 
public officials.615 Thus it is useful to remark that while there are legitimate limitations to 
both rights under national and international law, this threat to freedom of expression may 
610 Institute for Human Rights and Business, “ICT, Human Rights & Business: A Roundup of 2014 and 
Challenges for 2015”, 12 January 2015, available at <http://www.ihrb.org/commentary/ict-human-rights-
business-roundup-2014.html>, accessed 16 May 2015.
611 Global Network Initiative, “Data Beyond Borders: Mutual Legal Assistance in the Internet Era | Global 
Network Initiative”, available at <https://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/content/data-beyond-borders-
mutual-legal-assistance-Internet-era>, accessed 16 May 2015.
612 Morgan Kennedy, “Digital Advertising Alliance Will Begin Enforcing Its Mobile Guidance September 1, 2015”, 
InsidePrivacy.com, 14 May 2015, available at <http://www.insideprivacy.com/advertising-marketing/digital-
advertising-alliance-will-begin-enforcing-its-mobile-guidance-september-1-2015/>.
613 ECJ, Joined cases C-293/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v. Minister for Communications and Others and C-594-
12 Kärntner Landesregierung and Others, Judgment, 8 April 2014.
614 Judith Vidal-Hall, “Judith Vidal-Hall: Taking on the Giant - Index on Censorship”, indexoncensorship.org, 22 
April 2015, available at <https://www.indexoncensorship.org/2015/04/judith-vidal-hall-taking-on-the-
giant/>.
615 International Press Institute, Out of Balance: Defamation Law in the EU and Its Effect on Press Freedom, Report, 
July 2014, available at <http://www.freemedia.at/ecpm/defamation-law-report.html>.
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only be kept at bay if the balancing that occurs between freedom of expression and other 
rights (including that to privacy) strives to preserve the essence of the right.
Another major threat to freedom of expression is the arbitrary cut-off, blocking, filtering and 
censorship in the name of national security or anti-terrorism. While it is possible to justify 
such restrictions,616 as well as limitations on the right to information,617 the risk is that such 
restrictions and limitations would exceed the thresholds of necessity and proportionality; 
and will be used illegitimately, e.g. for a ruling party’s political advantage. Such risk may 
be heightened in the absence of such control measures as procedural protection of the 
suspects, and continuation of mass surveillance measures that target all related data subjects 
and official transparency.618 In general, then, there should be sufficient legal safeguards to 
cope with the risks and challenges that arise from the merging of the use of data (including 
personal data) for law enforcement, national security and intelligence service purposes.619
In several countries, violations of offline rights to free expression are carried over to online. 
To implement this, there are often direct liability conditions that are imposed on Internet 
intermediaries for access and content control, and threats to de-register or fine them. There 
are also actors who attack online expression with tactics like DDoS assaults and x infections.
Freedom of expression has also made some gains against overly broad restrictions. For 
instance, the Indian Supreme Court found a legal provision, which had criminalized the 
posting of menacing or grossly offensive information, as both unconstitutional and a 
restriction to the right to freedom of speech.620 Similarly, a number of States are realising the 
dangers and difficulties of limiting online expression, and beginning to embrace Media and 
Information Literacy as a means to avoid a paradigm of protecting citizens from illegitimate 
content online, and instead to focus on the preparation of the users with the knowledge 
and skills required to take a rights-led approach in engaging effectively in the online world.
616 In the sense of blocking related websites. Hayley Richardson, “France to Debate ‘Frighteningly Intrusive’ 
Surveillance Powers”, Newsweek, 20 March 2015, available at <http://europe.newsweek.com/france-debate-
frighteningly-intrusive-surveillance-powers-315507>.
617 Alissa J. Rubin, “Lawmakers in France Move to Vastly Expand Surveillance”, The New York Times, 5 May 2015, 
available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/06/world/europe/french-legislators-approve-sweeping-
intelligence-bill.html>.
618 Jonida Milaj and Jeanne P. Mifsud Bonnici, “Unwitting Subjects of Surveillance and the Presumption of 
Innocence”, (2014) Computer Law & Security Review, Vol. 30, No. 4.
619 See Cannataci’s detailed analysis of data sharing by both sectors in Europe: Joseph A. Cannataci, “Defying 
the Logic, Forgetting the Facts: The New European Proposal for Data Protection in the Police Sector”, (2013) 
European Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 4, No. 2, Sections 2.8 and 2.9, available at <http://ejlt.org//
article/view/284>.
620 Jason Burke in Delhi, “India Supreme Court Strikes down Internet Censorship Law”, The Guardian, available 
at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/24/india-supreme-court-strikes-down-Internet-
censorship-law>, accessed 17 May 2015.
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CHAPTER 9 Conclusions and recommendations
9.1  Introduction 
In the previous Chapters, this Report has analysed the main issues relating to the rights and 
values of privacy, freedom of expression and information, and transparency, and addressed 
key challenges revolving around the balancing of these rights and values in the digital 
age. It has also illustrated challenges to the rights of privacy and freedom of expression—
especially those linked to individuals and the online context—as may be expected to 
escalate in the near future due to fast advances in the ICTs. The Report has also illustrated 
how the interplay and interactions between multiple players—e.g. the State agents, Internet 
users, ICT companies, civil society organizations, the judiciary and the security services—
shapes the rights to freedom of expression and privacy online, as well as the nature of the 
protection mechanisms adopted in relation to such rights.
• Traditional laws and regulations do not transpose seamlessly to the online 
world
As revealed by a review of the status quo in the previous Chapters, traditional laws and 
regulations for the protection of privacy and freedom of expression—as formulated in the 
pre-digital era to reflect behavioural boundaries in communal life—cannot be applied 
seamlessly to the current and upcoming online world. Instead, in many cases, updated and/
or new laws and regulations are required in order to prescribe and/or support protection 
mechanisms for these rights, which apply to the current (and upcoming) situations. This 
is especially true in view of the pressing privacy threats that result in the digital age from 
such existing and evolving phenomena as: the increasing cross-border data transfers; all 
sorts of mass surveillance practices; the rise of Cloud computing, along with such other 
technologies as distributed and grid computing; the growing use of drones and smart 
devices; and the advent of big data technologies.
The need for novel and updated laws and regulations is also clearly visible in view of the 
growing threats to freedom of expression. Indeed, State and non-State actors are gaining 
massive capacities in the control of the use of the Internet, especially as equipped with 
multiple new technologies for the purposes of censoring, filtering, blocking and attacking 
information and information services, by means of such technologies as: a) DPI; b) packet 
filtering; c) Domain Name System (DNS) filtering and redirection; d) Internet address blocking; 
e) denial of service attacks; f ) portal censorship and search result removal; g) website take-
down; h) network disconnection and connection reset; and i) control of Internet Exchange 
Points (IXPs). In many countries, these new technical measures and instruments have hardly 
been well-confined by domestic laws for freedom of speech and privacy. This is the case, in 
particular, when cybercrime and online terrorist activities are a major concern, or where the 
governments adopt approaches that involve tight political control.
• How we can achieve more transparency and limits of transparency
As showcased in the UNESCO’s Internet Freedom Series621 and other research reports, 
transparency—as a communal value—can be achieved by protecting the individual’s 
621 UNESCO Series on Internet Freedom: http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-and-information/
resources/publications-and-communication-materials/publications/publications-by-series/unesco-series-
on-internet-freedom/
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rights to freedom of expression and information. In turn, transparency can also support 
the same two rights. However, since the disclosure of personal information may—directly 
or otherwise—influence others’ private lives and public image, transparency and the right 
to expression, including the right to information can also be restricted by other individuals’ 
exercising of their rights to privacy (and reputation). This is particularly the case in online 
contexts, which are characterised by the ability to publish digitised personal information.
• Traditional technical and legal mechanisms do not suffice
Against the above background, traditional technical and/or legal mechanisms do not 
suffice in coping with the escalating online challenges to the rights to privacy and freedom 
of expression and transparency. There are, however, many recent developments in Internet 
Governance to enhance them at the international and domestic stages.
• Industry and State governments appreciate the value of transparency
The growing need for transparency is nowadays clearly visible to both the industry sector 
and State governments, who recognise its value in enabling the clear definition of rules and 
procedures for the protection of privacy and freedom of expression. In addition, multiple 
international organizations—including UNESCO and various NGOs—are paying more 
attention to the protection of online human rights and have published a series of research 
reports. Similarly, States across the globe have proposed new legislation for the protection 
of personal data and data privacy that involve the implementation of controls that enable 
legal scrutiny of the mass surveillance practices that they engage in.
9.2 Bridging gaps
Given the current circumstances as described in the previous Chapters, there is still a need 
for the bridging of considerable policy and legal gaps. In order to better protect the two 
critical rights of expression and privacy, as well as the right to information and transparency 
in the digital age, this Report points to further actions that need to be taken, in the following 
aspects:
• More positive measures should be taken by national State authorities to secure the rights 
to privacy and freedom of expression in various forms, including by: a) encouraging 
the self-regulation and co-regulation of the private sector of the Internet, including 
provision for transparency and redress, and without pre-empting or excluding the role 
of independent courts to make final decisions; b) updating legal protection to adapt 
to new circumstances by new legislation and law interpretation; and c) improving 
transparency in e-governance and e-democracy developments. 
• More clearly-drafted State laws are needed for the protection of privacy and freedom 
of expression, which reflect the shifted scopes of the conflicting rights and values. 
In particular, legitimate exceptions and derogations should be narrow and under 
procedural scrutiny that follows international human rights law and constitutional law 
standards, including those of legitimacy, necessity and proportionality. In the case of 
hate speech online, the Rabat principles can reduce potential damage to legitimate 
expression. The UNESCO R.O.A.M. principles are also important to consider, particularly 
in regard to how any balancing of rights impacts on Openness and Accessibility, and 
the value of multi-stakeholder participation in such balancing. 
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• More privacy and freedom of expression protection measures should be taken by 
private companies, thus recognizing their long-term interest in the protection of both 
rights. These measures should include transparency reports and clear privacy clauses. 
Internet intermediaries should be shielded from liability for third party content. 
Terms of service and implementation of content moderation policies should also be 
transparent and narrowly-defined, and opportunities for redress should be offered. 
• More international and regional cooperation among national authorities is needed to 
enhance the protection of both rights. Such cooperation may be achieved in several 
ways, including by enhancing the possibility of reaching any needed international 
agreements on cross-border data protection, whether in the form of soft law or other 
alternatives.
• More efforts should be made to raise awareness and understanding through 
future investigations, concerning the influences of rapid ICT evolutions—e.g. those 
increasing the number and/or effects of privacy intrusive technologies such as IoTs, 
IoEs, smart devices (for use in smart homes, smart cities and smart borders), and 
drones—on: a) human life; b) the two fundamental rights; and c) the transparency of 
those technologies.
9.3  Recommendations for online privacy protection 
In view of the privacy challenges analysed and discussed in the previous Chapters, this 
Report proposes for consideration further action in the following fields:
At the individual level, the raising of individuals’ awareness should be a main focus 
of attention, because individuals still lack substantial understanding relating to many 
escalating negative impacts on their private lives – even while the same individuals make 
increasing use of digital devices that may impinge on their privacy, whether by “choice” or 
because of the many factors that render the use of such devices so useful and unavoidable. 
The awareness-raising activities should be extended from the understanding of the privacy 
impacts of existing and/or new ICTs, to sufficient knowledge, know-how and tools—such 
as user-friendly communication encryption tools, and online anonymity instruments—that 
would enable individuals to protect their own privacy.
More specifically, this may be achieved as follows:
• Governments should undertake initiatives to raise critical awareness, such as by 
initiating and financing special programmes/projects for this purpose. These can 
encompass public promotion activities, public interest advertisements on public 
media, including TV and radio; special TV programs; Data Privacy Day (similar to the 
one organized by the EU); and promotion programmes in educational institutions, and 
in particular through what UNESCO calls Media and Information Literacy.622
• Players from the private sector, in particular from ICT companies, should take 
substantive measures to foster privacy awareness and promote new know-now, 
including by providing more information to customers. As data controllers or 
processors, they should take more active steps to define and employ more privacy 
enhancing technologies (PETs) to achieve trustworthiness in their services and gain 
622 http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-and-information/media-development/media-literacy/
mil-as-composite-concept/
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their consumers’ trust, which will improve their reputation and eventually result in 
economic benefit. Like governments, players from the private sector could pass the 
message to individual users by reporting more about privacy breaches and harms.
• Civil society organizations play an important role too in representing their consumers 
in litigation, providing organizational and operational skills for collective privacy 
promoting activities and in presenting the individual’s interests in the law and policy-
making processes, bridging potential gaps left by the private sector and public bodies. 
They should be encouraged and supported to take additional roles in the future policy 
and law-making processes in Internet Governance to represent individual end users. 
At the national level, multiple efforts and substantial measures could be taken at the 
regulatory and governance levels to improve privacy protection. Also, PETs should be 
encouraged and promoted as a general Internet policy, and financial arrangements should 
be made to support and promote technical innovation and novelty.
• Laws and policies dealing with privacy should be defined or updated to adjust to the 
new circumstances of the digital age, thus attaining better coverage and protection of 
the right to online privacy.
 – More specifically, this may be achieved by new legislation, legal amendments, and/
or legal interpretations made by capable legal authorities.
 – Regulatory improvements can be made in many ways, including by: providing 
constitutional privacy protection; promulgating special data protection 
instruments, like Data Protection Laws in EU Member States and other countries; 
adding privacy protection clauses in new legislations like Section D of the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA); and having special online 
privacy protection regulations like the USA Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
(COPPA). 
• The protection of online anonymity plays an important role in the protection of 
individual privacy. Thus, it is recommended that State authorities do not mandate 
real name registration, unless such registration is necessary to authenticate a user for 
security reasons and by the user’s consent.
• It is advisable to have special data protection authorities responsible for data protection 
and data privacy protection in the field. National Data Protection Authorities in EU 
Member States have made considerable contributions to the data protection and 
privacy protection of EU citizens, for years, with noticeable achievements. Their 
association Article 29, as a collective body of Data Protection Authorities, has issued 
authoritative opinions and statements regarding multiple issues in EU’s data protection 
practices, which are widely respected by their national counterparts and lawyers.
• Transparency in the processing of data should be promoted and secured by each 
national State, insofar as this enables better privacy protection with respect to the data 
held by both the private and the public sector.
 – This includes steps to grant individual citizens and capable institutions by law the 
right to access the information regarding their data collection and processing, and 
to correct the data in the case of inaccuracies.
120
 – In particular, the State should have the positive duty to disclose laws and policies 
regarding data privacy protection to the public, and to prescribe to private 
companies a duty of proper disclosure regarding data processing.
 – State privacy laws should set data breach notification as mandatory for all data 
controllers, unless such breach would cause pressing State security and public 
order concerns.
• In the context of State surveillance—whether this is targeted or mass surveillance— 
it is suggested that transparency, from the State authority’s perspective, is crucial to 
improving the public’s trust and the Internet users’ confidence in the Internet as a 
secure communication medium. It is recommended that State authorities make 
contributions in three aspects: 
 – they should have clear rules and procedures that define the legal capacity of 
intelligence service agencies and their duties to disclose necessary information to 
supervising bodies—e.g. a capable court—if such disclosure to the public is not 
possible; 
 – clear distinctions should be drawn between ‘surveillance practices for law 
enforcement purposes’ and ‘intelligence services purposes’; 
 – while anti-terrorism is a pressing policy task in many countries, relevant surveillance 
measures intended to counter terrorism should not override the privacy interest of 
the innocent public, and should be balanced with proper procedural safeguards. 
For instance, when a search warrant is not possible or desirable for the sake of 
urgency, post hoc reporting duties might be a good option. The protection of 
the confidentiality of sources of journalism in the digital age could be specifically 
provided for, including through revised legislation where appropriate.623
• For State authorities, technical solutions to enhance privacy protection are an 
alternative or complementary measure that is efficient and effective. It is highly 
recommended that State policies encourage and promote the concept and practice 
of PbD among market players and public bodies processing personal information and 
data. PbD should be mandatory for public bodies and private sector players as data 
controllers fulfilling public functions. From the outset of their tasks, privacy concerns 
must be identified and mitigated early and comprehensively and PETs should be 
adopted and integrated.624 It is suggested that State authorities take positive steps 
to promote technical instruments to better protect individual privacy, including PETs, 
even in the private sector.
• As a further safeguard of the right to privacy, it is recommended that State authorities 
take active steps to offer efficient and effective remedies to individuals via judicial, 
administrative, or arbitration channels. Procedural and data privacy laws should 
623 UNESCO, (2015), World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media Development: special digital focus. Paris: 
UNESCO. http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-and-information/resources/publications-and-
communication-materials/publications/full-list/wtr-special-digital-focus-2015/; UNESCO (2015), Protecting 
Journalism Sources in the Digital Age. Paris: UNESCO. http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/
HQ/CI/CI/images/Themes/Freedom_of_expression/safety_of_journalists/Protecting_Journalism_Sources_
in_Digital_Age_UNESCO_Flye.pdf
624 Ann Cavoukian, (2009) Privacy by Design ... Take the Challenge, Ontario, Canada, pp. 2 and 4, available at 
<https://www.privacybydesign.ca/index.php/paper/pbd-book/>.
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facilitate the processing of litigation that involves individuals. They could also consider 
a shift of duties in presenting evidence in decision-making procedure. Collective 
or class litigations should be allowed before a court by individual consumers when 
confronting a large-scale privacy breach or violation. 
At the international level, there could be increased commitment by States and the rest 
of international society to improve privacy, even though numerous initiatives have already 
been taken. There should be more regional or international collaborative efforts, whether 
via concrete programs or mutual-agreements, to improve data protection (or data privacy) 
among participating States in order to regain trust in cross-border data transfer. Albeit the 
EU-USA Safe Harbour program failed to meet its original purposes, the principle endures 
as a means to encourage and secure data flow between different regions and countries, 
with some level of guarantee at least. Additionally, there should be more substantial moves 
from rhetorical principles or mere guidelines to concrete data protection measures at 
the international level, perhaps especially so in the case of the OECD Guidelines on the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flow of Personal Information, or the APEC Cross-
border Privacy Enforcement Arrangement (CPEA).
Fair treatment of personal data and equal privacy protection of individuals in foreign 
jurisdictions is an important aspect for individuals to enjoy the fundamental right to privacy 
as guaranteed by international human rights law. It is recommended that State authorities 
take active actions to respect and protect foreigners’ data privacy rights in a world where 
cross-border data flow is so ubiquitous, and also a pre-condition for the well-functioning of 
the global economy and communication. 
In addition, considering the mass data breach in case of cyber-attacks from criminals and 
unknown foreign sources, the international community should take positive actions, not only 
by national States but also by Internet security organizations and technical communities, 
to avoid such cyber-attacks. This kind of cyber-attacks should be prevented with all means 
by international cooperation of related countries to avoid further occurrence or escalation.
9.4  Recommendations for online freedom of expression protection 
At the individual level, a person’s exercising of the right to freedom of expression and 
opinion and freedom of information depends, in part, on the individual’s Media and 
Information Literacy; e.g. competencies in Internet literacy, privacy literacy, ethical literacy 
and digital security. Thus, UNESCO’s umbrella concept of Media and Information Literacy 
(MIL) should be promoted and integrated into formal and informal education systems, in 
recognition of the important roles that digital literacy in particular plays in promotion of 
the rights to freedom of expression, freedom of information, privacy, education, assocation, 
sustainable development, etc. Media and Information Literacy courses should be compulsory 
from primary education level, with the aim of teaching basic knowledge and skills that 
would facilitate access to the Internet and learning a variety of online communication skills, 
including in relation to the use of SNSs for group communication and expression. Measures 
should also be taken by national States to reduce the “digital divide”,625 as well as digital 
illiteracy, by offering assistance to disabled and elderly people, and in particular to citizens 
625 Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, 16 May 2011, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/27, para. 17, available 
at <http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/17/27>.
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from developing countries with limited access possibilities, who may have difficulties 
relating to Internet access and/or expression in online contexts.
At the national level, since Internet access is essentially no less important than other 
public services—e.g. water and electricity—in daily life, competent State authorities could 
consider protecting individuals’ access to the Internet as a public utility, even if not a right, as 
done by Finland, Estonia, and France. State authorities should find ways to reduce the costs 
involved in the use of broadband services—including by means of by public subsidies if 
needed—rendering such services affordable to every citizen.
Furthermore, to secure online freedom of expression, State authorities should establish 
clear laws, following the international standards set out by the UN capable bodies and 
regional human rights courts, to limit restrictions in relation with online free expression 
to the minimum, and to only impose such restrictions when exceptions and derogations 
are necessary. Among other exceptions, online defamation and online privacy invasion 
should be decriminalized in many countries, even if the relevant legal provisions are not 
enforced in practice. This helps avoid the use of privacy as an online censorship tool. 
Similarly, to avoid stifling of the right to freedom of expression and transparency, such 
notions as ‘national security’ and ‘public morals’ should not be interpreted too broadly, but 
in the light of the Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and 
Access to Information 626 and the Tshwane Principles on National Security and the Right to 
Information627.
Also, State authorities should enact sufficiently specific laws that define—proportionally—
both the Intermediaries’ legal rights and their limited liability responsibilities regarding both 
privacy protection and freedom of expression protection. On the one hand, State authorities 
should not manipulate intermediaries to restrict access to the Internet and/or control 
Internet contents; e.g. by asking them to arbitrarily block, filter and/or censor unwanted 
content, and in particular political dissent. It is recommended that more breathing space 
be given to intermediaries to enable the thriving of free speech in general. On the other 
hand, State authorities should protect individuals against and upon privacy invasion and/
or violations in their right to freedom of expression, including such invasions or violations 
that may result from excesses linked to market competition or the actions of individuals.
For access to information or data held by public bodies and the private sector, transparency 
is important in imposing a positive duty on the data controllers to disclose information 
not merely upon requests but, in the case of public information and data that are of public 
interest, pro-actively, online and/or offline, by following pre-prescribed rules, whether in the 
hands of the private or the public sector. 
In particular, the protection of the online expression of journalists and Internet (new) media 
producers should receive due attention, because of the role played by these actors in 
transparency and public life. It is also recommended that new online media and online 
freelance or other reporters be offered protection equating with that offered to professional 
journalists. Additionally, cases of defamation and privacy invasion should have higher 
thresholds for litigation and the granting of remedies when these actors are potential 
defendants. 
626 Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information https://
www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/standards/joburgprinciples.pdf
627 Tshwane Principles on National Security and the Right to Information https://www.fas.org/sgp/library/
tshwane.pdf
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It is recommended, in order to promote the right to online free speech, for State authorities 
to permit additional technical means that would enable and/or enhance freedom 
of expression and freedom of information, including online tools that may support 
anonymization, such as VPNs, GUnet, Tor, and encryption-based tools that may allow 
individual users to communicate online without worrying about undue interception or 
losing personal information. It is, in particular, not recommended to fragment the Internet 
by controlling and separating national Internet spaces from the rest of the Internet.
At the international level, the right to freedom of expression (including press freedom 
and the right to information), globally, is universal. However, each national State and cultural 
community has its own understandings of the right. The blocking and censorship of online 
content in one country may also impact on the information available in other countries, 
across the globe. For instance, blocking activities that would have caused many DNS 
corruptions could affect the rest of the world.628 For this reason, the international society 
is not immune to moral responsibilities to promote freedom of expression globally. It is 
therefore recommended for States and international organizations to support: 
• More sharing of good practice in balancing freedom of expression with other rights 
and the role of transparency therein.
• More efforts to provide substantive support to improve freedom of information where 
this is an issue.
• More cooperation in addressing cross-border data protection and conflicts of 
jurisdiction, for instance, in the form of international or regional treaties, or improved 
Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) to set out certain minimum standards for the protection 
of online privacy and freedom of expression.
9.5  Promoting transparency as key to balancing 
Given the significance of transparency in facilitating multiple communal values, including 
those of privacy and freedom of expression, substantial measures could be taken to improve 
transparency in both private and public institutions at the national and international levels. 
This would be achieved by means of such constructs as transparency reports, procedural 
guarantees and monitoring mechanisms, accompanied by stronger protection of the 
citizens’ right to information and the broader right to freedom of expression. Such measures 
and instruments should be integrated in future e-government and e-democracy systems, 
including during the course of their development.
Importantly, more efforts should be spent in exploring the mechanisms and instruments 
that may be used for the balancing of privacy, freedom of expression and transparency 
in the digital age, to resolve the ever-increasing and more complex conflicts that arise 
between them. Good balancing should always be under international human rights 
standards, procedural checks and made in terms of long-run public interest, as opposed to 
any short-term goals held by the individuals and/or parties engaging in such balancing, and 
therefore in the shaping of the future.
628 Thomas Fox-Brewster, “Accidental DDoS? How China’s Censorship Machine Can Cause 
Unintended Web Blackouts”, Forbes, 26 January 2015, available at <http://www.forbes.com/sites/
thomasbrewster/2015/01/26/china-great-firewall-causing-ddos-attacks/>, accessed 11 May 2015.
124
9.6  Consolidated policy recommendations to key actors on 
privacy, free expression and transparency
Seen from the perspective of key actors, the above recommendations can be summarized 
as follows:
For State actors, consideration could be given for more efforts in:
• Updating the legal protection framework to adapt to new circumstances in the 
digital age by clearly-set legislation and the interpretation of law regarding the 
related concept and scope of the rights to privacy and freedom of expression, as well 
as clarifying exemptions and derogations of the two rights. In particular, legitimate 
exceptions and derogations should be narrowly defined and put under procedural 
scrutiny that follows international human rights law and constitutional law standards, 
including those of legitimacy, necessity and proportionality. In the case of hate speech 
online, the Rabat principles can reduce potential damage to legitimate expression. 
The UNESCO R.O.A.M. principles are also important to consider, particularly in regard 
to how any balancing of rights impacts on Openness and Accessibility, and the value 
of multi-stakeholder participation in such balancing;
• Encouraging self-regulation, within the framework of international human rights, of 
the private sector in areas where it does not yet seem appropriate to intervene with 
legislation at the national level; 
• Where appropriate and possible, looking to align national law with emerging legal 
standards possibly through the use of legal instruments such as existing or new 
multinational treaties;
• Improving transparency in future e-governance and e-democracy development 
of public bodies, establishing parameters for the private sector carrying out public 
functions by clear procedural requirements and safeguards;
• Enacting new laws that restrict surveillance, by clarifying related legal duties towards 
users as data subjects and the boundaries in sharing data with law enforcement 
agencies, and providing well-defined procedural safeguards; 
• Encouraging the use of encryption amongst citizens, as well as other technical means 
that enable anonymization, possibly with substantive means—including financial 
subsidies—for software and hardware development;
• Protecting online anonymity by not mandating real name registration, unless such 
registration is necessary to authenticate a user for security reasons and by the user’s 
consent;
• Supporting and encouraging the ICT industry in regard to Privacy Enhancing 
Technologies (PET) development and standard setting for Privacy by Design (PbD) for 
the ICT industry; 
• Stopping support to countries seeking to obtain or develop ICT technologies to 
infringe human rights and taking steps internationally to promote human rights, 
including the two discussed in this report;
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• Taking active measures to improve the protection of citizens’ data and privacy in case 
of data transfer to third countries, including by international cooperation, mutual legal 
assistance instruments, or other possible law instruments;
• Respecting and protect foreigners’ data privacy rights in a world where cross-border 
data flow is so ubiquitous, and also a pre-condition for the well-functioning of the 
global economy and communication; 
•  Advocating for protection of online expression of journalists and social media 
producers of journalism because of the role played by these actors in transparency and 
public life. It is also recommended that new online media and online freelance or other 
reporters be offered protection equating with that offered to professional journalists. 
Additionally, cases of defamation and privacy invasion should have higher thresholds 
for litigation and the granting of remedies when these actors are potential defendants; 
• Raising critical awareness among Internet users, such as by initiating and financing 
special programmes/projects for this purpose. These can encompass public promotion 
activities, public interest advertisements on public media, including TV and radio; and 
special TV programmes; 
• Promoting relevant programmes in educational and other institutions, and in particular 
through what UNESCO calls Media and Information Literacy (MIL). This includes making 
Media and Information Literacy courses as compulsory from primary education, with 
the aim of teaching basic knowledge and skills that would facilitate rights on the 
Internet, and learning a variety of online communication skills and ethics, including in 
relation to the use of SNSs for group communication and expression;
• Reducing the digital divide as well as digital illiteracy, by offering assistance to disabled 
and elderly people, and in particular to citizens from developing countries with 
limited access possibilities, who may have difficulties relating to Internet access and/
or expression in online contexts.
For the private sector and Internet intermediaries, it is recommended that consideration 
be given to: 
• Take substantive measures to foster privacy awareness and promote new know-
now, including by providing more information to customers. As data controllers or 
processors, they should take more active steps to define and employ more privacy 
enhancing technologies (PETs);
• Take more transparency measures wherever possible and appropriate, including 
by means of internal policies and structures, clarified privacy policies, transparency 
reports, and human rights impact assessments; terms of service and implementation 
of content moderation policies should also be transparent and narrowly-defined, and 
opportunities for redress should be offered;
• Follow higher standards aligned to international human rights and improve self-
regulation and co-regulation with regards to the protection and promotion of privacy, 
transparency and freedom of expression;
• Respect the human rights of foreign citizens, including when operating on foreign 
territory, while following local law requirements, and unless it is unlawful to do 
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so, producing relevant transparency reports; promote policies whereby Internet 
intermediaries should be shielded from liability for third party content. 
For international society, including UN organizations, transnational organizations and 
other regional organizations or institutions with international responsibilities, it is important 
to consider to: 
• Continually emphasize the importance of the rights to privacy and free expression in 
the digital age;
• Foster more international and regional cooperation among national authorities to 
enhance the protection of both rights. Such cooperation may be achieved in several 
ways, including by enhancing the possibility of reaching any needed international 
agreements on cross-border data protection, whether in the form of soft law or other 
alternatives;
• Negotiate and develop international standards that deal with privacy and the 
protection of personal data while also trying to minimise on-line surveillance across 
borders; 
• Foster more sharing of good practice in balancing freedom of expression with other 
rights and the role of transparency therein and provide substantive support to improve 
freedom of information where this is an issue;
• Take positive actions, along with other actors including national States, Internet 
security organizations and technical communities, to avoid cyber-attacks that violate 
freedom of expression and/or privacy. Cyber-attacks should be prevented with all 
means by international cooperation of related countries to avoid further occurrence 
or escalation;
• Improve digital literacy as a life skill within Media and Information Literacy and reduce 
the digital divide by providing inter alia educational measures, especially in developing 
countries.
For the technical community, it is recommended to consider to:
• Develop and promote technical solutions to enhance privacy protection as alternative 
or complementary measures to regulatory and self-regulatory steps. From the 
outset of their tasks, privacy concerns must be identified and mitigated early and 
comprehensively and Privacy Enhancing Technologies should be adopted and 
integrated;
• Promote additional technical means that would enable and/or enhance freedom of 
expression, including freedom of information, including online tools that may support 
anonymization, such as VPNs, GUnet, Tor, and encryption-based tools that may allow 
individual users to communicate online without worrying about undue interception 
or losing personal information; 
• Not fragment the Internet into national intranets. 
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For civil society and individual users:
• Civil society should continue to promote the rights to privacy and freedom of 
expression in the digital age, empowering citizens about these rights, and monitoring 
violations of these rights in both the digital and non-digital realms;
• Civil society organizations play an important role too in representing their consumers 
in litigation, providing organizational and operational skills for collective privacy 
promoting activities and in presenting the individual’s interests in the law and policy-
making processes, bridging potential gaps left by the private sector and public bodies. 
They should be encouraged and supported to take additional roles in the future policy 
and law-making processes in Internet Governance to represent individual end users;
• Individual users should have more awareness of both rights and make efforts to 
improve their Media and Information Literacy; e.g. competencies in Internet literacy, 
privacy literacy, ethical literacy and digital security; 
• Take cognisance that the two rights assessed in this Report are also considered in 
UNESCO’s 2015 Internet Study “Keystones to foster inclusive Knowledge Societies”629, 
which provides the Internet Universality concept630 which has been endorsed by 
UNESCO’s 195 Member States in November 2015. In terms of this concept, the 
reconciling of free expression and privacy rights where needed should also take 
account of intersections with the principles of Openness and Accessibility, as well as 
be undertaken in a multi-stakeholder modality. This can inform the broader process of 
decision making in the Internet Universality perspective. 
629 http://www.unesco.org/new/en/internetstudy
630 http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-and-information/crosscutting-priorities/unesco-internet-
study/internet-universality/
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Abbreviatons and acronyms
ACHR  American Convention of Human Rights
APEC  Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
AR  African Region
BCRs  Binding Corporate Rules
CBPR  Cross Border Privacy Rules
CCTV  Closed Circuit Television
CEDAW  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women 
CoE  Council of Europe
COPPA  Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act
CRC   Convention on the Rights of the Child – or – Committee on the Rights  
of the Child
DDoS  Distributed Denial-of-Service 
DNS  Domain Name System
DPA  Data Protection Authority
DPD  Data Protection Directive
DPI  Deep Package Inspection
EaaS  Everything as a Service
ECJ  European Court of Justice
ECOWAS  Economic Community West African States
ECtHR  European Court of Human Rights
ENISA  European Union Agency for Network and Information Security
EU  European Union
FISA  Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
FOI  Freedom of Information 
FTC  Federal Trade Commission
GC  General Comment
GFW  Great Firewall 
GNI  Global Network Initiative
GPS  Geographical Positioning System
HIPPA  Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
HRC  Human Rights Committee
IaaS  Infrastructure as a Service
IAB  Internet Architecture Board
IACHR  Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
ICAAN  Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
ICCPR  International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
ICERD   International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination
ICESCR  International Covenant of Cultural, Economic and Social Rights
ICTs  Information Communication Technologies
IETF  Internet Engineering Task Force
IG  Internet Governance
INGOs  International Non-governmental Organizations
IoP  Internet of People
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IoT  Internet of Things
IP  Internet Protocol
ISPs  Internet Service Providers
IT  Information Technology
ITU  International Telecommunication Union
IXP  Internet Exchange Point
LEAs  Law Enforcement Agencies
LGBTI  Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex
LSAs  Intelligence Service Agencies
MLAT  Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty
NGOs  Non-governmental Organizations
NSA  National Security Agency
OAS  Organization of American States
OECD  Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHCHR  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
OPA  Online Privacy Alliances
PaaS  Platform as a Service
PbD  Privacy by Design
PC Personal Computer
PETs Privacy-Enhancing Technologies
PHI Protected Health Information
PII Personable Identifiable Information
PITs Privacy-Invading Technologies
PNRs Passenger Name Records
RFID Radio-Frequency Identification
RTI Right to Information
RUDs Reservations, understandings, and declarations
SARS Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
SIS Secret Intelligence Services
SMEs Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
SNP Social Network Platform
SNS Social Networking Services
TEU Treaty on European Union
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UPN  User Principal Name
U.S.A.  United States of America
VPNs  Virtual Private Networks
WGIG  Working Group Internet Governance
WSIS  World Summit on Information Society
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Appendix 1: UNESCO Connecting the Dots Outcome Document
Outcome document
The “CONNECTing the Dots: Options for Future Action” Conference held at UNESCO 
Headquarters 3-4 March 2015, 
Noted the potential of the Internet to advance human progress towards inclusive Knowledge 
Societies, and the important role of UNESCO in fostering this development within the 
wider ecosystem of actors, 
Affirmed the human rights principles that underpin UNESCO’s approach to Internet-related 
issues, specifically that the same rights that people have offline must be protected 
online as per Human Rights Council resolution A/HRC/RES/26/13;
Recalled Resolution 52 of the 37th session of the General Conference, which mandated a 
consultative multi-stakeholder study with options for consideration of Member States, to 
be reported to the 38th General Conference within the framework of UNESCO’s work on 
the World Summit on the Information Society,
Further recalled the establishment of principles in guiding documents that include the 
article 12 and 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and article 17 and 19 in 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; 
And, having reviewed the draft of the UNESCO consultative study, 
Commend continued work on the related options below, and look forward to UNESCO 
Member States deliberations on them:
1.  Overarching options for UNESCO 
1.1  Considering the Final Statement of the first WSIS+10 conference, endorsed 
by the 37th General Conference, affirm the on-going value of the World 
Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) outcomes, including the Internet 
Governance Forum (IGF), for the post-2015 development agenda, Internet 
governance issues, and the role and work of UNESCO;
1.2  Affirm that the fundamental human rights to freedom of opinion and 
expression, and its corollary of press freedom and the right of access to 
information, and the right to peaceful assembly, and the right to privacy, are 
enablers of the post-2015 development agenda;
1.3  Also affirm that increasing access to information and knowledge across 
society, assisted by the availability of information and communication 
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technologies (ICTs), supports sustainable development and improves people’s 
lives; 
1.4  Promote the alignment of Internet-related laws, policies and protocols with 
international human rights law;
1.5  Support the Internet Universality principles (R.O.A.M) that promote a Human 
Rights-based, Open Internet is Accessible to all and characterized by Multi-
stakeholder participation; 
1.6  Strengthen the cross-cutting role of the Internet in all of UNESCO 
programmatic activities, including Priority Africa, Priority Gender Equality, 
support to Small Islands Developing States and Least Developed Countries, 
as well as in UNESCO’s leadership of the International Decade for the 
Rapprochement of Cultures.
2.  Options for UNESCO related to the field of Access to Information and Knowledge:
2.1  Foster universal, open, affordable and unfettered access to information and 
knowledge, and narrowing the digital divide, including the gender gap, and 
encourage open standards, raise awareness and monitor progress;
2.2  Advocate for ICT policies that enhance access guided by governance 
principles that ensure openness, transparency, accountability, multilingualism, 
inclusiveness, gender equality, and civil participation including for youth, 
persons with disabilities, marginalized and vulnerable groups;
2.3  Support innovative approaches to facilitate citizen involvement in the 
development, implementation and monitoring of the Sustainable 
Development Goals, as agreed at the UN General Assembly;
2.4  Promote universal access to information and knowledge and ICTs by 
encouraging the creation of public access facilities, and by supporting users of 
all types to develop their capabilities to use the Internet as creators and users 
of information and knowledge;
2.5  Reaffirm the important contribution provided by open access to scholarly, 
scientific and journalistic information, open government data, and free and 
open source software, towards the building of open knowledge resources; 
2.6  Explore the potential of the Internet for cultural diversity. 
3.  Options for UNESCO related to the field of Freedom of Expression
3.1  Urge Member States and other actors to protect, promote and implement 
international human rights law on free expression and the free flow of 
information and ideas on the Internet;
3.2  Reaffirm that freedom of expression applies, and should be respected, 
online and offline in accordance with Article 19 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) that any limitation on freedom of information must 
comply with international human rights law as outlined by Article 19(3) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
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3.3  Support safety for journalists, media workers, and social media producers who 
generate a significant amount of journalism, and reaffirm the importance 
of the rule of law to combat impunity in cases of attacks on freedom of 
expression and journalism on or off the Internet;
3.4  Noting the relevance to the Internet and digital communications of the 
international Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW), and the work of the Office of the High Commissioner on Human 
Rights, concerning the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial or religious 
hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence 
(Rabat Plan of Action 2012), promote educational and social mechanisms 
for combating online hate speech, without using this to restrict freedom of 
expression;
3.5  Continue dialogue on the important role that Internet intermediaries have in 
promoting and protecting freedom of expression;
 4.  Options for UNESCO related to Privacy
4.1  Support research to assess the impacts on privacy of digital interception, 
collection, storage and use of data, as well as other emerging trends; 
4.2  Reaffirm that the right to privacy applies and should be respected online and 
offline in accordance with Article 12 of the UDHR and Article 17 of the ICCPR 
and support as relevant within UNESCO’s mandate, the efforts related to UN 
General Assembly Resolution A/RES/69/166 on the Right to Privacy in the 
Digital Age;
4.3  Support best practices and efforts made by Member States and other 
stakeholders to address security and privacy concerns on the Internet in 
accordance with their international human rights obligations and consider in 
this respect the key role played by actors in the private sector; 
4.4  Recognise the role that anonymity and encryption can play as enablers of 
privacy protection and freedom of expression, and facilitate dialogue on these 
issues.
4.5  Share best practices in approaches to collecting personal information that 
is legitimate, necessary and proportionate, and that minimizes personal 
identifiers in data;
4.6  Support initiatives that promote peoples’ awareness of the right to privacy 
online and the understanding of the evolving ways in which governments 
and commercial enterprises collect, use, store and share information, as well 
as the ways in which digital security tools can be used to protect users’ privacy 
rights;
4.7  Support efforts to protect personal data which provide users with security, 
respect for their rights, and redress mechanisms, and which strengthen trust in 
new digital services. 
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5.  Options for UNESCO related to Ethical dimension of the Information Society
5.1  Promote human rights-based ethical reflection, research and public dialogue 
on the implications of new and emerging technologies and their potential 
societal impacts;
5.2  Incorporate, as a core component in educational content and resources, 
including life-long learning programmes, that support the understanding and 
practice of human rights-based ethical reflection and its role in both online 
and offline life; 
5.3  Enable girls and women take full advantage of the potential of the Internet for 
gender equality through taking proactive measures to remove barriers, both 
online and offline, and promoting their equal participation;
5.4  Support policy makers in enhancing their capacity to address the human 
right-based ethical aspects of inclusive knowledge societies by providing 
relevant training and resources;
5.5  In recognition of the trans-boundary nature of the Internet, promote global 
citizenship education, regional and international cooperation, capacity-
building, research, the exchange of best practices and development of a 
broad understanding and capabilities to respond to its ethical challenges.
6.  Options for UNESCO related to cross-cutting issues:
6.1  Promote the integration of UNESCO’s expertise on Media and Information 
Literacy (MIL) into formal and informal education systems, in recognition of 
the important roles that digital literacy and facilitating universal access to 
information on the Internet, play in the promotion of the right to education, as 
enumerated in Human Rights Council, Resolution 26/13;
6.2  Recognize the need for enhanced protection of the confidentiality of sources 
of journalism in the digital age;
6.3  Support Member States as requested in the harmonization of relevant 
domestic laws, policies and practices with international human rights law;
6.4  Support transparency and public participation in the development and 
implementation of policies and practices amongst all actors in the information 
society.
6.5  Promote research into law, policy, regulatory frameworks and the use of the 
Internet, including relevant indicators in the key areas of the study.
6.6  Promote UNESCO’s participation in discussions on Network Neutrality as 
relevant to the fields of access to information and knowledge and freedom of 
expression.
7.  Options related to UNESCO role
7.1  Reinforce UNESCO’s contributions and leadership within the UN system, 
including continued implementation of the WSIS outcomes, the WSIS+10 
review, the IGF and the post-2015 development agenda;
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7.2  Engage as relevant with partners outside of the UN system, such as individual 
governments, civil society, news media, academia, private sector, technical 
community and individual users; including by providing expert advice, sharing 
of experience, creating fora for dialogue, and fostering development and 
empowerment of users to develop their capacities; 
7.3  Support Member States in ensuring that Internet policy and regulation 
involves the participation of all stakeholders, and integrates international 
human rights and gender equality.
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Appendix 2: UNESCO Concept paper on Internet Universality
Internet Universality: A Means Towards Building Knowledge 
Societies and the Post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda
2 September 2013
Abstract
UNESCO’s Communication and Information Sector is canvassing a new concept of “Internet 
Universality”, which could serve to highlight, holistically, the continued conditions for 
progress towards the Knowledge Society and the elaboration of the Post-2015 Sustainable 
Development Agenda. The concept includes, but also goes beyond, universal access to the 
Internet, mobile and ICTs. The word “Universality” points to four fundamental norms that 
have been embodied in the broad evolution of the Internet to date, and which provide 
a comprehensive way to understand how multiple different aspects are part of a wider 
whole. For the Internet to fulfill its historic potential, it needs to achieve fully-fledged 
“Universality” based upon the strength and interdependence of the following: (i)  the 
norm that the Internet is Human Rights-based (which in this paper is the substantive 
meaning of a “free Internet”), (ii) the norm that it is “Open”, (iii) the norm that highlights 
“Accessible to All”, and (iv) the norm that it is nurtured by Multi-takeholder Participation. 
The four norms can be summarized by the mnemonic R – O – A – M (Rights, Openness, 
Accessibility, Multi-stakeholder). The “Internet Universality” concept has very specific value 
for UNESCO in particular. By building on UNESCO’s existing positions on the Internet, the 
concept of “Internet Universality” can help frame much of UNESCO’s Internet-related work 
in Education, Culture, Natural and Social Sciences and Communication-Information for 
the strategic period of 2014-2021. As regards global debates on Internet governance, the 
“Internet Universality” concept can help UNESCO facilitate international multi-stakeholder 
cooperation, and it can also help to highlight what the Organization can bring to the Post-
2015 Sustainable Development Agenda.
 
By: Division of Freedom of Expression and Media Development
Communication and Information Sector631
* An integral version of this paper in all UN offcial languages is online at:
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-and-information/crosscutting-priorities/
unesco-internet-study/internet-universality/
631 Incorporating insights from UNESCO Inter-sectoral and external consultations. We also thank Ms Constance 
Bommelaer for her contribution to the development of the concept.
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Summary version (4 pages)
1.  Why a concept of “Internet Universality”?
UNESCO has long recognized that the Internet has enormous potential to bring the 
world closer to peace, sustainable development and the eradication of poverty.632 As 
an international intergovernmental organization that operates with a global remit and 
promotes values that are universal, UNESCO has a logical connection to the Internet’s 
“universality”. This “universality” can be understood as the common thread that runs through 
four key social dimensions pertaining to the Internet, namely the extent to which this 
facility is based on universal norms of being: (i) Human Rights-based (and therefore free); 
(ii) Open; (iii) Accessible to All; and (iv) Multi-stakeholder Participation. The four norms can 
be summarized by the mnemonic R – O – A – M (Rights, Openness, Accessibility, Multi-
stakeholder).
Various stakeholders have characterized the Internet according to what they perceive as its 
essential features, highlighting one or other aspects such as freedom of expression, open 
architecture, security issues, online ethics, etc.633 What this range of conceptualisations 
illustrates is both the diversity of concerns and interests, as well as the multi-faceted character 
of the Internet itself. In turn, this prompts the question as to the possibility of understanding 
how the various considerations and dimensions relate to each other and to the wider whole. 
As a method to conceptualize this bigger picture, UNESCO is now canvassing the concept 
of “Internet Universality”, which could serve as a macro-concept. The purpose is to capture 
the enduring essentials of the vast, complex and evolving Internet, and which facilitates a 
comprehensive understanding of where and how different parties, and especially UNESCO, 
relate to the Internet. The concept could particularly serve as an enabling perspective in the 
context of the increasing centrality of Internet to societies, and specifically the increasing 
“Internetization” of education, the sciences, culture and communication-information.
As well as identifying four distinctive norms that have special interest to UNESCO, the 
concept of “Internet Universality” groups these under a single integrated heading in a 
way that affords recognition of their mutually reinforcing and interdependent character. 
Without such a comprehensive intellectual device, it would otherwise be hard to grasp 
interconnections amongst UNESCO’s Internet-related work and how it contributes to 
Knowledge Societies and the Post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda. 
As regards UNESCO’s involvement in global debates, the concept of “Internet Universality” 
can be considered for its potential as a unifying, consolidated and comprehensive 
framework. On the one hand, it highlights the freedom and human rights principles as 
shared by those existing notions such as “Internet freedom”; on the other hand, it also 
632 For example: “Reflection and Analysis by UNESCO on the Internet: UNESCO and the use of Internet in its 
domains of competence” (2011). http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/ED/ICT/pdf/
useinternetdomains.pdf.
633 For example, there have been different emphases at the Stockholm Forum, the Freedom Online Coalition 
on Cyberspace, Wilton Park, and the London and Budapest conferences on Cyberspace. Similarly, the 
Internet has been analyzed diversely by international organisations. Examples here are: the Council of 
Europe’s “Recommendation CM/Rec(2011)8 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the 
protection and promotion of the universality, integrity and openness of the Internet” (2011), the OECD 
Council Recommendation on Principles for Internet Policy Making (2011), the OSCE Representative on 
Freedom of the Media Recommendations from the Internet 2013 Conference (2013); the ICC Policy 
Statement on “The freedom of expression and the free flow of information on the Internet”, and the 
Internet Rights and Principles Coalition’s “Internet Rights & Principles Charter” (2010). 
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provides an umbrella to address the intertwined issues of access and use, as well as the 
matters of technical and economic openness. In addition, the concept also encompasses 
multi-stakeholder engagement as an integral component. In this inclusive way, the “Internet 
Universality” concept can therefore be a bridging and foresighted framework for dialogue 
between North and South and among different stakeholders. As such, it could also make 
a unique contribution to shaping global Internet governance discourse and the post-2015 
Sustainable Development Agenda.
2.  Unpacking the concept of “Internet Universality” 
The linking of four normative components of the “universality” of the Internet builds closely 
upon prior UNESCO thinking about the Internet which includes:
• Recommendation on the Promotion and Use of Multilingualism and Universal Access to 
Cyberspace (2003).634 (This document particularly points to the accessibility norm, as 
well as the need to balance rights).
• Reflection and Analysis by UNESCO on the Internet (2011).635 (This document highlights 
normative work in relation to UNESCO’s programmes, and multi-stakeholder 
participation).
• Final Recommendations of WSIS+10 review event, and the Final Statement of the WSIS+10 
review event (2013).636 (These cover rights, access, openness, and multi-stakeholder 
issues).
• UNGIS (UN Group on the Information Society) Joint Statement on the Post-2015 Sustainable 
Development Agenda (2013).637 (This document highlights the importance of the social 
conditions for Information and Communication Technologies in general, and the 
Internet in particular, to contribute to inclusive Knowledge Societies). 
“Internet Universality” integrates a range of existing UNESCO insights and shows the link 
between the Internet and what UNESCO has already recognised638 as the underlying key 
principles of Knowledge Societies: freedom of expression, quality education for all, universal 
access to information and knowledge, and respect for cultural and linguistic diversity. In 
this way, the concept highlights what is needed for the Internet to be a means towards 
achieving Knowledge Societies. It serves as a heuristic to highlight that the Internet’s 
character and utility entail technical, social, legal, economic and other arrangements which 
in turn depend on particular norms that underpin the positive potentiality of this facility. 
Considered in more depth, the R – O – A – M norms constitutive of “Internet Universality” 
(Rights, Openness, Accessibility, Multi-stakeholder) can be understood as follows:
634 http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-and-information/about-us/how-we-work/strategy-and-
programme/promotion-and-use-of-multilingualism-and-universal-access-to-cyberspace/.
635 http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001920/192096e.pdf; 
636 Documents from the First WSIS+10 Review Event, “Towards Knowledge Societies for Peace and Sustainable 
Development”, Paris 25-27 February, 2013: http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CI/
CI/pdf/wsis/WSIS_10_Event/wsis10_recommendations_en.pdf; http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/
MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CI/CI/pdf/wsis/WSIS_10_Event/wsis10_final_statement_en.pdf
637 http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CI/CI/pdf/wsis/ungis_joint_statement_
wsis_2013.pdf.
638 Reflection and Analysis by UNESCO on the Internet, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/.
images/0019/001920/192096e.pdf.
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(i)  By identifying the Internet’s connection to Human Rights-based norms as constituents 
of freedom, “Internet Universality” helps to emphasize continued harmony between 
the growth and use of the Internet and human rights. A free Internet in this sense 
means one that respects and enables the freedom to exercise human rights.639 In this 
regard, “Internet Universality” enjoins us to consider the gamut of interdependencies 
and inter-relationships between different human rights and the Internet – such as 
freedom of expression, privacy, cultural participation, gender equality, association, 
security, education, etc.
(ii)  “Internet Universality” also highlights the norm of the Internet being Open. This 
designation recognizes the importance of technological issues such as open standards, 
as well as standards of open access to knowledge and information. Openness also 
signals the importance of ease of entry of actors and the absence of closure that might 
otherwise be imposed through monopolies.
(iii)  Accessible to All as a norm for “Internet Universality” raises issues of technical access 
and availability, as well as digital divides such as based on economic income and urban-
rural inequalities. Thus it points to the importance of norms around universal access to 
minimum levels of connectivity infrastructure. At the same time, “accessibility” requires 
engaging with social exclusions from the Internet based on factors such as literacy, 
language, class, gender, and disability. Further, understanding that people access the 
Internet as producers of content, code and applications, and not just as consumers 
of information and services, the issue of user competencies is part of the accessibility 
dimension of “Universality”. This highlights UNESCO’s notion of Media and Information 
Literacy which enhances accessibility by empowering Internet users to engage 
critically, competently and ethically. 
(iv)  The Internet in this sense cannot only be seen from the “supply side”, but needs a 
complimentary “user-centric” perspective. The Participatory, and specifically the Multi-
stakeholder engagement, dimension of “Internet Universality” facilitates sense-making 
of the roles that different agents (representing different sectors as well as different 
social and economic status, and not excluding women and girls) have played, and 
need to continue to play, in developing and governing the Internet on a range of levels. 
Participation is essential to the value that the facility can have for peace, sustainable 
development and poverty eradication. In bridging contesting stakeholder interests, 
participative mechanisms contribute to shared norms that mitigate abuses of the 
Internet. “Universality” here highlights shared governance of the Internet. 
These norms for these four aspects are distinct, but they also reinforce each other. Rights 
without accessibility would be limited to the few; accessibility without rights would stunt 
the potential of access. Openness allows for sharing and innovation, and it complements 
respect for rights and accessibility. Multi-stakeholder participation helps guarantee the 
other three norms. Overall, an Internet that falls short of respecting human rights, openness, 
accessibility or multi-stakeholder participation would by definition be far less than universal. 
639 In this manner, “Internet Universality” accords with the Report of UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion 
and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression and also echoes the first resolution on 
“promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet” passed by UN Human Rights 
Council in 2012.
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3.  How the concept of “Internet Universality” is relevant to UNESCO
UNESCO has a unique role in promoting “Internet Universality”. It is the UN agency with 
a mandate that spans social life at large and, within this, has programs that involve the 
Internet in education, culture, science, social sciences and communication-information. By 
using “Internet Universality” as an umbrella concept, UNESCO can position more specific 
concerns such as mobile learning, education for girls, cultural and linguistic diversity, media 
and information literacy, research into climate change, freedom of expression, universal 
access to information, bioethics and social inclusion, etc. In this way, “Internet Universality” 
can also support the priorities of Gender Equality and Africa. It can serve as an over-arching, 
integrating framework for Internet-related work across UNESCO, establishing a common 
frame of reference for all. Operationally the concept can elevate a range of work to the 
status of initiatives that jointly advance “Internet Universality”. It can encourage synergies 
and inter-sectoral co-operation and joint programming. In particular, the concept can 
enhance understanding of the mid-term strategy of 2014-2021 (37/C4) and the quadrennial 
program (37/C5). 
4.  Conclusion
“Internet Universality” accords with the Organization’s service to the wider international 
community in the following respects: 
• Laboratory of ideas, including foresight – elaborating the concept is directly relevant 
to UNESCO’s creative and think-tank potential; 
• By stimulating global debate, “Internet Universality” illustrates how UNESCO can be a 
catalyst for international cooperation, with a holistic and inclusive approach. 
• Standard-setter – if the concept gained traction broadly, it could inform the 
development of standards for monitoring progress in “Internet Universality” 
• As a normative framework that can inform policies, and draw in public and private, civil 
society and decision-makers, “Internet Universality” can help UNESCO fulfill its role as a 
capacity-builder in Member States.
Looking ahead, “Internet Universality” could follow in the footsteps of previous influential 
intellectual work by UNESCO such as the concepts of “Intangible cultural heritage” 
and “Knowledge Societies”. Because “Internet Universality” represents an updated 
conceptualization of the era, the concept could become a valuable contribution to the 
global discussion about this complex and dynamic human creation and serve to enhance 
Internet’s continued contribution to humanity’s shared future. 
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